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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1S75 I was completing my Master's degree in
Political Science at St. Louis University along with
satisfying requirements in the Department of Education
in order to obtain certification as a secondary school
instructor.

At this time I also was employed as a

residence counselor and lived in a college dormitory.
This employment provided numerous opportunities for
interactions with young adults. Through conversations I
noted that late adolescents' discussions of moral issues
and their questions regarding the morality of their
personal behaviors were closely linked to developmental
issues.

As a seminarian I was naturally attracted to

discussions about morality.

In addition,

however, I

sensed my own academic interests were in a state
of transition.

I became increasingly dissatisfied with

the content of my Political Science courses; rather,
what did stimulate my intellectual interests were
counseling issues as well as questions pertaining to
human development.
During my assignment as an instructor in social
science and as a counselor at a Jesuit secondary school
1
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in Denver Colorado, I observed that high school youth,
at a more rudimentary level than their college
counterparts, shared the same developmental issues.
That is, moral questions and concerns frequently were
tied to developmental issues.

For me, this observation

proved a catalyst for later academic pursuits.

I began

to read avidly in the area of developmental psychology
in general, and moral development in particular.
specifically the writings of Lawrence Kohlberg began to
occupy my time.

Yet, while I was reading, I sensed

a growing discontent with the framework in which
psychology, particularly the cognitive-developmental
approach, interpreted morality.

My own observations of

and interactions with adolescents led me to conclude
that another approach needed to be pursued.

Moreover,

the adolescent's moral development, I thought, was more
properly viewed as an attempt to develop and sustain
caring responses in the midst of everyday functioning.
Throughout my three-year teaching assignment in Denver
and subsequent four years of graduate theological
studies leading to my Master of Divinity degree as well
as through my first three years of doctoral studies in
Clinical Psychology, I have reflected on the issue of
adolescent moral development, particularly how such
development can be reconciled with the Christian
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religious tradition and, more specifically, the efforts
of religious educators to focus on the development of
the moral self.

In essence, this dissertation sets

forth, from a psychological perspective, a way to
conceptualize morality that brings together
psychological theories of morality and the concerns of
religious education.
Recently, few topics have generated as much
interest among psychologists and educators as
"morality."

The questioning of cultural norms in the

seventies (as exemplified by the Vietnam War and
Watergate), youth's demand for "honesty" and
"authenticity" in relational concerns, and the
questioning and challenging of formerly sacrosanct
values (e.g., traditional sex-roles, interpersonal and
sexual behaviors, acceptance of legal and political
authority) have converged to stimulate questioning as to
what constitutes morality for youth today.

Answers to

the question--what is morality?--continue to occupy the
time of developmental psychologists, theologians, and
educators.
Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) cognitive-developmental

view represents the most theoretically advanced and
empirically scrutinized perspective on morality advanced
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thus far.

Even so, numerous criticisms of his theory

(e.g., Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984) have led theorists to
consider other approaches.

In order to delineate

everyday morality in adolescence, attention must first
be given to the merits and limitations of this dominant
theoretical perspective as set forth by Kohlberg.
Chapter II provides a critical reading of this theory.
By exploring the tenets of Kohlberg's theory and
addressing salient criticisms, the need for an
alternative view of morality

emerges.

Moreover, a

critical examination of Kohlberg's theory suggests that
explicit attention be given to the religious dimensions
of human experience.

Recently, Bergin (1980) has

criticized the non-religious character of clinical and
counseling psychology.

It is equally important,

however, that developmental theory, particularly moral
developmental theory, be asked to address this
challenge.
More recently, Rest (1983, 1984, 1985; Carroll &
Rest, 1982) has proposed that a fully developed view of
morality must incorporate four components.

These

components of morality are:
1. Recognition and sensitivity:
translating and
disambiguating a given social situation so as to be
aware that a moral problem exists; to be sensitive
enough to recognize that someone's welfare is at
stake;
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2. Moral judgment: determining what ideally ought
to be done. in the situation, what one's moral
ideals call for or which moral norms apply in the
given circumstances;
3. Values and influences: devising a plan of
action with one's moral ideal in mind but also
taking into account non-moral values and goals
which the situation may activate;
4.
Execution and implementation of moral action:
behaving in accordance with one's goal despite
distractions, impediments, and incidental
adjustments; organizing and sustaining behavior to
realize one's goals.
(Carroll & Rest, 1982, p.
434)

Rest (1983) maintains that psychologists have opted
to view only one or more of these components, yet have
neglected to consider all four components of morality
simultaneously as integral for morality; consequently,
the complexity of morality is underestimated.

At the

same time, religious educators' focus on prescriptive
behaviors (Component II) most likely narrows their own
vision and precludes them from discerning the numerous
factors suggested in Rest's model which undoubtedly
influence a person's moral behavior.

Rest asserts that

''we need to attempt a fuller, more complicated, more
integrated picture of morality and to envision how the
part processes are organized'' (p. 558).
From another perspective, Martin Hoffman has
provided a different focus for morality.

According to

Hoffman, empathy emerges as a catalyst for stimulating
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prosocial behavior.

The contrast of Kohlberg's and

Hoffman's theories highlights a fundamental limitation
of each approach.

Though Kohlberg defines a valued

ideal (the justice principle), there exists no human
mechanism in his theory to account for why people
behave morally.

On the other hand, Hoffman adequately

explores the human element required for prosocial

responding (i.e., empathy), yet he fails to provide a
valued principle which directs one's prosocial
responses.

Chapter III delineates Hoffman's theory of

empathic morality as well as the limitations of his
approach. Relatedly, Chapter IV formulates a perspective
of morality termed everyday morality (Shelton, 1985,
Shelton & McAdams, in press) which incorporates
Hoffman's empathic perspective and addresses Rest's
concerns for a more integrated and fully developed view
of morality.

Moreover, this chapter critically examines

the similarities and differences between everyday
morality and what Haan (Haan, Aerts & Cooper, 1985) has
come to call interactional morality.
Nonetheless, there remains the need to reorient
everyday morality in terms of Rest's call for a more
fully integrated view of morality.

A critical reading

of his writing points out both the merits of his
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conceptual scheme and the need to set forth "processes"
that fulfill his criteria.

Chapter Vis an examination

of "processes" which allow for the development of the
adolescent's everyday morality.

Situated within the

context of an everyday morality, these processes
reconcile Kohlberg's need for a human mechanism as well
as Hoffman's lack of a directional focus for empathic

responding.

Furthermore, these processes are sensitive

to the concerns of religious educators (e.g., Groome),
which heretofore have been absent in the developmental
literature.

An application of this process is provided

in Chapter VI with special emphasis given to adolescent
social morality.
In sum, this study will look to a different focus
of morality than Kohlberg's moral orientation which is
centered around one's understanding of justice.
Specifically,

in contrast to the notion of justice,

morality will be framed in a prosocial context and be
concerned with prosocial acts as they commonly occur in
everyday life (thus this morality is termed everyday
morality).

In order to study everyday morality during

the adolescent years, Rest's component process model is
utilized.

Moreover, the features set forth in the

examination of Rest's model will be termed "morality
of the heart.

11

It is the morality of the heart whi.ch
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fosters and sustains the adolescent's attempt to care
for others.
A Final Comment

Finally, this dissertation provides a broad view of
adolescence.

An acceptable definition of adolescence is

stated by the American Psychiatric Association (cited in
Nicholi, 1978):
a chronological period beginning with the
physical and emotional processes leading to
sexual and psychosocial maturity and ending at
an ill-defined time when the individual
achieves independence and social productivity.
This period is associated with rapid physical,
psychological and social changes. (p. 519)
More specifically, however, this dissertation is focused
on secondary school youth; as a consequence, adolescence
is limited to this population.

As a result, given this

focus, the meaning of this study for specific segments
or sub-populations of adolescents (e.g., the mentally
retarded, drop outs) is unclear.
In addition, morality (which will be discussed more
fully in Chapter IV) is defined as behavior which
benefits others.

The word "religious" is consonant with

the theistic value system as set forth by Bergin (1980).
Numerous ideas as to the nature of morality as well
as the enormous research findings necessitate the need
to develop some means for organization.

More to the

point, Rest has proposed what he terms a component
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process model for investigating morality.

In this

study, Rest's means of conceptualizing morality will be
utilized.
The integration of disciplines has become the norm
rather than the exception for research pertaining to
morality (Carroll & Rest, 1982; Kurtines & Gewirtz,
1984).

Increasingly, approaches to the study of

morality must seek to incorporate psychological,
educational, and philosophical concerns.

"Altogether,

investigation of everyday morality is a transdisciplinary venture that best includes psychology
and philosophy as well as those social science
disciplines that focus on human collectivities" (Haan,
1982, p. 1103).

With an eye towards this end, this

study provides an integration of the available
literature and sets forth a view of morality that is
germane to the adolescent's experience and which
addresses the research concerns of psychologists and
educators.

In turn, it is hoped that this study will

generate future empirical research as well as stimulate
constructive interventions for professionals who work
with adolescents.

CHAPTER II
THE KOHLBERG LEGACY
Questions of moral meaning have always been an
essential focus for human inquiry
the same time, emphasis on

(Staub, 1978).

At

the function, maintenance,

and continuity of human societies necessitates
discussion as to
Staub, 1978).

the nature of morality.

(Rest, 1983;

Thus, "although the specific definitions

may vary, there is an acknowledgment that morality
constitutes the basic fabric of societal and
interpersonal relations" (Colangelo, 1985, p. 244).
Pointing to this universal consensus, Berkowitz and Oser
(1985) observe that in any poll-taking venture, few
people would vote against morality although considerable
disagreement would ensue as to what are morality's
essential elements.
Moreover, psychologists note that individuals
attempt to view themselves as moral persons (Guidano &
Liotti, 1983; Haan, et al., 1985; Kagan, 1984).

The

importance of morality for people's lives has not gone
unnoticed in social science theorizing.

Psychology's

relationship to the study of morality has led Haan
(1982) to conclude that "issues concerning moral
10
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meanings in people's lives can not be ignored if social
science is to be complete and competent" (p. 1096).
Among psychological explanations of morality, Lawrence
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach has been
dominant, although other approaches
(e.g., Kurtines & Greif, 1984).

have surfaced

In earlier writings,

Haan gives credit to Kohlberg's empirically rich
formulation of the justice principle, but in her most
recent work it is dismissed as ill-defined; furthermore,
the meaning of morality, she maintains, lacks a unified
consensus in the social science community.

Having

rejected Kohlberg 1 s cognitive-structural approach, Haan
has championed a notion of morality which she terms
"everyday morality."

Haan construes this morality as

meaning how individuals act morally in their everyday
lives (Chapter IV sets forth a definition of everyday
morality for the present study).

She cautiously offers

the hope that social science in general, and psychology
in particular, can profit from a redirected effort to
investigate the importance of morality for people's
everyday lives.
Haan's call for an everyday morality has heuristic
appeal; recently, she has offered a more understanding
yet equally incisive crjtigue of Kohlberg's theory (Haan
et al., 1985).

Still, any psychological discussion of
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morality can ill afford to take lightly Kohlberg's
contribution.

Indeed, discussion of the psychological

meaning of morality must proceed from an understanding
of both the merits and inadequacies of Kohlberg's
approach.

His significance for a psychology of morality

arises for two reasons.

First, Kohlberg has provided

psychological research with the most theoretically
integrated and empirically tested theory of morality.
Thus, psychological investigations of morality must
consider his approach before offering alternatives.
Secondly,

Kohlberg 1 s moral theory, among all

psychological theories of morality, enjoys broad support
in educational, philosophical, and religious circles
(Berkowitz & Oser, 1985; Muson, 1979).

Woodward and

Lord (1976) report that over 5,000 school districts have
utilized aspects of Kohlberg's theory in their
curricula.

Accordingly, in order to explore a

psychological understanding of morality for the
adolescent's everyday life, attention must first be
given to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view.
The Bac~round for Kohlb~'s Theo;:-y
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach (1975,
1978, 1981, 1984) is the most ambitious attempt to date
at delineating a psychological view of morality.
catalyst for Kohlberg's research was the apparent

A
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previous failure of psychologists and educators to set
forth a universal and empirically valid moral theory.
According to Kohlberg, two movements in particular
typified the failure to generate a viable moral theory.
These movements were the character studies undertaken by
Hartshorne and May {Hartshorne & May, 1928; Hartshorne,
May, & Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, & Shuttleworth,

1930) and the value education movement of the 1960s
(e.g., Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972).

In regards

to the latter, Kohlberg has rejected the values
clarification approach (e.g., Martin, 1982; Simon, Howe,
&

Kirschenbaum, 1972).

Briefly stated, this approach

objected to moralizing in the classroom and advocated
student participation as a way to foster the child or
adolescent's personal value system.

In other words,

this approach attempts to develop the child's
recognition of specific values and an awareness as to
how these personal values correspond to the child's
behavior.

Essentially, this approach encourages

students, through a method of value process, to prize,
to choose, and to act on values they deem appropriate
for a given situation.

The inadequacy of value

clarification approaches, says Kohlberg, resides in the
relativity to which all values are reduced.
Consequently, any and all values are options for

14

students.

Kohlberg (1981) notes that a value

clarification approach, in order to be consistent, must
even allow cheating to be a legitimately chosen option
for the child.
In the l920's Hartshorne and May embarked upon a
massive character study of over ten thousand elementary
and secondary school students.

These researchers

employed over thirty behavioral tests to measure
behaviors associated with a ''virtuous" character.
Having surveyed religious leaders and educators,
Hartshorne and May constructed an agreed upon list
of behaviors which virtuous children and adolescents
would be apt to carry out (e.g., altruistic acts,
instances of self-control).

In addition to these tests,

teachers rated students on lists of virtuous
characteristics.

Intercorrelations among the various

tests yielded low relationships, generally in the .20 to
.30 range.

These findings led Hartshorne and May to

conclude that positive behaviors such as altruistic acts
are situation specific.

In other words, these

researchers found no evidence of a ''moral character"
which influenced one's moral behavior across a variety
of situations.

Thus, they concluded that positive

behavior was contingent upon the situation.

15
When commenting upon these disappointing results,
Kohlberg (1981) has noted "it is a fair statement of the
history of psychological research in the field to say
that the study of character as a set of virtues has not
been a flourishing or successful research paradigm" (p.
2).

As a general comment, Kohlberg has characterized

the Hartshorne and May studies as exemplifying a "bag of
virtues" approach to morality.
In contrast to an approach which focuses on the
behavioral study of traditionally accepted positive
behaviors, Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1984) has insisted that
there exists an "internal component" (p. 500) involved
in "moral action".

Kohlberg's own research has

attempted to redress the disillusionment fostered by
Hartshorne and May's findings that moral behavior is
situation-specific.

Throughout his nearly thirty

years of research, Kohlberg (1981} has maintained there
exists a "universal ontogenetic trend toward the
development of morality" (p. 105) as it has been set
forth by Western moral philosophers.

In effect,

Kohlberg's writings underscore his acceptance of a
deontological ethical position.

Essentially, this

position argues that morality is not based on rules
(e.g., the Ten Commandments), but on principles that are
universally binding on all human beings. Thus, Kohlberg
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(1984) maintains
The focus of Piaget and myself on morality as
deontological justice springs, in part, from a
concern with moral and ethical universality in
moral judgment. The search for moral universality
implies the search for some minimal value
conception(s) on which all persons could agree,
regardless of personal differences in detailed aims
or goals. (p. 248)
Kohlberg has set forth a three level-six stage
theory of morality that is invariant, sequential, and
cross-cultural.

Individuals tend to prefer the highest

stage in which they can reason.

These stages have been

empirically validated in longitudinal studies by
Kohlberg and his associates.

The three levels and six

stages which make up Kohlberg's theory are given below.
Recently, Kohlberg (1984) has responded to critical
comments and challenges to his theory.

When

appropriate, Kohlberg's responses are presented as a way
to expand on the theory and his current thinking.
I.

Preconventional Level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural
rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong,
but interprets these labels either in terms of the
physical or hedonistic consequences of action
(punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in
terms of the physical power of those who enunciate
the rules and labels.
The level is divided into
the following two stages:
Stage l: The punishment-and-obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine its
goodness or badness, regardless of the human
meaning or value of these consequences.

17

stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instrumentally
satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the
needs of others.
II.

Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived
as valuable in its own right, regardless of
immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude
is not only one of conformity to personal
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it, of actively maintaining, supporting and
justifying the order, and of identifying with the
persons or group involved in it. At this level,
there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good
boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that
which pleases or helps others and is approved by
them.
There is much conformity to stereotypical
images of what is majority or ''natural" behavior.
Stage 4: The ''law and order" orientation. There
is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and
the maintenance of the social order. Right
behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing
respect for authority, and maintaining the given
social order for its own sake.
III.

Postconventional, autonomous, or principled
level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define
moral values and principles that have validity and
application apart from the authority of the groups
or persons holding these principles and apart from
the individual's own identification with these
groups. This level also has two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic
orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones.
Right action tends to be defined in terms of
general individual rights and standards which have
been critically examined and agreed upon by the
whole society. There is a clear awareness of the
relativism of personal values and opinions and a
corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for
reaching consensus.

18

Stage 6:
The universal-ethical-principle
orientation. Right is defined by the decision of
conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness,
universality, and consistency.
These principles
are abstract and ethical (The Golden Rule, the
categorical imperative); they are not concrete
moral rules like the Ten Commandments.
At heart,
these are universal principles of justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of
respect for the dignity of human beings as
individual persons (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671).
This central, underlying principle which forms the
basis for morality is the individual's understanding of
justice.

Kohlberg (1974) has stated "there is a natural

sense of justice intuitively known by the child" (p. 5).
Accordingly, an individual reasons about values, life
dilemmas, and personal choices in the context of an
understanding of justice which is appropriate for his or
her stage.

Firmly placing himself within the

cognitive-deveopmental tradition of Piaget, Kohlberg
(1981) has argued
A cognitive-developmental theory of
moralization holds that there is a sequence of
moral stages for the same basic reason that there
are cognitive or logicomathematical stages; that
is, because cognitive-structural reorganizations
toward the more equilbrated occur in the course of
interaction between the organism and the
environment.
Kohlberg (1984) states that "stage notions are
essentially ideal-typological constructs designed to
represent different psychological organizations at
varying points in development''

(p. 39).

Kohlberg
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distinguishes his own stage theory of moral development
from other stage theories.

He labels, for example,

Erikson's theory of life cycle development as a
functional stage; that is, Erikson's theory focuses on
individual functioning within a variety of cultural
roles.

Another type of stage theory (Kohlberg also

describes these theories as models) is that of a soft
structural stage.

A soft structural stage is

characterized by the inclusion of "elements of affective
or reflective characteristics of persons,
characteristics not easily assimilated to the Piagetian
paradigm" (p. 237).

Kohlberg offers Loevinger's theory

of ego development as an example of a soft stage
structure.

In contrast, Kohlberg presents his theory as

being a hard stage structure; in essence, a hard
stage structure is one which meets Piagetian stage
criteria.
stage:

In brief, there are four criteria for a

(1) the structure of each stage is

distinguishable from other stages;

(2) these stages form

an invariant, sequential ordering in human development
wherein cultural factors can influence the rate of
development but are unable to alter the sequence;

(3)

each stage represents a "structural whole''--a
distinctive "underlying thought organization";

(4)

stages are hierarchically integrated thus a higher stage
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incorporates all lower stage structures.
According to Kohlberg, Erikson's functional theory
lacks three of the four Piagetian criteria.

Erikson 1 s

functional stages delineate a variety of ego functions
in response to crises rather than focus on a single form
of activity such as moral reasoning which is constant
across situations and experiences (criterion three).
Further, a functional stage theory addresses
psychological aspects of the ''self's concern" and can,
therefore, be culturally relative.

In contrast, hard

stage structures separate the forms of reasoning from
psychological accounts of self and thus can be tested
cross-culturally (criterion two).

Finally, Erikson's

stages lack hierarchical integration; in reality, says
Kohlberg, the ego takes on a new function at each stage.
On the other hand, hard structural stages "replace
earlier stages in the sense that each succeeding stage
transforms the previous one into a more adequate
reorganization" (p. 239}

(criterion four).

In summary, the differences between Eriksonian
functional stages and hard structural stages
are relatively straightforward. These
differences concern not only the nature of the
stages but also the focus of the theories they
are based upon.
The focus of functional stage
models on the self coincides with the notion
of developing stages of an ego, viewed as an
executor or chooser that uses cognitive and
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other structures.
In contrast, the focus of
hard structural stages is upon forms of manifest
reasoning rather than upon the ego's processes of
affirming or defining itself.
(p. 240)
Kohlberg, likewise, uses Piagetian stage criterion
to distinguish his theory from Loevinger's "soft stage"
theory of ego development.
between the tw0 theories.

Kohlberg finds similarities
Even so, Kohlberg states his

theory is viewed as a focus on forms of thinking whereas
"Loevinger's scheme consider structure less as a form of
thinking and more in terms of fairly stable personality
functions and contents" (p. 242)

(see criterion three).

Moreover, Loevinger's theory, says Kohlberg, addresses
the self's definition, its unity, and its "enhancement
and defense".

This type of thinking is labeled second

order thinking and is contrasted by Kohlberg to the
Piagetian hard structural stage thinking which is
thinking logically related to a set of operations.
"The Kohlberg stage model, then, represents the
different hierarchically integrated forms of the
operations of reciprocity, equality, and equity" (p.
244) .

All in all, Kohlberg sees clear distinctions among
the three differing views of stages.
In sum, we have attempted to elaborate a set of
distinctions between functional, ~oft structural,
and hard structural stage models. We have argued
that a rigorous application of the Piagetian
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criteria for a hard structural stage can
distinguish three stage models, and that only a
hard structural stage model can actually meet these
criteria. (p. 248)
Kohlberg believes that moral growth, like cognitive
development, allows for increasingly moral structural
transformations.

These transformations are the result

of life experience, increasing capacity for role-taking,
encounters with and discussions about hypothetical
dilemmas, and most recently, his belief on the
importance

of the existence of a socio-moral

environment which fosters a just community (Kohlberg,
1984, 1985).

All in all, given the foregoing

experiences, an individual encounters a greater degree
of disequilibrium which engenders stage advancement.
"In essence, there is a "deep logical structure" of
movement from one stage to the next; a structure tapped
by both a psychological theory of movement and by
families of philosophical argument" (1981, p. 182).
Moreover, each stage reflects a more adequate
understanding of the justice principle because inherent
in each stage of moral development is a greater degree
of differentiation and integration.

That is, each

stage, because of its differentiated and integrating
capacities is, in essence, a more mature structure
capable of meeting the complexity and variability
inherent in life dilemmas, conflicts, and differing

23

points of view.

"These combined criteria,

differentiation and integration, are considered by
developmental theory to entail a better equilibrium of
the structure in question" (p. 135).

Even so, though

each stage underscores a distinctive understanding of
the justice principle, it is only at stage six that
justice embraces the attributes of fairness, equality
and reciprocity.

Only at this stage does justice become

universally acceptable because only stage six morality
incorporates a view of justice which all rational
persons regardless of cultural background or existential
situation could agree upon.
Some Salient Criticisms of Kohlberg's Theory
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach has
been the subject of numerous critiques.

Accordingly, in

this section, major criticisms are highlighted which
elucidate the limitations of Kohlbergts theory in light
of the need for a morality for everyday life (e.g.,
Shelton, 1985).
1.

Methodological shortcomigg_s of his approach with

special emphasis on the validi!Y._of stage six.
Among all the critiques directed against his
theory, few have been as pointed as the criticism of
methodological inadequacies.

These shortcomings
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include:

flawed scoring procedures, lack of

reliability, and the validity of a post-conventional
morality (Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Wonderly & Kupfersmid,
1980).
Recently, Kohlberg and his associates (1984) have
attempted to address these criticisms.

In effect,

Kohlberg has introduced a standard issue scoring that
obtains a more objective and reliable scoring system by
specifying exact criteria requisite for each stage.

In

turn, these measures have produced an extremely high
degree of reliability as well as a clear demarcations of
content from structure.

The subject responds in an

interview format to a group of dilemmas constructed by
Kohlberg and his colleagues.

Once a response is given,

a series of questions are asked in order to probe the
respondent's level of moral reasoning and to expunge
content.

To summarize briefly, Kohlberg (Kohlberg,

1984; Rest, 1983) utilizes a

classifying procedure in

which the subject's open ended responses are first
classified by issue. The issue is then divided according
to one of twelve possible norms and then classified
further according to one of seventeen elements.

Only

then is the open ended response scored. Commenting on
these new efforts, Rest (1983) notes that Kohlberg has
been able to purge "content with a vengeance" {pp.
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58 2-583).

One must wonder, however, that in purifying

his stages, Kohlberg is left with a narrowly based

view of morality--a morality so concerned with its
structural purity that is eschews other significant
factors (e.g., emotion, personal meaning to the moral
agent).

On the other hand, although the new scoring

format has rectified many previous shortcomings, the new
scoring format has failed to satisfy all of Kohlberg's
critics (e.g., Cortese, 1984; Montemayor, 1985;
Villenave-Cremer & Eckensberger, 1985).
Nonetheless, the most damaging criticism leveled
against Kohlberg's theory is the inability to validate a
sixth stage.

In earlier formulations of the theory

(Kohlberg, 1969), Kohlberg spoke convincingly of the
obtainment of principled morality and the exciting
possibilities that such a post-conventional world view
had for human society.

Heretofore, when discussing the

adolescent years, Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971)
optimistically maintained that the adolescent's development would lead to a questioning and relativistic stance
leading some (albeit a minority of adolescents) to adopt
a principled (post-conventional) solution to life
issues.

By the late seventies, however, Kohlberg was

less sanguine in regard to the adolescent's achievement
of a principled morality.

A reanalysis of his original
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data led Kohlberg to reject his assertion as to the
likelihood or even the possibility of stage six moral
reasoning.

Commenting in a critical way on his own

research he noted
Empirical research between 1968 and 1976 did not
confirm my theoretical statements about a sixth and
highest stage (Kohlberg, 1979). My longitudinal
subjects, still adolescents in 1968, had come to
adulthood by 1976, but none had reached the sixth
stage. Perhaps all the sixth stage persons of the
1960s had been wiped out, perhaps they had
regressed, or maybe it was all my imagination in
the first place. (1980, p. 457).
In a similar vein, Kohlberg argued that the
American secondary school could no longer accede to his
challenge to foster a principled morality among its
students.

By the late seventies Kohlberg called instead

for the development of stage 5 thinking
the secondary school.

as a goal for

Yet, in 1980, Kohlberg admitted

that further "retrenchment'' was necessary and that only
stage 4 thinking was a realistic possibility for the
secondary school student.

By the mid-eighties

(Kohlberg, 1984} maintained that moral reasoning above
stage 4 was unobtainable for adolescents and most young
adults.

Stage advancement up through stage four

requires a more adequate conceptualization of roletaking which allows the student to comprehend the social
system.

However, movement beyond Stage 4 requires the

subject to commit him or herself to ideals which are
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valued and which in turn will be carried out.

Only with

college experience and leaving home is the late
adolescent capable of anticipating commitment to valued
ideals.

Kohlberg believes such experiences as

separation from parents are necessary for advancement
beyond stage 4 for only through such transitions does a
person encounter experiences that are not of his or her
making and which require choices for which the adolescent must take responsibility.

Movement to principled

thinking (stage 5) necessitates a combination of life
experiences, active and on-going questioning about life
choices, commitment to personal decisions, and
corresponding moral reflection.
In summary, personal experiences of choice
involving questioning and commitment, in some sort
of integration with stimulation of cognitive-moral
reflection, seem required for movement from
conventional to principled (Stage 5) thought.
It
is probably for this reason that principled thought
is not attained in adolescence. (p. 493)
Nonetheless, Kohlberg has reemphasized in his own
theory the importance of truly principled morality
(stage 6).

Although no longer maintaining the empirical

verifiability of stage 6, Kohlberg now views that the
theoretical possibility of a principled morality evinced
in stage 6 thinking has considerable import.

Further,

Kohlberg now sets forth a role for substages (termed
"Substage B" for each of the stages).

Individuals who
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demonstrate reasoning at Substage B levels tend to be
more autonomous and responsible in their thinking and
are more inclined to view the importance of justice
operations such as equality and recipricity.

For

example, Kohlberg reasons that individuals who score at
substage B for stage 5 are able to intuit part of the
principles of justice set forth in stage 6, yet they are
unable to articulate the central role accorded the
justice principle as the criterion for stage 6
reasoning.
The present position of stage 6 thinking, moreover,
appears to provide two features for his theory.

First,

justice has come to operate as a functional component
inasmuch as it offers a conceptual understanding for his
theory.

Thus, Kohlberg (1984) argues that "a terminal

stage, with the principle of justice as its organizing
principle, helps us to define the area of human activity
under study" (p. 271).

Secondly, he appears to view

stage 6, in the current sketch of his theory, as an
"ideal end point" for the development of the more
limited understandings of justice articulated at lower
stages.

It should be noted, however, recent scoring

revisions demonstrate only minimal support even for
stage 5 thinking.

Thus, Rest (1983) noted that "stage 5

even in minor traces is a rarity" (p. 583) and that,
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in general, movement from one stage to another is an
exceedingly slow process wherein most change occurs
among only a few stages (usually from 2 to 4}.
Yet, Kohlberg now hypothesizes the utility of a
stage 7.

Kohlberg views a stage 7 orientation as a

"soft'' hypothetical stage.

Thinking at this stage is

concerned with life issues and questions which go beyond
the "hard'' philosophic reflections characteristic of the
first six stages (e.g., Why be moral?,
evil?).

Why is there

In entertaining the idea of a stage 7, Kohlberg

acknowledges the limitations of his theory to account
for all meaningful life questions. In this respect,
Kohlberg appears sensitive to challenges to his own
thinking.

"Generally speaking, a Stage 7 response to

ethical and religious problems is based on constructing
a sense of identity or unity with being, with
life, or with God 11 (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 249}.

He

associates stage 7 thinking with more theistically based
orientations; for example, he includes such thinkers as
James

Fowler in this latter category.
In sum, even though there is absent an empirically

verifiable sixth stage, Kohlberg argues for its
inclusion as an ideal end-point in an individual's
on-going moral development.

Nonetheless, Kohlberg

(1981, 1984} has so identified the justice principle
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with morality that its absence in fact and the paucity
of post-conventional scores leaves open the question of
what is moral as well as the question of who can be
moral.

Kohlberg (1984) has stated

Morality as justice best renders our view of
morality as universal.
It restricts morality to a
central minimal core, striving for universal
agreement in the face of more relativist
conceptions of the good.
(p. 306)
Although this view of morality is understandable
given Kohlberg's emphasis on hard stage structures,
it is also problematic in that it

rules out an

individual's full obtainment of morality.
2.

The contextual relevancy of Kohlberg's view of

morality and the resulting inadequacy of the cognitivedevelopmental view for addressing moral situations in
everyday life.
A second difficulty with Kohlberg's
conceptualization of morality concerns the application
of the justice principle to everyday life situations.
Surprisingly, even though the concept of justice is the
central focus for Kohlberg's moral system, the exact
meaning which Kohlberg accords the justice principle is
unclear.

He has defined justice as "equality" (p. 38);

a moral principle, that is, "a mode of choosing" which
all people will adopt in all situations (p. 39); the
resolution of competing claims (p. 143); the "core of
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morality" (p. 295); "the agreement, contract, and
impartiality of the law" (p. 300); and as an abstract
formal principle containing characteristics termed by
philosophical discourse as universality, inclusivity,
consistency, and objectivity.
Regardless of the justice definition one adopts,
the justice principle, when applied to Kohlberg's
dilemmas, negotiates the conflicting rights and claims
of individuals.

Morality for Kohlberg is justice.

And

the highest form of morality is contained in justice
reasoning characteristic of stage six. However, from the
standpoint of the nature of morality, interpreting
morality as the resolution of rights and claims
represents a circumscribed perspective of morality's
meaning (Staub, 1978).

Furthermore, the emphasis on

rights and duties underscores what many have believed to
be the strong ideological bias in Kohlberg's system
(Haan, 1982; Hogan, 1975; Kagan, 1984; Shweder, 1982).
Thus, as Gibbs and Schnell (1985) conclude "Kohlbergian
theory as currently constituted would indeed seem to be
compromised by philosophical individualism with its
ethnocentric and elitist ramifications and would appear
to be in need of revision" (p. 1075).

Moreover, the

dilemmas Kohlberg utilizes to develop a stage morality
delimit moral context.

In other words, individuals as
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moral agents frequently encounter what they would term
moral situations not reducible to a conflict of
competing claims.

Eisenberg (1977) has addresed this

very point regarding the rule oriented focus of
Kohlberg's dilemmas.

Her development of prosocial moral

reasoning categories attempts to widen the narrow
conflicting rights focus associated with Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas.

Even so, her emphasis on

hypothetical dilemmas weds her to the reasoning focus of
Kohlberg rather than a context for morality situated in
everyday life events.

Relatedly, Lemming (1978) found

that when given everyday situational dilemmas,
adolescents tended to reason at stages lower than
corresponding stages associated with Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas.

Recent investigations by

Kohlberg (Higgens, Power,

&

Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg,

1985) have attempted to be more sensitive to the
practical dimensions of moral dilemmas.

Advocating the

concept of a democratic or just community, Kohlberg and
his associates have shown that the moral atmosphere of
the school fosters positive behaviors.
To summarize, notwithstanding Kohlberg's
acknowledgement of a more practical side to morality, it
is likely that Kohlberg's preference for defining
morality in terms of justice necessarily narrows
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morality's meaning.

Likewise, hypothetical dilemmas

neither provide ·an emphasis for other dimensions of
morality (e.g., personal everyday behaviors) nor do they
accurately reflect numerous situations that individuals
encounter in everyday life events.
3.

~

tension between an ethics of justice and an

ethics of care:

The cognitive versus affective debate.

Essentially, the question associated over the
debate between an ethics of justice versus an ethics of
care focuses on the following:
morality?

What is the nature of

As noted above, for Kohlberg, the essence of

what is moral is found in the justice principle which is
applied impartially and universally to competing claims
or interests; in addition, this view of morality or what
Kohlberg terms "the moral point of view" is discovered
through rational discourse.
On the other hand, Gilligan (1982) focuses on an
ethics of care and

proposes a significant refocusing of

morality's meaning.

Gilligan's work results from three

studies undertaken by her and her associates.

The first

study contained interviews of college sophomores and a
follow-up study five years after graduation. The second
study focused on women's experience of abortion and the
reasoning utilized in making such a decision.

A cross

sectional study of 8 men and 8 women at 9 different ages
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was the focus of the third study; in addition, 2 men and
2 women were the subject of a more intense interview
process.
The results of these studies lead Gilligan to claim
there exists a dominance of the care orientation in
women whereas men opt for a more rule-oriented morality.
Borrowing upon recent revisions in psychoanalytic
thinking, Gilligan weaves together a feminine view of
morality which values connectedness, places emphasis on
interpersonal relationships, and adopts a caring stance
towards the needs of others.

By contrast, she notes

that the male view of morality is oriented towards
separation, sensitivity towards rights and duties, and
the just resolution of competing interests.

Gilligan

has noted
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly
in interviews with women is an injunction to
care, a responsibility to discern and
alleviate the "real and recognizable trouble"
of this world.
For men, the moral imperative
appears rather as an injunction to respect the
rights of others and thus to protect from
interference the rights to life and
self-fulfillment.
(p. 100)
In addition to her claims of male-female moral
orientations, Gilligan charges that developmental
theorists (e.g., Kohlberg) have unfairly advocated a
male oriented view of morality which, in effect, has
undervalued the female moral orientation that prizes
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care and connectedness.

In this respect, the female

orientation has been unfairly viewed as simply a
deviation of the male oriented justice view of morality.
In reality, what is needed, says Gilligan, is a blending
of these two perspectives (''voices") in each person
thereby transforming morality in a way that neither
perspective could envision separately.
Colby and Damon (1983) have noted "this book
[Gilligan's] has created an unusual excitement within
and beyond the field of psychology, no doubt because it
is full of exciting ideas" (p. 473).

Yet a close

scrutiny raises questions, state these two critics, as
to the adequacy of Gilligan's claims.

Colby and Damon

note that studies documenting sex differences are mixed.
There is some evidence which suggests male-female
difference regarding some aspects of social behavior and
occupational choice.

However, other areas of

development, specifically cognitive maturation and
aspects of personal behaviors, show no differences.
Colby and Damon remark that "the available research
data, therefore, do not reveal a clear picture of global
dichotomy between the life orientation of men and women"
(p. 476).

They cautiously add, however, that ambiguous

conclusions regarding sex-differences do not necessarily
undercut Gilligan's assertions.

In a related vein,
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Nunner-Winkler (1984) reports limited research findings
which point to strikingly similar moral reasoning
patterns between males and females thus questioning
Gilligan's claim concerning sex differences in moral
orientation.
Kohlberg (1984) has provided the greatest challenge
to Gilligan's thesis of differing moral orientations in
males and females.

He readily acknowledges that his

moral judgement theory was originally based on empirical
findings utilizing only male subjects.

He accedes to

Gilligan's contention that there exists an ethics of
care orientation, and maintains such a perspective
"usefully enlarges the moral domain" (p. 360).

What he

does challenge is Gilligan's claim that there exists sex
differences when Kohlberg's scoring format is utilized.
Although Gilligan (1982) does not report a summary of
quantitative data, another report by Gilligan and her
colleagues (cited by Kohlberg, 1984) offers findings
on male-female responses to Kohlberg's justice dilemmas.
Gilligan claims the data support the conclusion that a
bias against the female moral orientation exists in
Kohlberg 1 s moral theory.

Kohlberg (1984) responds

11

we

totally disagree with this conclusion and that it is
unwarranted, given their own findings" (p. 342).
Kohlberg goes on to critique Gilligan's assertions and
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points out the following shortcomings in her
conclusions:

lack of test-retest reliability,

utilization of a scoring format at variance with
Kohlberg's own measure and which he claims sacrifices
the conceptual integrity of the individual's moral
developmental stage, and psychologically (clinically)
insignificant differences between males and females.
Although Kohlberg admits that the charge of sex bias
might be germane in regard to his original stage scoring
formulated in his 1958 dissertation, he strongly refutes
the assertion that the currently revised scoring format
fosters a sex bias.

Kohlberg proceeds to review a

substantial body of literature which focus on
male-female moral reasoning differences.

He finds that

where dissimilarity exists, it can be attributed to
educational and vocational differences. Further, his
longitudinal study of kibbutz males and females report
"no significant mean sex-differences•• (p. 348).
concludes:

He

"studies comparing the sexes in justice

reasoning stage either report no sex differences or
report sex differences attributable to higher education
and role-taking opportunity differences related to work"
(p. 348).

Colby and Damon (1983) offer essentially the

same critique when, after reviewing the available
literature they conclude: "while her [Gilligan's]
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ayal of general sex linked life orientations in

intuitively appealing, the research evidence at this
point does not support such a generalized distinction 11
(p. 479).

Kohlberg resolves the tension of an ethic of

justice versus an ethics of care by interweaving these
two perspective into his own justice orientation.
Kohlberg maintains that principled morality is concerned
with the rights and duties of every person whereas a
care orientation stresses the bondedness and connectedness one maintains with the entire community; in effect,
both orientations champion mutual care and respect
towards life.

In sum, Kohlberg credits Gilligan with

enlarging "the moral domain beyond our focus on justice
reasoning" (p. 358).

Nonetheless, he disallows her

claim that there exist two moral orientations and
prefers to view the justice orientations as conceptually
adequate to accommodate an ethics of care.
Moreover, a close reading of Kohlberg's recent
reformulation shows that Kohlberg is attempting to
acknowledge the importance of a care ethics, yet
preserve the priority he assigns to the justice
orientation.

Accordingly, although Kohlberg argues that

justice and care share a similar focus with respect to
responsible concern towards humanity, a closer
examination of the origin of justice in Kohlberg's
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theory reveals a distinctive bias towards a cognitive
emphasis of morality thereby favoring the justice
orientation.

That is, the cognitive emphasis associated

with moral judgment reasoning, in effect, subordinates
the more affect-laden response of care and benevolence
to the cognitive view of justice.
In earlier writings (Kohlberg, 1981) emphasized the
need for "role-taking" to develop moral judgment.

Yet,

present throughout his writing there exist an
appreciation and concern for the welfare of others which
he views as inherent in the cognitive-developmental
approach.

Thus he writes that moral judgments entail "a

concern for welfare consequences'' (p. 143) and that "the
psychological unity of empathy and justice in moral role
taking is also apparent at the very start of the moral
enterprise" (p. 143).

Furthermore,

Psychologically, both welfare concerns (role
taking, empathy) and justice concerns, are
present at the birth of morality and at every
succeeding stage and take on more
differentiated, integrated, and universalized forms
at each step of development. (p. 175)
And

The centrality of role taking for moral
judgment is based on sympathy for others, as
well as in the notion that the moral judge
must adopt the perspective of the 11 impartial
spectator" or the "generalized other."
(p.
141)

In essence, Kohlberg views

the sympathetic,
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affect-laden empathic dimension as originating at the
earliest stages of moral development.

Still, he

consistently views the cognitive dimension of
role-taking as the means for advancing moral judgment
and little mention is made of a more sympathetic arousal
to the plight of others (e.g., empathy) as a means for
fostering stage advancement.
In light of the foregoing, it is instructive to
note that not all role-taking leads to beneficial
results.

For example, Pritchard (1981) maintains

that role-taking might serve to reinforce one's
"resentment" towards those who are more adequately
endowed; that is, experiencing an awareness
(role-taking) of another who is better off might arouse
an internal condition of jealousy towards the other
rather than serve as a catalyst for advancing moral
judgment.

In addition, Kohlberg does not address the

issue of empathic overarousal.

Thus, if one is more

empathically aroused towards the plight of others, then
such empathic arousal might well supersede any cognitive
role taking experience thereby giving greater support to
an affective dimension for morality.
In addition, many theorists have questioned whether
morality can be so easily identified with a cognitive
orientation.

For example, Haan et al.

(1985) argue that
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emotions are integral to any moral understanding.
Whereas Kohlberg would view a moral problems in terms of
the moral agent's dispassionate rise above

the

co~~radictions and emotional turmoil engendered by the
moral problem, Haan et al.

(1985) would see emotion as

an integral component in the obtainment of a moral
solution.
Emotions accompany and enrich understandings,
and they convey far more authentic information
about a person's position in a dispute than
any well-articulated thoughts.
In ordinary
circumstances, emotions instruct and energize
action.
In situations of great moral costs,
emotions can overwhelm and disorganize
cognitive evaluations.
(p. 147)
Relatedly, it is likely that a person's investment
in a meaningful everyday moral encounter is likely to
elicit ego-defensiveness.

In other words, everyday life

situations which present moral difficulties for an
individual are likely to evoke a variety of affective
responses which are proportional to the situational
meanings such encounters hold for the individual; in
contrast, Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas are far
removed from ego concerns and thereby enlist little ego
involvement (Haan 1977; Haan, et al., 1985).
Consequently, as Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger
(1985) assert
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Whether a subject is able to apply his or her
moral competence to a real-life context seems
not only to be a structural problem but rather
a problem of affectively dealing with personal
needs and self-interests in a situation. (p.
176) .

Interestingly, the researchers entertain the notion that
the prevalent and consistent finding that adults score
at a conventional level might suggest, that individuals
are more inclined, from an emotional standpoint, to
adopt a societal perspective rather than to confront the
emotional strain of justifying a position of individual
rights which represents the more advanced stage 5
thinking.
Consequently, inasmuch as Kohlberg

(1984)

identifies morality as the justice principle, little
emphasis is given to the role of affect.

In the latest

revision of his theory (Kohlberg, 1984), the stark
primacy of cognition can still be viewed.
Just as the strength of the emotional
component is irrelevant to the theoretical
importance of cognitive structure for understanding
the development of scientific judgment, so also is
the quantitative role of affect relatively
irrelevant for understanding the structure and
development of justice reasoning. (p. 292)
Kohlberg views emotions as

11

part" of moral

development yet "they do not tell us anything directly
about the specifically moral development of the subject"
(p. 293).

All in all, Kohlberg's position endorses the

primacy of cognition over affect.

As a consequence; an
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ethics grounded in affective responding (e.g., empathic
arousal} and the consequent behaviors (prosocial
responses) is accorded ancillary status.
Given the foregoing tenets of Kohlberg's theory, an
ethics of care orientation must look elsewhere for its
foundation.

Relegating emotion to a secondary status in

moral development, however, is clearly at variance with
the historical traditions of many religiously oriented
ethical approaches.

The accentuated nature of a

cognitive approach to morality, as exemplified in
Kohlberg's theory, undermines the prosocial dispositions
accorded more normatively based traditions.

Not

surprisingly, critics of Kohlberg (e.g., Ellrod, 1980)
have underscored this point. Heretofore, religious
educators (e.g., Moran, 1984) as well as theologians
(e.g., Conn, 1983; O'Connell, 1978; Spohn, 1984)
have maintained that emotion exercises a critical role
in human moral experience.

Similarly, in psychological

circles, the role of emotion has received support not
only from researchers advocating empathy and
prosociality as a basis for morality (e.g., Hoffman) but
also from other theorists who view emotion as the
foundation for morality (e.g., Kagan, 1984).
4.

The inability of the justice orientation to sustain

a value content for moral decisions.
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A fourth criticism leveled against Kohlberg's moral
theory is the absence of a value content for moral
development.

As noted previously, Kohlberg's moral

theory arose from the disillusionment emanating from the
"bag of virtues" approach to morality.

In the sixties

Kohlberg (1981) disassociated his own theory from a
content-laden approach which advocates distinct values
and normatively based ethical guidelines.

"In my view a

culturally universal definition of morality can be
arrived at if morality is thought of as the form of
moral judgments instead of the content of specific moral
beliefs" (p. 300).
Although Kohlberg continues to advocate a content
free view of moral development, he has modified somewhat
his original statement regarding the
of moral development.

value-free nature

After working in several

experimental educational settings, Kohlberg, in 1975,
altered his absolute prohibition of value content and
admitted the necessity of some content acquisition by
students.
I realize now that the psychologist's
abstractions of moral "cognition" (judgment and
reasoning) from moral action, and the
abstraction of structure in moral cognition and
judgment from content are necessary
abstractions for certain psychological research
purposes.
It is not a sufficient guide to the
moral educator who deals with the moral concrete in
a school world in which value content as well as
structure, behavior as well as reasoning must be
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dealt with.
In this context, the educator must be
a socializer teaching value content and behavior,
and not only a Socratic or Rogerian
process-facilitator of development.
Kohlberg goes on to state that
I no longer hold these negative views of
indoctrinative moral education and I believe
that the concepts guiding moral education must
be partly "indoctrinative." This is true, by
necessity, in a world in which children engage
in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in a
context wherein one cannot wait until children
reach the fifth stage to deal directly with
moral behavior. (1975, p. 14)
still, such normative criteria bear resemblance to the
"bag of virtues" approach which he has disclaimed.

More

importantly, however, Kohlberg appears to see the need
to set forth some culturally universal behaviors which
are requisite for nascent moral development.
In order to accommodate

normative values and

behaviors, Kohlberg has discussed the ethics of
benevolence.

In contrast to the justice principle which

is defined by its focus on equality, equity, and
fairness, the principle of benevolence is associated
with

11

Christian ethical teaching" or "agape" and the

religiously held notions such as "charity,"
"brotherhood," and "community."

Further, he admits that

"the principle or care or responsible love has not been
adequately addressed in our work" (p. 227).
Nonetheless, even though he makes this admission, he
still places questions of care under the mantle of
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cognition.

Kohlberg contends that the justice ethic,

which embraces the

11

concepts 11 of reciprocity and

contract, is capable of handling the situational
realities (e.g., relationship and personal conflicts,
prosocial responses) raised by an ethic of benevolence.
Yet he also contends that another meaning of moral,
which he terms "special" obligations and relationships,
is also capable of resolving difficulties arising out of
particular relationships.

Although Kohlberg

acknowledges, in effect, two uses of the word

11

moral 11 - -

one embracing the justice ethic and the attributes of
impartiality, universalizability, and consensual
dialogue in contradistinction to a second approach
defined in terms of caring and altruistic responses
accorded special relationships and obligations to family
and friends--he points out that the latter is relative
and culturally determined.

Moreover, Kohlberg maintains

that an ethic of care is best viewed as a "personal"
sense of the word moral whereas the justice orientation
is moral because of its impartiality and universal
application.

Kohlberg contends that these two meaning

of moral are best viewed as contrasting dimensions of
morality.

Yet he clearly favors the "moral" labeling of

justice because the two dimensions do not share equally
in ugenerality" and "validity."
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The cognitive-developmental approach advocated by
Kohlberg leaves unanswered several questions.

First,

the principle of justice is unable to account for

situations where the issue is not the violation of

rights but the question of fulfilling values associated
with prosocial responding.

Many human situations are

typified by instances of prosocial dilemmas wherein
specific individuals decided the allocation of resources
or the expenditures of personal energies
altruistically based ends.

for

A justice orientation fails

to appreciate other rationales for behavior such as
those based on a theistic value system (e.g., Gelpi,
1978) as suggested by Bergin (1980).

Furthermore,

Kohlberg's identification of principled reasoning with
morality unfairly abrogates the religious dimension of
human experience.

Moran (1984) argues that separating

morality and religion obscures what is commonplace for
most peoples' lives; for a large segment of people, the
separation of morality and religion is not acceptable.
In a similar vein, Hauerwas (1981) has noted that the
concept of

11

moral development" has been unduly circum

scribed by Kohlberg's justice interpretation.

Moral

development, according to Hauerwas, includes a level of
growth not based on an advancement of stages, but is
more aptly characterized as a continuous and deepening
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commitment to values associated with an ethics of care
orientation.

To summarize, notwithstanding the

principled perspective of morality advocated by
Kohlberg, for many theorists there exists a contentladen dimension of morality that receives little
attention in Kohlberg's theory.

Kohlberg does accept

some indoctrinative features for morality.

Nonetheless,

the mantle of the justice orientation is unable to
accommodate the presence of prosocial behaviors which
are commonly accepted by a theistic value system.
Consequently, what is needed is a consideration of
morality that allows for the incorporation of a
religious dimension which is absent in Kohlberg's

theory.
5.

Kohlberg's emphasis on moral reasoning rather than

moral behavior.
The final criticism of Kohlberg stems from the
absence of behavior as an essential component for
morality's meaning.

Kohlberg adheres to a formalistic

principled morality which undercuts the historically
significant role that
when defining morality.

ethics have accorded behavior
As Staub (1978) has pointed

out, morality is usually centered on personal actions
which conform to either internalized moral norms
Which one has adopted or to socio-cultural norms
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accepted by the individual.

Thus, morality seems to

entail both valued personal beliefs as well as behaviors
which conform or deviate from the norms of society
(Rest, 1983).
In contrast to this more conventionally held
definition of morality, Kohlberg situates morality in a
formalized abstraction termed the justice principle.
Moran (1983) summarizes Kohlberg's position in this
regard by stating that "Kohlberg wishes to leave behind
the social (person in interaction) for a philosophical
ideal" (p. 71).
As noted previously, Kohlberg (1984) defines moral
reasoning as the awareness and resolution of moral
conflicts which lead to the development of a stage
sequential theory of moral development.

Kohlberg (1975)

has stated that although moral reasoning is only one
factor in determining an individual's moral behavior, it
11

is the single most important or influential factor yet

discovered in moral behavior" (p. 672).

For this reason

Kohlberg has advocated a moral reasoning approach to
moral education for public school.

Practical

applications of Kohlberg's approach (Kohlberg, 1980;
Kohlberg & Wasserman, 1980) based on student and staff
responses have reported a greater level of fairness and
sense of community among school members.

In addition,
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Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) has shown that
advancement in moral reasoning stages leads not only to
increasing acceptance of moral principles (which answer
the question what is moral) but also increased judgments
of responsibility (which lead one to accept the
responsibility to carry out the moral action).

These

results are in line with earlier review of moral
judgment which show positive correlations with behavior
(e.g., Blasi, 1980)
This movement of Kohlberg's thinking towards
behavior undercuts the charge by Moran that Kohlberg is
uninterested in moral behavior and that he is willing to
sacrifice the person's behavior for the ideals present
in philosophical discourse.

Still, the priority in

Kohlberg's thinking remains the reasoning component
which enables individuals to resolve conflicting claims
and duties.
Kohlberg's increasing willingness to consider
behavioral linkages to moral reasoning stages in all
likelihood should allow for some rapprochement with
educators who favor focusing on behaviors and
content-laden approaches (values and virtues).
Nonetheless, Kohlberg's disavowal of the "bag of
virtues" approach confirms his disinclination to view
moral development in terms of approaches he terms
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"indoctrinative."
On the other hand, recent reanalysis of the
original Hartshorne and May data shed new light on the
behavioral aspects of values and suggests that
Kohlberg's dismissal of this classic study is
inappropriate.

Rushton (1980, 1981) reanalyzed the

Hartshorne and May data and has found the original
conclusion of situational specificity to be more one of
long standing error.

Basically, Hartshorne and May

compared scores on individual tests rather than combined
test scores.

Individual test comparisons led to an

inflated error variance which is reduced in test battery
comparisons.

For example, Hartshorne and May compared

single situation tests of altruism separately rather
than combining them into a single battery for comparison
with other batteries.

Rushton points out that a single

situation is equivalent to one item on a paper and
pencil test battery.

Combining these single items into

batteries led to battery correlations in the .50 to .60
range.

Furthermore, teacher rating correlated .80 with

these battery scores.

These reanalyzed findings led

Rushton (1980) to conclude that although situations do
influence behavior, there does exist a consistent moral
self and that "the evidence is very solid that there are
quite stable and consistent patterns of individual
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differences across situations" (1980, p. 64).

Based on

these findings, Rushton goes on to describe what he
terms the altruistic personality.

Such people are

more motivated to engage in a1truistic acts.
He or she has internalized higher and more
universal standards of justice, social
responsibility, and modes of moral reasoning,
judgment, and knowledge, and/or he or she is
more empathic to the feelings and suffering of
others and able to see the world from their
emotional and motivational perspective.
On the basis of such motivations, this person
is likely to value, and to engage in, a great
variety of altruistic behaviors--from giving
to people more needy than themselves, to
comforting others, to rescuing others from
aversive situations. Altruists also behave
consistently more honestly, persistently, and
with greater self-control than do
nonaltruists. (p. 84)
Thus, according to Rushton, individuals can
subscribe to a distinctive value system and reflect this
value system through behaviors that are consistent
across a variety of situations.
Rushton's reevaluation of the original Hartshorne
and May data gives considerable weight to a conception
of morality associated with commonly agreed upon
prosocia1 values. More recently, Small, Zeldin, and
Savin-Williams (1983) note that behavioral observations
of adolescent males showed a consistent altruistic
trait across time and a variety of situations.
Moreover, religious values and beliefs have been
shown to be excellent predictors of behavior.

For
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example, Strommen, Breke, Underwager, and Johnson (1972)
discovered that religious values were frequently better
predictors of people's attitudes and behaviors than
commonly used variables as age, occupation, level of
education, or financial status. Strommen (1984) reports
three national studies covering three random samples
totaling over 27,000 secondary school students.

In

these studies Strommen states that the single, best
indicator of high school students rejection of alcohol
and drug usage is the value they place in religious
faith.

Relatedly, Benson and William (1982) in an

empirical analysis of a random sampling of members in
the 96th Congress, found that religious beliefs and
values predicted voting behavior patterns to a degree
commensurate with party affiliation.

The value stances

of lawmakers could account for up to 40% of the variance
on some issues.

Further, when the elected official's

values stance was combined with party, up to 70% of the
variability in voting records could be explained.
Strommen (1984) maintains
In several of our major studies we were able
to probe people's religious beliefs and values
as well as their psychological, sociological,
and demographic dimensions. In each case,
these studies have shown that religious
variables rank high as predictors of behavior.
(p. 153)
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In sum, Kohlberg's resolute resistance and unyielding criticism of a "bag of virtues'' approach to morality
are open to serious questioning. Research has documented
in many cases the significant role that values
exercise in fostering a distinctive set of

can

behaviors.

A summa;:y
In sum, Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental
view of moral development has provided developmental
psychology and education with a rich reservoir of
empirical data.

Nevertheless, sufficient questions

regarding Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view exist
to warrant consideration of other approaches.

More

specifically, the questions related to the purpose and
function of a sixth stage, the applicability of a
justice ethic in everyday life, the subordination of an
ethics of care to an ethics of justice as well as the
diminution accorded the affective domain of morality,
the refusal to consider a value content dimension
to morality, and the question of a behavioral dimension
for morality render Kohlberg's approach to morality as
questionable when the focus is on a morality for
everyday life.

By contrast, viewing morality from a

foundational perspective of empathic development leads
to an understanding of morality sufficiently at variance
with Kohlberg's perspective to warrant detailed
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investigation.

This latter approach to morality,

likewise, is consonant with a morality focused on
everyday life events.

CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF EMPATHY
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory remains
the dominant perspective from which to view a psychology
of morality.

Nonetheless, the limitations of Kohlberg's

perspective as well as the complexity of the nature of
morality have engendered both variations of Kohlberg's
theory as well as competitors.

Among the variations to

Kohlberg's cognitive developmental view are transactive
induction processes (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983); the
distributive justice paradigm (Damon, 1975; Enright,
Enright, & Lapsey, 1981); the retributive justice
orientation (Lapsey & Quintana, 1985); and prosocial
moral reasoning (Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, 1982).
More significant differences exist when the
question moves fro� cognitive-developmental approaches
to the issue of the origin of morality.

Kohlberg has

argued for a ontogenetic understanding of the justice
principle as a basis for morality.

Other researchers

have maintained that it is possible to look for an
affective source for morality (Kagan, 1984; Rest, 1983).
The most promising source for this view of morality is
empathy.
56
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The idea that empathy is essential for morality has
a rich heritage in Western thought.

11

For at least 300

years philosophers in the Anglo-American (or
utilitarian) tradition of ethics have assumed that man
has an innate social sensitivity which plays an
important role in moral development" (Hogan, 1973, p.
222).

Historically, philosophers such as David Hume and

Adam Smith as well as social scientists such as George
Herbert Mead have accorded a significant role for
empathy in their own theories (Hoffman, 1981b, Hogan,
1973).
The origin of empathy is derived from the German
word Einfuhlung which is most aptly translated as
"feeling into" (Gill, 1982).

The word Einfuhlung was

introduced into psychological literature by Lipps in his
discussions of aesthetic perception.

Originally, Lipps

viewed the person as projecting him or herself into an
object; as a consequence, the perceiver developed a far
deeper appreciative understanding of the object at hand.
Later, Lipps widened his definition to include people as
the objects of empathic focus.

The notion of empathic

understanding arose from the observer's reaction to the
observed person's behavior.

In effect, the perceiver

provided cues which served as signals for
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his or her newly found understanding of the other
person.

In 1910 Tichner translated the word Einfuhlung

as "empathy"

(Goldstein & Michaels, 1985).

At the beginning of this century empathy was first
used to describe an aesthetic experience which arose
while viewing a piece of art.

By mid-century, however,

clinical uses of empathy became prominent.

For example,

Rogers (1957) has suggested that empathy was best viewed
as a necessary ingredient for successful therapeutic
interaction between therapist and client.

Recently,

therapy studies have deviated from Roger's
phenomenological definition of empathy and have
considered empathy more as a "process" of responding to
the client's experience rather than as the vicariously
aroused state of the therapist (Hackney, 1978).
Surprisingly, although empathy is a richly nuanced term
having great import for human relationships and social
well-being, Clark (1980) has criticized the dearth of
theoretical and empirical studies regarding empathy ir.
social science literature.
A problem arises in empathy research because there
exist numerous definitions.

Hackney (1978) has noted

there are at least 21 empathy definitions in the
therapeutic literature alone.

This plethora of

definitions notwithstanding, two salient characteris_tics
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often appear in empathy discussions.
characteristics are:

(a}

These

an awareness of another's

situation (cognitive component} and (bl an arousal to
another's plight and distress (affective component).
Studies cited herein focus on these two
characteristics.

Several instruments for measuring

empathy (e.g., Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian, 1972) have
interspersed both cognitive and affective dimensions
within the measure.

According to Davis (1980), however,

t~e limitation of the aforementioned instruments are
their reliance on a single empathy score thereby
bringing affective and cognitive components of empathy
into a unidimensional framework.

Utilizing factor

analysis, Davis has developed the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI) which is capable of delineating
affective (concern) and cognitive (perspective taking)
components.

In addition, Davis was able to identify two

other dimensions--a fantasy dimension and a distress
dimension.

Within this study, Hoffman 1 s definition of

empathy (which is stated below) is utilized.
11:!.e Human Ca12aci ty_for Al.truism
Martin Hoffman has proposed the most integrated and
sophisticated theory of empathic development.
Accounting for physiological, affective, and cognitive
development, Hoffman (1981, 1982, 1983) has posited an
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affective basis for morality directly challenging the
view of morality set forth by cognitive-developmental
theory.
Empathy 1 s importance is best viewed when
considering its role in the development of altruism
(Hoffman, 1975, 1981a).

At this point it is important

to clarify the two most commonly used words in
psychological literature that are associated with caring
for others-- "prosocial" and

11

altruism" (although other

words such as "positive behavior" are frequently found).
The psychological literature usually delineates these
two terms in the following way.

11

Prosocial 11 is used

when the behavioral act benefits another, although the
person might receive some reward for his or her action.
On the other hand,

"altruism" is used for those acts

which are done selflessly and for which one derives no
benefit to speak of.

In fact, one might actually suffer

(self-sacrifice) when engaging in the altruistic act or
encounter some personal risk when engaging in the act.
There is, of course, a "fine" line between these two
terms and the research literature reflects this thinking
(e.g., Staub, 1978).
this distinction.

Hoffman does not directly address

He utilizes altruism as defined above

and focuses on the concern (as demonstrated by affective
arousal) that the empathizer
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has for the other.

For the sake of variety, prosocial

is used interchangeably with altruism, and both terms
will reflect Hoffman's understanding which focuses on a
selfless care towards the other.
Anthropological evidence indicates that prehistoric
individuals encountered an adverse and hostile
environment.

As a consequence, social cooperation would

maximize survival.

However, since the unit of

reproduction is the individual rather than the group,
some anthropologists have argued for an egoistic view of
the human person.

According to Hoffman, evolution has

provided two motives which enable the human species to
survive.

On the one hand, there exists an egoistic

motive which motivates the person to engage in actions
for self-protection or the enhancement of one's own
condition.

On the other hand, there exists an

independent altruistic motive which promotes the other 1 s
welfare

11

without conscious regard for one's own self-

interestlt {1981a, p. 124).

Hoffman envisions empathy as

the source of this care for others.
Accordingly, both an egoistic motive and an altruistic
motive are necessary as both

motive systems allow for

an optimal level of human adaptability and, therefore,
human survival.
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The tension between an egoistic and altruistic
basis for human nature can be resolved, says Hoffman, if
evidence can be found for some prosociality which also
enhances individual fitness.
such thinking in

Hoffman finds support for

Trivers 1 view of reciprocal altruism.

Essentially, Trivers uses a "rescue model" to
demonstrate that natural selection must favor altruism.
even between non-related individuals.

The inclusion of

non-related individuals is at variance with other
theories such as kin selection which argue for an
"inclusive fitness" which means an organism's tendency
not only to favor offspring but also the fitness of
other relatives who share the same genes {Hoffman
maintains that this latter view of kin selection also
favors a biological disposition towards altruism).

In

short, Trivers' model asserts that if there are two
individuals (called X and

Y)

and Xis in serious need,

the model assumes that the cost to Y is less than the
gain for X and that there exists a high likelihood that
roles will be reversed in the future.

As Hoffman

( 198 la) notes, "it is, in other words, in the
individual's long-term selfish interest to take the
relatively low risks associated with helping others in
danger"

(p. 124).

That is, ultimately it is to the
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benefit of each individual i f everyone responds
prosocially.
An objection to this evidence for biological

altruism comes in the form of gene benefit; in other
words, the person's genes ultimately prosper because of
such role reversals.

Hoffman asserts that such a view

would render the whole notion of altruism useless
because all behavior would be reduced to selfishness.
In addition, Hoffman points out that this debate is the
result of differing levels of conceptualization.

That

is, one must look not at individual genes but at the

total organism who encounters the challenges and
adversities of the environment.

Citing Gould (1977),

Hoffman notes "selection simply cannot see genes and
pick among them directly .... Selection views bodies.

It

favors some because they are stronger, better insulated,
etc."

(p. 24).

Or, as Hoffman (1981) states,

"it is the

total organism or body that confronts the persistent
ecological pressures and is directly involved in the
struggle for existence" (p. 123).

He thus concludes

that a minimum level of prosociality is necessary in
order to insure human survival.

This being the case, he

asks the question as to the origin of this altruistic
response.

He finds that the human mechanism for this

response is rooted is the human experience of
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empathy.

Over time, empathic interactions fostered the

social bonding n~cessary for community survival.

The validity of an independent altruistic motive,
says Hoffman, comes from research which documents
individual's spontaneously helping others, particularly
when they are the only persons available to aid the
distressed person.

Furthermore, i f the basis of

altruistic responding resides in egoism, then one would
expect individuals in need of social approval to help
more than others who feel satisfied with their level of
social approval.

In fact,

the research supports the

opposite conclusion; that is, individuals who are
satisfied with their own social approval are most likely
to engage in altruistic acts.

A

likely reason for this

phenomenon is that individuals who are dissatisfied with
their social standing are most likely to be "needy"
emotionally.

Therefore, they adopt ego defensive

strategies and utilize their psychic energies to deal
with feelings of inadequacy.

Consequently, they are

less likely to be attentive to the needs of others
having focused their psychic energies on their own
troubled emotional states.
Finally there exists biological evidence to support
the idea of an altruistic motive.

Citing studies by

MacLean which focus on the limbic system's effect on
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expressive and feeling states, Hoffman (1975) notes that
part of the limbic system appears to be related to
prosociality and the development of social bondedness
with others.

MacLean reports that one area of the

limbic system is associated with emotions which foster

self-preservation.

On the other hand, MacLean maintains

another area of the limbic system is predisposed to
sociability.

Citing MacLean (1962), Hoffman (1975)

notes "in the complex organization of the
phylogenetically old and new structures under
consideration we presumably have a neural ladder for
ascending from the most primitive sexual feeling to the
highest level of altruistic sentiments" (p. 300).

In

addition, the biological study of the brain appears to
sustain the biological possibility for altruism.
MacLean has shown a neural connection exists among the
primitive limbic cortex, the hypothalamus (which
integrates somatic experiences and feeling states) and
the prefrontal cortex (which fosters insight and an
awareness of others' needs).

Says Hoffman (1975)

In other words, the brain structures required
for affective involvement with objects in the
external world, including people, were
apparently present early in man's evolution.
The more recent addition of newer brain
structures along with the acquisition of
connective neural circuits have made it
possible for such affect to be experienced in
conjunction with a cognitive, increasingly
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sophisticated social awareness or insight into
others--and all of this appears to be independent
of the neural base for egoistic, self-preserving
behavior.
In brief, the neural basis for a
primitive empathy was apparently present early in
man ' s evolution . ( p. 61 0)
Clark (1980), likewise, has argued that altruism
necessitates advanced neurocortical development and
adequate limbic system functioning.
Taken together, Hoffman believes that the varying
pieces of

evidence lend support to an altruistic motive

in human social exchanges.

Given that this is the case,

Hoffman inquires as to what is the mediator or mechanism
which fosters altruistic behavior. Hoffman maintains
that empathy is the most likely mediator for an
altruistic response.
The_Components and Modes __o( Empath_y
Hoffman (1979, 1980, 1981b, 1982) has elaborately
detailed the nature and development of empathy.
According to Hoffman (1982), empathy is a vicarious
affective response to another's situation.

Unlike other

definitions of empathy which stress the emotional
arousal of the individual, Hoffman's definition focuses
on the appropriateness of one's response to another's
experience rather than on one's internal feeling state.
This "appropriateness" is derived from the cognitive
component of empathy which allows for an accurate
interpretation of another's state.

Furthermore, in
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addition to affective arousal, empathy appears closely
linked to a naturally induced state to respond
altruistically to another's distress.
Hoffman (1981b, 1982) maintains there exists six
modes of

From a developmental

empathic arousal.

perspective, these modes appear in the following order.
ctive Newborn

Developmental studies

demonstrate that even three day old infants utter
reactive cries upon hearing the cries of other infants.
Although it is impossible to state whether such
reactions are learned or innate, it has been shown that
infants respond to the distressed cry of other infants.
"This reactive cry must therefore be considered as a
possible early precursor of empathy, though not a full
empathic response because it lacks any awareness of what
is happening"

(1981b, p. 45).

In other words, Hoffman

observes that, developmentally, the newborn lacks the
ability to comprehend the actual situation of the other.
~l~ssical Conditioning.

Soon after the experience

of the reactive cry, the infant can view the distress of
another at the same time that he or she is experiencing
distress.

Conditioning results from the fact that

"distress cues from others become conditioned stimuli
that evoke feelings of distress in the self" (p. 45).
Hoffman offers as an example the tenseness of a mother
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who, upon holding her child, conditions an anxious state

in the child.

At a later time, the mother's facial or

verbal cues which accompany her distress (conditioned
stimuli) engender distress in the child even in the
absence of physical contact.
Direct_Association.

A more general

type of

conditioning exists through an association.

This third

mode of empathic arousal is contingent upon the past
experience of the empathizer.

In other words, the

distress cues of another evoke in the child his or her
past experiences of distress which in turn induce an
empathic response.
The feelings of distress that accompanied those
past experiences are then evoked by distress cues
from the victim that call up any of them.
It is
thus a far more general mechanism than
conditioning, one which may provide the basis for a
variety of distress experiences with which children
and adults as well may empathize.
(p. 46)
In this mode of empathic arousal a person
imitates the facial and posture of another person.

This

imitation in turn leads to "inner kinesthetic cues"
which aid the observer in understanding the other and
allow for the feeling of similar emotions.

Heretofore,

this mode of empathy has been passed over because of its
instinctual overtones; however, Hoffman maintains it is
a plausible empathic experience.
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A more advanced mode of
empathic arousal is associated with symbolization.

In

this mode a person becomes aware of another's distress
through symbols (e.g., reading a letter).

Thus,

language mediates between the empathizing observer and
the distress of the victim.
;sg_le-taki~.

Empathic experiences associated with

the previous five modes requires only minimum cognitive
effort.

Role-taking, on the other hand, the most

developmentally advanced of the empathic modes, requires
an individual to imagine how he or she would feel in the
other's situation.

This imaging of the other's

situation leads one to "experience some of what the
other person is feeling"

(p. 47).

Hoffman does not view these six modes as equally
utilized in everyday life situations; rather, reactive
crying terminates with maturation whereas role-taking is
infrequently utilized.

The four intermediate modes are

used intermittently throughout the life span and require
a variety of situational cues for their activation.
Hoffman (1980) maintains that empathy has two
components:

cognitive and affective.

In addition,

there exists what might be termed a motivational
component derived from empathic affect.

This three-
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fold delineation is crucial inasmuch as most definitions
of empathy (Clark, 1980; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985)
underscore cognitive and affective dimensions yet fail
to focus on subsequent behaviors which reduce the plight
of the distressed person.
'[he_ D~yE!JQP"1'!.E!_~!_Q_L_gl}!12_~ thY
Hoffman (1979, 1980, 1981b, 1982) maintains that
the cognitive transformation of empathy transpires
developmentally.

Hoffman's theory sets forth four

developmental levels of empathic distress.
Global_Empath,y.

Essentially, before the year one,

the child lacks the capacity to differentiate the self
from others.

Thus the child, upon viewing the distress

of the other, is unable to construe the distressed
person's plight as separate from his or her own and,
therefore, he or she acts accordingly.

This empathic

response is termed global because the child fails to
differentiate between the discomfort of others and his
or her own distress; thus, distress is experienced as a
diffuse and generalized state encompassing both the
distressed person as well as the infant.
nRgocentric __EJllPathY.'._'.

Having obtained "person

Permanence," the child is capable of differentiating the
self from others thereby understanding that the distress
of the other is not one's own.

At this stage a child is
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most likely to respond to the other's distress by
sharing an object or engaging in a behavior which
relieves the child's own distress.

Thus Hoffman cites

as an example the 13 month old child who, upon seeing
the distress of the adult, offer the adult his favorite
doll.

Hoffman places quotations on the word egocentric

to point out this reference is not entirely accurate;
that is, he does not view the child's behavior as
selfish.

Insofar as egocentrism is present, the child

does confuse actions which offer relief to the other
with actions which mitigate the child's own distress.
Nonetheless, both the affective tone of the child's
utterances and his or her facial cues as well as the
behavior itself points to a developmentally
appropriate altruistic response.
E~athy_for_Another's_Feelings.

Although at first

rudimentary, the inception of role-taking allows the 2
or 3 year old child to begin to appreciate the others's
feelings and interpretations of events as separate from
his or hew own.

At the same time, the child's language

development allows for an inner awareness and
sensitivity to the feelings of others.

Finally, with

development, the child becomes increasingly
sophisticated at differentiating the feeling of others
and empathizing simultaneously

with several feelings.
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Although not directly addressing the question of
empathy, recent developmental research demonstrates that
very young children show a remarkable level of
prosociality, thus lending support to Hoffman 1 s
contention of an altruistic dimension to human nature
(Bridgeman, 1983; Hay

&

Rheingold, 1983;

Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler,

&

Chapman, 1982).

These

findings run contrary to earlier theoretical
speculations (e.g., Freud} which frame an egocentric
focus for the child.

Apparently earlier interpretations

of child development eschewed the prosocial nature of
children and adopted instead a non-social egocentrism
(Hay

&

Rheingold, 1983).

In fact, some theorists (e.g.,

Bridgeman, 1983} conclude that prosociality is possible
even in 2 year old children.

Given these developmental

features of childhood, Hoffman would view the child
capable of moral acts {if prosociality is accepted as
the basis for morality).

In fact, given the possibility

of prosociality even among young children, it can be
concluded that empathy theorists would argue that even
very young children are capable of a moral response.
True to the nature of developmental thinking, empathy
theorists would ultimately maintain that although the
young child is incapable of sophisticated moral
explanations of his or her action, the fact that he or
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she responds at whatever level of empathy is
developmentally appropriate points to a moral response.
Em~athy_for_Anothers General Pl!g_ht.

By the later

childhood years, a young person or early adolescent is
capable of understanding that other people possess
independent life histories, that immediate feelings are
oftentimes transitory, and that the other person has
feelings beyond a particular situation.

Thus, at this

level, a child can imagine the situation of the other
beyond the situation at hand (e.g., the child realizes
that an economically deprived peer might be joyful over
receiving a birthday gift, yet that this child is still
disadvantaged).

This final level elicits a more

sophisticated response from the observer which balances
immediate reactions to the other's plight with a fuller
understanding of the other's existential situation.
Hoffman (1981b) concludes:
To summarize, empathy is the coalescence of
vicariously aroused affect and a mental
representation of the other, at whatever level
the observer is capable.
Individuals who
progress through the four stages become
capable of a high level of empathic distress
(p. 50).
Although not considered a level, Hoffman maintains
that a more advanced understanding of "Empathy for
Another's Plight" allows the older child or adolescent
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to empathize with entire classes of people (e.g., the
poor, the oppressed, a racial or political group).

This

wider domain for empathizing results from the
abstractive and hypothetical abilities engendered by
formal operational thinking (e.g., Elkind, 1975).
!J!!..12~!:_hy__As a_Mot i ve ~_f_or Al truism
Empathic distress has so far been viewed as having
both a cognitive and an affective component.

The

interplay of these two components is discerned when
Hoffman (1981b) notes that the affective and cognitive
components are ''derived from the observer's cognitive
sense of the other" (p. 51).

Equally important, this

enhanced cognitive capacity, in addition to fostering
empathic distress, fosters in the observer a feeling of
sympathetic distress (or what is generally termed
compassion).

The end result of the observer's awareness

of the other and sympathetic distress is an inclination
to respond prosocially.
In addition to the cognitive and affective
components of empathic distress and the concurrently
felt state of sympathetic distress, Hoffman asserts that
guilt exercises a special role in influencing the
child's prosocial nature.

In order to understand the

child's guilt experience, the relationship of empathy
and socialization requires brief discussion.
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Hoffman notes that parental socialization is a
primary influence on children's empathic reactions.
Hoffman (1980) has summarized research on parental
discipline into three broad categories:

power

assertion, love withdrawal, and induction.

Power

asserting techniques are utilized when the parent
attempts to influence the child through their physical
strength or control over the child's possessions.
Examples of this approach include physical force and
control over choices (e.g., refusing to grant permissions).

Love withdrawal takes place when the message in

the parental technique is separation or the threat of
abandonment.

Examples of this technique include

isolating the child, threatening to leave the child and
refusing to speak to the child.

Whereas these first two

approaches have a highly punitive quality, induction
techniques provide the child with reasoning or focus on
internal processes which the child might already be
utilizing.

Examples of this technique include pointing

out to the child the consequences of his or her actions
on others or appealing to the child's pride, ability to
master situations, or concern for others.

"These

techniques rely less on fear and more on the children's
connecting their cognitive content with his own
resources for comprehending the requirements of the
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situation and controlling his behavior accordingly" (p.
322},

In short, inductive techniques allow the child to
focus on and to attend to the hurt they have caused
others thereby activating empathic arousal to the
distressed person's plight.

In reality, Hoffman asserts

that delineation of parental discipline techniques into
one of the three categories above is often not possible;
in other words, discipline often shows aspects of all

three approaches.

For example, the punitive nature of

power assertion may be necessary in order to gain the
child's attention.

Nonetheless, the presence of an

inductive dimension in the discipline triggers empathic
arousal and allows the child to focus on the
consequences of his or her behavior.
Hoffman (1970) has demonstrated that older children
socialized to induction parenting techniques (being made
aware of the consequences of one's actions) are more
inclined to behave prosocially than children socialized
through methods of love withdrawal and assertion of
power techniques.

More recently, Zahn-Waxler,

Radke-Yarrow, and King (1979) have shown this same
result for younger children.

Utilizing such inductive

techniques fosters the child's awareness of the
consequences of his or her actions (e.g., hurting the
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other).

Most likely, this experience, says Hoffman,

causes a guilt reaction and leads to helping behaviors.
In all likelihood, a cognitive component is integral to
the guilt response.
the child to
responses.

Cognitive transformation enables

develop more sophisticated guilt
That is, cognitive maturation allows the

child to view how his or her actions might qe the source
of another's injury. Thus, even younger children can
feel guilty over the observed physical hurt that they
cause the other.

However, a more developmentally

advanced form of cognition is necessary to attribute
self-blame to one's own actions or feel guilt over the
anticipation of hurting the other.

Furthermore,

"another important cognitive dimension of guilt is the
awareness that one has choice and control over one's
behavior!! (1982, p. 299).

Although the evidence on

choice is minimal, a plausible explanation, says
Hoffman, is the child's realization of his or her
omnipotence.

In turn, this omnipotence gives way to a

sense of helplessness and eventually to an understanding
that he or she has the ability to control (to various
degrees depending on the situation) most of his or her
actions.
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It seems plausible tentatively to assume that there
is an early developmental progression from a sense
of omnipotence, to a sense of helplessness, and
finally to an awareness of having some but not
total control over one 1 s actions.
(1982, p. 300)
Another cognitive dimension of guilt arises when
the child comes to understand the moral norms of
society, specifically the norm against harming another.
The child, socialized to this norm, will experience
guilt when he or she engages in or contemplates actions
discrepant from the norm.
A more developmentally advanced form of guilt which
often occurs in adolescence is existential guilt
(Hoffman, 1980).

This guilt response is classically

portrayed by the late adolescent (college freshman) who
enters college and is exposed to information and
philosophical ideas which are at variance with and call
into question his or her middle class or upper class
background. As a consequence, the student experiences a
sense of guilt; that is, the late adolescent comes to
believe that his or her privileged position is
accountable for the distress and plight of others.
Having been made aware of others' impoverishment and
distress, the late adolescent is capable of
empathizing with these disadvantaged while
simultaneously feeling guilty over his or her privileged
state thus leading to an existential crisis.
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In sum, the attribution of guilt necessitates a
distinction of self from others, an awareness of one's
actions towards the other, and understanding of one's

own choices and responsibilities.
Paradoxically, Hoffman notes that guilt, albeit
really the result of non-prosocial action, in turn leads
one to act prosocially.

Further, the separateness

between empathic distress (observing the hurt of the
other) and guilt (perpetrator of an action injurious to
the other) necessitates close scrutiny.
The line between empathic distress and guilt thus
becomes very fine, and being an innocent bystander
is a matter of degree.
To the degree that one
realizes that one could have acted to help but did
not, one many never feel totally innocent.
This is
another way of saying that empathy and guilt may be
the quintessential social motives, because they may
transform another's pain into one's own discomfort
and make one feel partly responsible for the
other's plight whether or not one has actually done
anything to cause it. (1981, p. 59)
El]J2._athy_:_ Altruistic or ~oistic?
Hoffman (1975, 1977, 1981a, 1981b) appears
particularly sensitive to the charge that relieving
empathic distress through prosocial responding is
actually more in line with egoistic than altruistic
motivation (e.g., Piliavin, Rodin,

&

Piliavin, 1969).

A review of Hoffman's writings shows that he flatly
rejects this idea.

A summary of these findings follows.
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For one, even though prosocial behavior might
reduce empathic distress, the aim of the prosocial
action is the aid of the distressed person.

Hoffman

maintains that critics fail to distinguish between the
consequence and the aim of an action.

Second, when

individuals, including young children, are queried about
their aid of distressed others (e.g.,
Eisenberg-Berg,

&

Neal, 1979; Latane & Rodin, 1969),

they answer in terms of the other's plight rather than
their own distress.

Third, although some theorists

(e.g., Bandura, 1977) suggest that individuals engage in
prosocial acts for self-reward, Hoffman argues that it
is neither likely that the misery of others would
engender self-reward nor that satisfying self-reward
would be dependent upon helping someone is distress.
This is the cas~ because "there is nothing intrinsically
prosocial about self-reward, as there is about empathy"
(1981a, p. 134); furthermore, self-reward is too
contingent upon cultural factors and too variable to
serve as an evolutionary criteria for an altruistic
human nature.

Fourth, sympathetic distress is aroused

by hurt experienced by the other rather than distress
arising from one's own personal experience.

Fifth,

gratification for helping the other depends on the
alleviation of the other's plight, rather than focusing
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on one's own welfare.

And lastly, all motives have the

potential for satisfying the person; as this is the
case, such satisfaction cannot be used to define a
distinctive class of motives {e.g., altruistic or
egoistic motives).

Furthermore, such an inclusive

interpretation renders as useless the very idea of
altruism. However, one must question the logic of this
last argument.

That is, if all motives are

self-satisfying, then forming an independent group of
motives which are non-self-satisfying is questionable.
Hoffman does appear to be walking a thin tight rope in
his attempt to establish an independent altruistic
motive.

On the one hand, he appears to accept the

satisfaction which goes with all human actions.

On the

other hand, he wishes to establish the viable nature of
an altruistic response. In sum, Hoffman appears to
recognize the satisfaction that prosocial actions have
for the person, yet he maintains that empathy serves as
a distinctly prosocial action which supports the view of
an altruistic human nature.

Thus,

it is more appropriate to designate empathic
distress as an altruistic motive {perhaps, with a
quasi-egoistic component) than to group it with
such obviously self-serving motives as material
gain, social approval, and competitive success.
(1981a, p. 134).
~l!U2_athic Overarousal
If empathy is integral to the formation of
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altruism, then a legitimate question becomes the degree
of one's empathic arousal.

Thus, can one conclude that

the more empathy one experiences, the more altruistic
one becomes?
Hoffman does not believe the relationship of
empathy and prosociality is monotonic.

Too little

arousal to the distress of another lessens sympathetic
distress.

Equally important, however, empathic

overarousal impedes prosocial responding.

Thus,

Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hanson, and Richardson
(1979) demonstrated that health care professionals
(nurses), even though they desired to help, found it
difficult to remain the same room as terminally ill
patients.

More recently,

(Shelton, 1985; Shelton

&

McAdams, in press) reported that whereas
perspective taking and empathic concern were
significantly related to a self-report prosocial
measure, empathic distress (overarousal to distress) was
unrelated to prosociality.

Interestingly, Hoffman

(1981a) surmises that the lack of relationship between
empathic overarousal and helping most likely aided
evolutionary survival; that is, overarousal is often
associated with severe if not hopeless situations which
enable the observer, therefore, to conserve energies and
interventions for more hopeful helping situations.
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Evidence Supportina Empathy as a Basis for Altruism
A large amount of empirical evidence has been
gathered to support Hoffman's view that empathy is a
basis for altruistic action.

The five major texts on

positive social behavior published in the last decade
(Bridgeman, 1983a; Eisenberg, 1982a; Rushton &
Sorrentino, 1981; Staub, 1978, 1979) devote
considerable space to empathy as the affective mechanism
(component) responsible for ~rosncjal behavior.

Based

on extant research, Staub (1978), in a comprehensive
review of positive social behavior, has stated that
although

11

it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly

the mediating influence of empathy on helping" (p. 146),
a cumulative review of the research does "suggest that
empathy is a likely determinant of helping" (p. 148}.
Rushton {1980, 1981) has maintained that empathy is a
critical ingredient in the formation of the

11

altruistic

personality" and has cited numerous studies to
substantiate this claim.

Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen

(1978) have reported that empathy is positively related
to helping behavior in adolescents.

Buckley, Sjegel,

and Ness (1979) found that children who were altruistic
scored significantly higher on empathy measures than
their peers while Ornum, Foley, Burns, DeWolfe, and
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Kennedy (1981) reported this same relationship held true
for college students.
At the same time, although researchers generally
conclude that empathy is a vital component for prosocial
responding, the relationship between empathy and
prosocial behavior is complex.

Thus, inconsistencies

are found in empathic experiencing in children whereas a
more uniform picture emerges for adults.

Most likely

differences among children are due to developmental
stages because children are less likely to cognize
accurately or lack the awareness required for
implementing prosocial behaviors.
Furthermore, empathy alone is not sufficient to
account for prosocial responding.

Although numerous

researchers have linked empathic development and
prosocial responding, no theorist has maintained that
empathy alone is sufficient to bring about prosocial
behaviors.

In this regard, Eisenberg (1982b) has noted

that the adolescent can justify his or her personal
behaviors (or lack thereof) by a diverse array of
reasons ranging from hedonistic desires to internalized
moral principles and that "in real life, situations that
call for prosocial actions vary across many dimensions"
(p. 241}.

And Hoffman (1982) has stated that ''although

one's empathic proclivities may make one more receptive
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to certain moral values, empathy alone cannot explain
how people formulate complex moral ideologies and apply
them in situations" (p. 310).
In addition, situational variables appear to occupy
a role in the activation of an empathic response;
consequently, even empathic arousal is not likely to be
triggered in all situations (Feshbach, 1982).

From

another perspective, researchers must carefully
scrutinize the intensity of the affective component of
empathy as well as mood states accompanying the arousal
of empathy (e.g., Cialdini, Kenrick,

&

Baumann, 1982;

Eisenberg, 1982).
As the above discussion suggests, the question for
researchers is not whether empathic arousal is linked to
prosociality but under what conditions is empathy most
likely to induce a prosocial response.
Sex Differences in Empath_y
If empathy is posited as integral for morality,
then a salient issue must be the question of possible
gender differences.

Clearly, the presence of sex

differences poses ethical and philosophical problems for
an empathically based morality; in short, such
inequality relegates the disadvantaged sex to a
condition of moral inferiority.
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Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), in an extensive review
of the literature on empathy, have reported no
significant differences exist between the empathic
experiences of males and females.

Hoffman (1977) has

labeled this conclusion "premature" (p. 713).

Examining

closely the specific studies reviewed by Maccoby and
Jacklin, Hoffman has stated that only six of their
studies can be classified as true measures of vicarious
affective arousal to another's experience (Hoffman's
definition of empathy).

In all six of these studies,

says Hoffman, females obtained greater levels of empathy
than males.

Hoffman has noted that combining other

studies which recognized another's distress "masked!! the
true differences that do exist between males and
females.
Hoffman's (1977) own review of the literature has
led him to conclude that differences between males and
females do exist.

He has stated "what is most striking

about the empathy finding ... is the fact that in every
case, regardless of the age of the subjects or the
measures used, the females obtained higher scores than
did the males" (p. 715).

In an examination of 16 recent

articles, Hoffman has found that in all 16 studies
females reported higher empathy scores than males.
random chance of such a uniform confirmation on 16

The
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independent samples, says Hoffman, i s l in 64,000.

He

has concluded that
although the magnitude of the difference may not
have been great, the finding overall clearly
provide a stronger case for the proposition that
females are more empathic through the life cycle
than that no sex differences exist."
(p. 715).
Feshbach 1 s

(1982) extensive analysis of empathy

differences in children has supported Hoffman 1 s
conclusion.

She adds, however, that in children

numerous and complex factors account for male and female
differences.
Scales to measure empathy have also supported
differences between males and females.

Mehrabian and

Epstein's (1972) scale for empathy measurement
differentiated at a significant level between males and
females.

These findings were supported by Davis'

(1980)

multidimensional approach to empathy wherein among all
four dimensions (empathic concern,
perspective-taking, personal distress, and fantasy)
females scored significantly higher than males (2 <
. 001) .

Further, it is noteworthy that an analysis of
Davis' findings supports Hoffman's argument for empathic
differences.

Hoffman (1977) has stated that although

there is clear evidence for differences between males
and females regarding the level of affective arousal
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(measured by the empathic concern subscale), no such
consistency can be found with more cognitively oriented
measures, such as perspective-taking.

Davis (1980) has

noted that his own research results show that although
perspective-taking is highly significant, male and
female differences are lowest for this subscale thus
lending support to Hoffman's conclusion that
perspective-taking is a less discriminant measure of
male-female differences.
Besides the cognitive dimension (perspective-taking
subscale) and affective dimension (empathic concern
subscale), Davis' multi-dimensional approach identifies
two other subscales--personal distress and fantasy.
The personal distress subscale measures extreme
emotional arousal to another's distress.

In other

words, this scale appears to be a more extreme dimension
of affective arousal to another's plight.

This

dimension is important because Hoffman (1981, 1982) has
noted that affective overarousal can attenuate helping
behavior in individuals who are exposed to another's
distress.
Davis'

(1980) finding that females experience

significantly more distress at another's plight could
result from several factors.

First, the affective

arousal evinced by women on the empathic concern
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subscale and supported by Hoffman's (1977) findings
might carry over to a more extreme response leading to
affective over-arousal.

Second, Hoffman has suggested

that males are oriented to a more "instrumental" role
which implies an active mastery of the world and social
competence.
question,

Extending this thinking to the present

if females are less socialized to initiate

behaviors to relieve the distress of another, then it is
plausible that their affective arousal to another might
well lead to personal distress.
Davis' fantasy subscale measures an individual's
tendency to imaginatively take the role of another.
Several items on this subscale were taken from an
earlier scale developed by Stotland et al.

( 1978).

Unfortunately, Stotland et al. reported no findings from
their data regarding sex differences for their scale.
Staub (1978) has reported that a difficulty with fantasy
research that relates to empathy and helping behaviors
is the question of external validity; in other words,
real life situations are often inherently more complex
than the "imagine" conditions developed in experimental
settings.

Hoffman (1977) has suggested that females are

more apt to imagine themselves as another.

This

predisposition is the result of affective arousal,
socialization experiences, and an inner sense of self
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which seeks interaction with others.

Staub (1978) gives

indirect support to this conclusion; he has noted that
females are more inclined to attend to the feelings of
others and place greater value on being considerate of
others.

Gilligan (1982), moreover, has argued that

females place greater emphasis than males on the values
of care and intimacy.
In addition,

the statements on Davis' fantasy

subscale have a distinctly empathic focus which
emphasizes consideration and awareness of others.

In

light of the above, his findings of a high statistical
significance (2 < .001) between males and females are

most likely the result of the sensitivity of the measure
to the value females place on personal
attentiveness towards others.
More recently, Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) have
undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the extant
literature in order to ascertain whether there does
indeed exist sex differences in empathy.

The

researchers note that a variety of constructs have been
utilized to measure empathic responses (e.g., infant
crying, self-reports, observer ratings).

Utilizing

meta-analytic techniques, they report the following
findings:

(a)

Females exhibit more reflexive crying

than males, yet methodological considerations
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limit what can be concluded about sex differences.

(b)

When picture/stOry measures of empathy were reported
females had a slight advantage, but this finding is
unclear due to the fact in all cases where females
scored significantly higher than males a female
experimenter was employed while, conversely, in all
studies where males scored higher a male experimenter
was used.

(c) In studies where self-report measures

were utilized after viewing simulated emotional
situations, the "limited data" led Eisenberg and Lennon
to conclude there exists a "tendency" for females to
respond more empathically, yet this concJusion is
compromised, say the researchers, by the
inconsistency noted when subjects are rated on other
measures (e.g., facial cues) which render any conclusion
suspect.

(d)

When physiological response measures were

employed the researchers concluded that "there is little
evidence of a sex difference in physiological response
to another's emotional distress.

(e)

The use of

facial, vocal, and gestural features do not produce sex
differences.

In studies where children's reactions to

another 1 s distress were unobtrusively observed, no sex
differences were reported.

( f)

Self-report measures of

empathy (e.g., the Mehrabian empathy measure) show
extremely high significance findings favoring females.
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Eisenberg and Lennon report that for adults some levels
of significance were beyond 2 < .000000001.
The researchers state
Indeed, according to the meta-analysis computed for
these studies, the finding of a sex difference
favoring females is Z = 18.35, 2 < .0001, with a
mean effect size of .99.
According to the
fail-safe statistic, 2,534 studies with a finding
of no sex differences would be needed to reduce the
Z to below significance at the .05 level. (p. 116)
All in all, Eisenberg and Lennon conclude that
gender differences regarding empathy are a function of
the methodology employed.

Use of self-report measures

most consistently show sex differences, but such
self-presentations are most likely to be explained by
influences such as cultural stereotypes and societal
expectations.

Thus the overwhelming conclusion that can

be drawn from self-report measures is that there exists
a clear difference between the capacity of males and
females for empathy.

However,

interpretations of this

finding must be made cautiously. In sum, Eisenberg and
Lennon state that any conclusions drawn from the extant
empirical research must be "circumscribed and tentative"
(p.

126).

They conclude that "indeed, at the present,

all that can be concluded with confidence is that many
important issues concerning sex differences in emotional
empathy are, as yet, unresolved" (p. 126).
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In sum, taken together, studies show that the
relationship of empathy and prosociality is accepted by
researchers.

However, the multidimensional nature of

empathy as well as the methodological issues involved
render suspect any conclusive statement as to the
presence of sex differences.
Limitations of an Empathic Morality
Although Hoffman {1984) maintains that empathy
allows for a moral orientation fundamentally distinct
from Kohlberg's justice orientation, he does not believe
that empathy resolves all moral issues and problems.
Below are areas where an empathy based morality is
problematic.
Empathic Overarousal.

There appears to be an optimal

level wherein empathic arousal induces sympathetic
distress.

On the one hand, too little arousal lessens

the likelihood of a prosocial response.

On the ot~~r

hand, too great arousal may encourage an egoistic
concern for one's own welfare thereby weakening the
likelihood of a prosocial response.
Qth~.J1£~~Lt~sues.

A second limitation for an empathy

based morality is the nature of the moral problem.

An

empathic morality is most likely to be utilized in
situations calling for actions of benevolence or agape.
Moral issues focusing on limited resources and
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conflictual rights are less likely to be resolved within
the domain of an empathic morality.

For example, an

employer might be sympathetic with the plight of an
unemployed.

However, how many unemployed workers are

hired and the wage they are paid is contingent upon
other factors (e.g., the financial situation of the
company, the financial obligations owed current
employees).

Furthermore, empathic arousal might lead

the empathizer to accept uncritically the
distressed person's point of view or to lose sight of
long term solutions.

In effect, empathic arousal is

vulnerable to a "situational immediacy" wherein the
moral concern at issue is unduly influenced and
potentially subordinate to the immediate emotional
turmoil experienced by the empathizer.
The Lack of Directional Focus.

Hogan (1973), although

endorsing the critical importance of empathy in
morality, notes that empathic experiences "can produce
an equivocating jellyfish as well as a compassionate
person with a broad moral perspective" (p. 224).

In the

case of an empathy based morality, there exists no
guiding principle which allows the empathizer to
evaluate his empathic inclinations or direct his
emotional arousal.

Thus, the individual can become

overly biased in favor of the distressed person or the
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"equivocating jellyfish'' and paralyzed with inaction and
equivocation.

LEin.~LCOl]_l]_en t
In sum, examination of Kohlberg and Hoffman's
accounts of morality show merits and limitations.
Recently, Gibbs and Schnell (1985) have set forth the
need to consider both perspectives when discussing
questions of morality.

More specifically, they

underscore the use of affect and cognition in both
Kohlberg's moral development approach and in what they
term Hoffman's socialization approach.

Still, such

consideration does not erase the priority each theorist
proposes.

Nonetheless, there most likely exists a good

measure of truth to their urging to consider both
approaches.
It is probably that both cognitive and
affective sources of motivation are usually
required for the accomplishment of good and
fair behavior in the face of narrowly egoistic
impulses.
An action that is fair or that
rectifies an injustice is especially likely to
be completed if its cognitive motivation is
enhanced by empathy or empathy-based guilt.

CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS AN EVERYDAY MORALITY
The issue of morality has received increasing
interest in the public arena.

Social philosopher

Michael Novak has remarked that "the nation's return to
this discussion [morality] is one of the decisive events
of the last twenty years" (McBee, 1985).

A 1984 Gallup

poll suggests that the overwhelming majority of American
parents support the discussion of morality within the
American school system (Solorzano, 1985).

Higher

education has also attempted to respond to this renewed
interest.

Currently, in any given year, America's

institutions of higher learning offer ll,OOO courses in
areas of applied ethics over a wide variety of
disciplines (McBee, 1985).
The renewed interest in morality arises in part from
recent disclosures of questionable moral practices.
Recently national attention has focused on corruption of
major officials in government (e.g, Chicago, New York);
in business (e.g., E. F. Hutton): and in education
(cheating scandals at Stanford ·University, the
University of Southern California, sports scandal at
Tulane University).

Furthermore, according to a
96
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national Roper poll survey, one of four Americans admits
cheating on his or her income tax returns.

Resultant

lost revenue to the federal government is estimated at
well over 135 billion dollars.

In addition, in the

private sector it is estimated that employers lose 160
billion dollars annually from individuals who misuse

work time (Hassett, 1981; McBee, 1985).
In light of the above, the question of honesty, the
nature of helpfulness, and a basic orientation that
limits egoistic concerns and the desire for personal
aggrandizement are issues of significance for American
society.

In essence, the positive behaviors studied in

the now classic Hartshorne and May research are
questions of increasing relevance.
The Definition of Eve~y_d~ Moral_i!_y in the Context of
Conte~ora~y_ American Culture
The definition of morality provided herein is one
attempt to answer Haan's challenge to psychology to
rethink the meaning of morality and to conceptualize a
morality appropriate for "everyday" life.
research cited thus far,

Based on the

three points are crucial.

First, Hoffman's research on

empathy pinpoints the

universality of and the capacity for an awareness and
Vicarious experience of another's needs.

Second, the

unanimity accorded the significance of prosocial
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behaviors for both relational and social functioning as
well as the necessity for a behavioral dimension
highlights the need to incorporate prosocial behavior as
an integral factor in any definition of morality.
Third, the fact that moral agents must strive to find
meaning and value as they encounter a complex array of
realities and situations necessitates a multi-visioned
approach to morality that is sensitive to the personal,
interpersonal, and social dimensions of huma~
experience.
Everyday morality is defined herein as, simply
stated, behaviors that aid others in the context of
daily human social exchanges.

In effect, morality is

viewed as distinctly prosocial behaviors which occur
within a person's daily life.
This view of morality is similar to Damon's (1975)
view of positive justice which is concerned with
problems associated with prosocial responding.

In his

own research (Damon, 1975, 1980), Damon has shown a
sequential development of childhood views regarding
positive justice.

It is only with adolescence, however,

that integration of moral principles and the self is
accomplished (Damon, 1984).
In addition to this general definition of everyday
morality, it is also asserted that this morality can
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best be understood within the context of three
d:imens:ions (or as discussed herein--three "visions").
These visions are:

the personal, the interpersonal, and

the social. Given the definition of morality described
above, personal morality is defined as an anonymous {on
the part of the agent) prosocial response or a response
that benefits a person(s) unknown to the moral agent.
The classical image of this type of person is the Good
Interpersonal morality is defined as a pro-

Samaritan.

social response directed towards a person known by the
moral agent.

Social morality is defined as behavior

which fosters the eradication of social :injustice or
attempts to aid those who suffer from this :injustice
(e.g., discr:iminat:ion, :inequality).

The argument for

three discrete visions of morality offers a maximally
useful strategy for understanding the "specificity
versus generality" controversy regarding moral behavior.
As noted previously, Rushton's reanalysis of the
Hartshorne and May data led him to argue for an
"altruistic personaJ:ity" or what he termed a general
moral orientation predisposed towards altruistic
behavior.

Yet, no theorist contends that one's behavior

is ~!~~-~ moral.

It is unlikely, moreover, that an

individual's actions are uniformly moral across all
situations particularly when the individual's actions
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are occasioned by a vast array of interpersonal complexities, situational cues, and diverse if not contradictory informational data.

As a consequence, viewing

morality from one of these three visions provides
insight into prosocial responding.

Use of personal,

interpersonal, and social dimensions provides a way for
understanding how personhood is constituted.

For

example, one scholastic definition of person is "a
separate being subsisting in an intellectual nature"
(distinctum subsistens in natura intellectuali).

Within

this context, a human person was viewed as someone
unique.

Framed in contemporary terms, philosophical

psychology views this uniqueness as shown in the form of
purposive behavior.

That is, the human person, from the

nature of consciousness can intend to aid others and
help those in distress.

The human person has, in other

words, a conscious sense of self-definition ("I am a
caring person") which provides a psychic context
permitting one to aid others (for a discussion of the
philosophical perspective and its relation to psychology
see Howard, 1985; Howard & Conway, 1986; Manicas &
Secord, 1983).

A second way of viewing the human

person is relational or, as designated herein, interpersonal; a person is defined in-relation-to others.
The dialogal understanding of person has found emphasis
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in the writing of contemporary

theologians who under-

stand the person as relational. That is, an individual
does not exist in isolation from the community.

He or

she develops sustaining and nurturing relationships
which are fundamental for psychological health (e.g.,
Erikson, 1963; Heath, 1965). Finally, a third view of
personhood has received significant attention in current
writings which focus on the social dimension of
humanity.

Contemporary writing in Marxism and recent

theological writings have explored this understanding
(e.g., political theology, liberation theology).

Thus,

the individual is not simply defined in terms of
personal relationships to others in society; rather,
there is a societal need for some honoring of the
"common good'' that requires commitment from all of
society's members.
A wide variety of writings provide a conceptual
understandings to the three-fold delineation of everyday
morality.

The following brief discussion is meant to be

illustrative, not exhaustive, of these writings.

A

considerable body of literature has viewed the
individual's moral self as inherently linked to the
capacity to make private moral decisions based on
personally meaningful value systems (e.g., Conn, 1981;
Nelson, 1973).

These values systems stand as a monitor
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of the "quality" of one's relationships with others.
This quality is ~xemplified by one's conduct and the
meeting of obligations within relationships. Albeit
discussions on the moral self are sometimes
controverted, there exists general consensus that a
privately held and internalized value system is an
essential factor for healthy and growthful human
experiencing.

For example, Rokeach and Regan (1980)

have argued that successful therapeutic outcomes can be
facilitated by focusing on the client's
contradictory behaviors which create "a state of
self-dissatisfaction"; in other words, the client's
realization of the failure to live up to a private moral
ideal creates an ensuing dissatisfaction which in turn
fosters changes in behaviors thus making "them all more
integrated with the person's self-conception as a
basically moral and competent person 11 (p. 580).
Professional organizations (e.g., the American
Psychological Association, 1981) recognize the importance of a private value system; this professional body
explicitly mentions

11

conscience 11 as an important ethical

guide for the psychologist to consider when conducting
research.

Finally, research on the mature personality

supports the importance of a private moral self.

Heath

(1965, 1980) has stated that an autonomous and stable
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value system is integral to healthy and mature functioning.

After reviewing several developmental and

personality theorists, Blocher (1974) has pointed out
that commitment to personal values is an essential
component of the "effective personality."

In sum, the

thread that weaves consistently through these writings

is the relationship of self to personal values.

Some of

these personal values no doubt influence one's conduct
or behavior towards others.

In terms of the present

discussion of morality, the individual responds
prosocially to the distress and needs of others.

The

thrust of this vision of morality is the popularly
understood image of the Good Samaritan; aiding one
unknown to the person.
The argument for an interpersonal morality needs
little introduction.

Historically, ethical guidelines

(e.g., the Ten Commandments) insist upon the intrinsic
unity of ethical ideals and interpersonal behaviors.
The capacity to engage in meaningful human relationships
is integral to mature conceptions of the person in
developmental literature (e.g., Erikson, 1963}.
Finally, two recent critiques of academic psychology
have raised the possibility for an interpersonal
morality that is prosocial in nature.

Bergin (1980) has

challenged what he terms the clinical-humanistic bias of
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contemporary psychotherapeutic theorizing and argues
that consideration must be given to a value system that
allows for commitment and self-giving in relationships.
More recently, Wallach and Wallach {1983) have viewed
psychology in general and psychotherapy in particular,
as dominated by an egoistic frame of reference; they
offer as an alternative a psychological view of the
human person which is interpersonally oriented.
Unlike personal and interpersonal morality, the
viewing of a social morality is a more recent
phenomenon.

Groome (1980) has fashioned an approach to

religious education which takes on a distinctly social
character whereas Hauerwas {1981) has argued for a
social ethic that is sensitive to the social needs of
society; he situates this ethic in the context of
symbolic and story forms of social theorizing.

Finally,

psychology is not immune from the challenge to consider
a social morality.

Current questioning of

psychotherapeutic practices and social values reflects
the need for mental health professionals to address the
concerns of social morality.

For example, Eldridge

{1983} has argued that professionals can integrate
social actions strategies into their professional
practices.

Butcher {1983} has reviewed the literature

concerning the mental health practitioner as a change
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agent (one who actively attempts to influence and change
social structures) and argues that change agentry is a
necessary and inevitable role for the mental health
professional in today's complex society.

Perhaps the

most enlightening statement on the role of psychology
and social morality comes from Bandura (1974) who has
stated "if psychologists are to have a significant
impact on common problems of life, they must apply their
corrective measures to detrimental societal practices
rather than limit themselves to treating the casualties
of these practices" (p. 86).
Using the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS), Shelton
(Shelton, 1985; Shelton & McAdams, in press) presented
evidence which showed construct validity among research
findings and this three-fold understanding of everyday
morality. This instrument is a paper and pencil measure
used to assess a secondary school adolescent's response
to the three fold dimensions of morality discussed
above.

The instrument provides the adolescent with the

opportunity to respond to a series of daily life
situations in terms of the likelihood of engaging in a
prosocial response.

All three samples (combined

male-female, male, female) obtained their highest mean
on the interpersonal score.

This finding is expected

inasmuch as interpersonal morality is defined as
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prosocial behavior which benefits someone the moral
agent knows.

Characteristically, individuals are most

apt to behave favorably towards those individuals who
are friends or personal acquaintances (e.g., Staub,
1978).

Conversely, the greatest variance in scores

occurs with the social morality subscore.

This type of

morality is the most complicated in terms of issues and
most potentially divisive as the result of political and
social ideologies which can be interjected as a
rationale for deciding what is an appropriate behavior.
As expected, both males and females scored lowest on
this dimension of morality.
findings are of interest.

Furthermore, two other
First, interpersonal morality

correlates most strongly ( .45) with perspective-taking
(an empathy subscale of the IRI measure developed by
Davis).

This is a persuasive finding because one would

be most apt to be sensitive towards those one knows.
Second, the morality subscale measures (personal,
interpersonal, and social) are positively correlated
least frequently with the distress empathy subscale
measure.

This finding is supported by Hoffman 1 s

assertion that empathic overarousal (distress) inhibits
prosocial responding.

Furthermore, a regression

analysis failed to find distress as a predictive
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variable for everyday morality.

Most likely, distress

Jeads one to focus inwardly in psychically defensive

ways thereby lessening the ability to recognize or
respond to the needs of others.
Several reasons exist as to why an understanding of
everyday morality as defined above is significant for
theorists and researchers.

First, an everyday morality

that is defined as prosocial responding appears
compatible with individual's actual understanding of
morality.

For example, Colangelo and Dettmann (1985)

asked a sample of over 300 elementary school students to
write a story depicting what they viewed to be a moral
problem.

Unlike Kohlberg's dilemmas which commonly

understood moral problems in terms of public welfare
concerns, the overwhelming majority of students
described personal and practical concerns with almost
half describing relationship issues (peers and family).
"The characteristics of the problems generated by these
students, however, differ considerably from Kohlberg's
hypothetical dilemmas" (p. 270).

Yussen (1977) found a

similar tendency among adolescents.
A second reason for social science investigation of
an everyday morality arises from widening public
interest in positive behaviors.

As noted previously, a

large majority of Americans favor school interventions
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which delineate moral standards.
secretary of Education.

More recently, U.S.

William Bennett has endorsed

character education as a goal for public education.

A

sign of this upsurge of interest is seen in the shifting
focus accompanying the teaching of values.

In the

l960's the demands for tolerance and appreciation of
diverse lifestyles led educators to adopt value
neutrality regarding questions of morality.

Currently,

a growing emphasis in school districts is encouraging
the teaching of nonsectarian values such as compassion
and honesty {Solorzano, 1985).
Moreover, an issue of r2_~~daJ_us published in the
early nineteen eighties which focuses on American
elementary and secondary education :eatures articles
highlighting the necessity of positive social behaviors
among students.

Sociologist Gerald Grant {1981),

commenting on the character of the American school,
notes that the emphasis placed heretofore in value
neutrality has led to a crisis in American education.
"The crisis of authority in the American school is that
in many places we no longer have any agreement on what
that provisional morality ought to be" (p. 146).

By

Provisional morality Grant means a socialization to
"some set of standards, beliefs, and values about what
it means to be a human being" (p. 146) which can be
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reevaluated by the child when he or she reaches
adulthood.

The point to be made, though, is Grant's

belief that the educational system is unable to reach
consensus on what such a morality might be.

As a

consequence, schools have for too long avoided moral
content and fostered a value neutrality.

As a solution,

Grant advocates a re-commitment to a provisional
morality which distinctly champions positive behaviors
associated with the everyday morality described herein.
He argues that a provisional morality must "express some
of the conscious beliefs of a democratic pluralist
society" (p. 147}.

Characteristics of such a morality

include
the minimal order required for dialogue, the
willingness to listen to one another, respect
for truth, the rejection of racism (or
openness to participation in the dialogue), as
well as those transcendent values that shore
up the whole society--a sense of altruism and
service to others and respect for personal
effort and hard work. Without such an
agreement, one does not have a public, but a
kind of radical, relativism; not pluralism but
mere coexistence.
(p. 148}
In a similar vein, Jerome Kagan (1981) has
maintained that the American school exercises critical
function for the American community.

He argues that a

responsibility of the school is to develop a "dimension
of character" among students.

He notes the

characteristics critical for such character dimension.
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Thus I borrow from both the moral absolutists
as well as the utilitarians in suggesting the
dimensions of character to be celebrated at
least until the balance is restored.
Kindness, restraint on aggression, honesty, and a
reasonable blend of pride and humility stand
at the top of my list for several reasons.
First, the community currently needs more
citizens to practice these standards, and many
youth are dissatisfied with the callous acts
of privacy, cheating, lying, and, on rare
occasions, destruction of a peer's notes they
are forced to in order to survive in a system
that can award special merit to only a few.
But my observations of children persuade me
that kindess and control of aggression have a
natural priority in development.
Three-year-olds spontaneously offer toys to peers in
distress and are reluctant to strike another,
unless the latter intrudes or threatens. (p.
163)
In a related event, two recent books published by
psychologists underscore the renewed emphasis on
positive behaviors in academic circles.

Psychologists

Lickona (1985) and Schulman and Mekler (1985),

in books

expressly written for parents, maintain that it is an
important enterprise for parents to encourage moral
behavior in

their children.

While eschewing a morality

based on religious beliefs, the overriding theme of both
works is that morality which is defined in terms of
prosocial values (compassion, care, kindness, respect,
helpfulness} and behaviors is a legitimate enterprise to
be taught to children and adolescents.
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'th.~_Ag_y~nt~Qf an Everyday Morality in Light of
0!.~~ent Moral Discussion
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) has characterized the
current state of moral thinking as one of moral
disarray.

He notes that the contemporary state of

morality is one "of grave disorder."

According to

MacIntyre, culture lacks a consensual understanding of
morality and thereby provides no uniform rationale for
deciding moral disputes.

"For what analysis of A's and

B's position reveals once again is that we have all too
many disparate and rival moral concepts" (p. 235).

In

essence, the idea of a moral community has been lost and
opposing views of justice (to take an example) vie for
dominance, each with his or her own adherents.
This fragmenting of community, which MacIntyre
discusses in terms of moral philosophy, is taken up by
Bellah (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler

&

Tipton,

1985) and reframed in light of sociological insight.
Commenting upon the ethical quandary which exists today,
Bellah notes
Now if selves are defined by their preferences, but those preferences are arbitrary, then
each self constitutes its own moral universe, and
there is finally no way to reconcile conflicting
claims about what is good in itself .... In the
absence of any objectifiable criteria of right and
wrong, good or evil, the self and its feelings
become our only moral guide. What kind of world
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is inhabited by this self, perpetually in progress,
yet without any fixed moral end?
(p. 76)
Historically, says Bellah, the dominant ethos in
American culture has been the focus on "individualism".
In short, individualism in both its utilitarian (the
personal maximization of goods) and expressive (the
primacy of self-actualized feelings)

forms has sundered

the individual from his or her historically felt
rootings in community.

Consequently, Americans remain

deeply ambivalent about their individualism.
The inner tensions of American individualism
add up to a classic case of ambivalence. We
strongly assert the value of our self-reliance
and autonomy. We deeply feel the emptiness
of a life without sustaining social commitments.
Yet we are hesitant to articulate our sense
that we need one another as much as we need to
stand alone, for fear that if we did we would lose
independence al together.
(pp. 150-151}
The philosophical quandary and social strains
emanating from disparate moral positions and the
dominance of selfhood in American culture will not be
resolved within these pages.

Yet, the definition of

everyday morality set forth herein offers the potential
for a unifying vision among diverse and disparate moral
views.
In other words, empathic experiences which induce
prosocial behavior provide a consensual basis for
morality as well as the bridging theme among diverse
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moral beliefs and autonomous human behaviors.

That is,

although individuals reason to conflictual moral views
and subsequently engage in contradictory if not opposing
behaviors, all individuals are endowed with an empathic
sense (Hoffman, 1975, 1977) and a commonly agreed upon
consensus is that a minimal level of prosocial behavior
is requisite for personal and societal functioning
(Rushton, 1980).

Thus, an everyday morality that is

empathy based offers the opportunity for personal
understanding and consensus as well as opportunities for
social discourse.

Bellah's discussion of how Americans understand and
express their prosocial behaviors provides insight into
how empathy might provide increased moral understanding.
American life is best characterized as "a society in
which the individual can only rarely and with difficulty
understand himself and his activities as interrelated in
morally meaningful ways with those of other, different
Americans" (p. 50).

As such, individualism is ''the

dominant ideology of American life" (p. 302).

A

consequence of individualism's dominating presence is
the relegation at times of even prosocial behaviors into
some form of enlightened self-interest.

That is, the

ethos of individualism encourages one to respond to the
another's needs if and only if, all things considered,
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such actions benefit oneself.

Equally important,

explanations for such behaviors, as pointed out by Smith
(1986), are often expressed in "cost benefit" terms;
this phenomenon results from the paucity of an adequate
moral language.

Because empathy (as defined by Hoffman}

entails cognitive and affective dimensions which in turn
induce a behavioral response, it is reasonably likely
that prosocial behaviors engendered by empathic arousal
provide an optimum forum both for encouraging social
interaction and allowing for self-insight into the
motives for one's actions.

All in all, given proper

social reinforcement and environmental supports,
empathic expressions would provide a useful antidote to
the impoverished understandings of prosocial
inclinations which Bellah maintains are commonly
expressed in American life.
Foundation for An Everyday Morality
It is maintained herein that empathy is a foundation for everyday morality.

As previously noted, the

argument that empathy is a basis for prosocial behaviors
has been suggested by numerous psychologists (Batson and
Coke, 1981; Coke, Batson,

&

McDavis, 1978; Hoffman,

1980; Rushton, 1980, 1981; Staub, 1978).

In order to

ascertain the relationship of everyday morality and
empathy Shelton (Shelton, 1985; Shelton

&

McAdams, in
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press) developed the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS).
Briefly stated, this scale described 45 everyday life
situations in which secondary school adolescents
responded in a Likert scale format as to their likelihood for engaging in a specific prosocial response.

The

criterion used for constructing the 45 situations was
the following:

The author had observed each

situation

occurring among adolescents he had either taught or
counseled, or he had been informed about the incident
through personal contact with an adolescent who had
experienced the situation.

The opportunity for this

contact with adolescents occurred while the author was
an instructor and counselor at a college preparatory
school in Denver, Colorado during the late seventies.
Utilizing one or the other of these criteria insured the
construction of prosocial situations which are commonly
experienced by adolescents in everyday life.

In a

preliminary study, the VMS successfully discriminated (£
< .001) between students engaged in voluntary school and

community service projects and a control group of
students.
Overall, a highly significant relationship emerged
between the total empathy score and the total morality
VMS score {.42,

£ < .001).

Although a cautionary note

is warranted given the correlational nature of the data,

116
the highly significant correlation combined with the
large body of supportive psychological literature lends
reasonable support to the conclusion that empathy is
integral for prosociality. In addition, a multiple
regression analysis found perspective-taking (the
cognitive component of empathy) and empathic concern
(the affective component of empathy) to be significant
predictors of an everyday moral orientation.

Moreover,

research supports the efficacy of paper and pencil
measures in predicting prosocial behaviors (EisenbergBerg & Mussen, 1978; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Rushton,
1981).

Finally, a broad range of studies have linked

empathy as a motivational force for fostering positive
behaviors (e.g., Goldstein

&

Michaels, 1985).

The use of empathy rather than justice (Kohlberg}
as a foundation for morality provides an alternative
view of morality advocated by some philosophers (e.g.,
Puka, 1985).

These critics, essentially, have posed the

question of how morality can be conceptualized with
reference to values such as compassion and love.
Moreover, moralities based on justice or prosociality
have both strengths and weaknesses.
It is important that we assess the merits and
demerits of a love or altruism rationale
against those of justice structure.
Just as
altruism may have difficulty resolving
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conflicts of interest, justice may have difficulty
(if it has anything to say at all) prescribing
ideals of character and community.
(A mixed or
complex conception of love or altruism could deal
with both issues). Where love may sometimes be
nondiscriminating regarding who gets what or
whether anyone gets the goods, justice may be
unacceptably indifferent as to what goods people
should pursue. (Puka, 1985, p. 197)
Furthermore, an empathy based morality finds support in
the psychological view of morality proposed by Kagan
(1984).

According to Kagan, the potential for a set of

feeling states "is a nonrelative platform upon which a
set of universal, or principled, moral standards can be
built" (p. 123).

Kagan offers the example of

considering whether to
point.

hurt someone to illustrate his

Rationalists (e.g., Rawls) would object to

harming another and base such refusals on Kant's ethical
imperative or the principle of the priority of human
life.

Notwithstanding these rationalist objections,

Kagan maintains that individuals refrain from such
behaviors primarily because of their emotional reactions; it is their need for standards which leads
individuals to develop rational justifications.
Optimally, the strongest moral convictions are likely to
be those that arouse one's emotions as well as satisfy
rational argumentations.
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Perhaps each of us is persuaded of the moral
rightness of an idea by two different,
incommensurate processes. One is based on
feelings; the other, on logical consistency with a
few deep premises. When a standard derives its
strength from either foundation, we find it
difficult to be disloyal to its directives. When
it enjoys the support of both, as it does for
torture and unprovoked murder, its binding force is
maximal.
(p. 124).
In other words, some human acts are so morally repugnant
that they shock basic moral sensitivities and invite a
deeply felt emotional response.

When in addition such

actions are devoid of any rational explanation (e.g.,
mass murder of a family)

they induce the strongest

objections; that is, they are viewed as violations of
one's deepest moral convictions.
Paralleling this emotional reaction is the child's
development of standards.

Kagan observes that empathy

provides one of several sources for standards; that is,
the child's feelings of discomfort, by age two, allows
for the inferences that another child who undergoes the
same experience will feel in a similar way.

This

inference based on one's own distress implies the
violation of some standard.

In sum, the capacity for

certain emotions and the corresponding needs for
standards emerge as the foundational soil for the
rooting of moral reasoning and ethical understandings.
Influences on an Everyday_M~~~li!_y
Everyday morality is not uniform across all
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situations.

Notwithstanding the presence of a general

moral orientation (e.g., Rushton, 1980), a variety of
factors influence an individual's inclination to respond
prosocially.

In short, even though a general moral

orientation may be a valid construct, specific developmental, situational, and social variables must be viewed
in order that everyday morality is not simply an
abstract understanding of morality but rather a morality
situated in the context of everyday life events.

The

following is a concise survey of salient factors which
affect prosocial tendencies.

~x
Behaviors which benefit others have generally been
defined in the literature as generosity (giving material
aid to another person), being helpful (aiding another
when he or she needs help), and bystander rescue
(intervening when another individual is in an emergency
situation)

(Staub, 1978).

Underwood and Moore (1982)

have noted that the results of studies regarding sex
differences are mixed.

In terms of generosity and

helpfulness, the consistent finding is that females
demonstrate more positive behavior than males.

The

researchers state that there does exist a sex
difference, albeit small, in the prosocial responses of
males and females; yet, this sex difference does not.
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always occur.

For example, there does exist evidence to

suggest that in some emergency situations, males are
more likely to intervene and aid the distressed person
than are females.

Staub (1978) has suggested that

perhaps the male-female differences exist because males
are more concerned with equity and keeping their
personal freedom;

these tendencies, consequently, might

lead them to be less helpful than females.

Thus an

individual in need might elicit a negative reaction from
the male who values independence and is dependent upon a
high level of status.

Staub notes, however, that

interpretations of male-female differences regarding
prosocial acts are complex due to the limitations of the
experimental studies and the numerous and at times
contradictory interpretations which can be given the
research findings.

In addition, Staub (1978) has

questioned Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) conclusion that
there exists no differences in the helping behaviors of
males and females.

This lack of differences, says

Staub, might be due to the types of studies they
examined.

For example,

in their discussion of rescue

studies, the researchers failed to note male tendencies
towards competence which might have led them to
intervene as much as females.
that

Staub (1978) has noted
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under certain circumstances females may be more
helpful than males, because they are competent in a
particular area, because being helpful is more
socially appropriate for them, or because certain
characteristics they acquired (or tend to possess
by heredity) make them more likely to be helpful.
(p.

254)

From another perspective, the values prized by
females might support a greater tendency for females to
act prosocially. Rokeach (Rokeach 1973, Rokeach and
Regan, 1980) has suggested that values represent ideal
end states which serve as evaluative standards for
personal actions.

Bearing this in mind, Feather (1980),

in a discussion of adolescent sex differences in value
orientation, noted that females are socialized to place
more emphasis on "communal" values and concerns which
favor caring behaviors whereas males are more likely to
adopt values which sustain independence and competit~ve
strivings.

Relatedly, Shelton (Shelton, 1985, Shelton

McAdams, in press) has found that female adolescents
consistently favored an everyday morality across
personal, interpersonal, and social dimensions when
compared with their male counterparts.
Q_r_oup Size
A consistent body of research has documented the
presence of others as having an effect on prosociality.
Latane, Nida and Wilson (1981) note

&
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There is little doubt that an individual's
likelihood of giving help decreases as the number
of other bystanders also witnessing an emergency
increases.
The evidence for this group size effect
is vast, remarkably consistent, and is comprised of
studies involving a wide variety of experimenters,
experimental situations, and participant
populations. (p. 309)
A limitation of group size studies is their
emphasis on emergency situations which, for the most
part, are not characteristic of everyday prosocial
responding.

Everyday situations rarely require the

urgent response that is characteristic of emergency
situations. Still, these bystander rescue studies offer
a necessary understanding to prosocial research, and,
relatedly, everyday morality which in turn must be
considered.

Latane, Nida, and Wilson (1981) reviewed 56

published and unpublished studies in which subjects
prosocial responses were measured.

The independent

variable in these studies was the subject alone or in
the presence of others (or the subject knew others were
observing the same situation).

In sum, 75% of people

tested alone helped, but fewer than 53% of those tested
with others helped.

In 48 of the 56 ~+~~;cs subjects

exposed to group conditions helped less.

The chances of

such findings over this range of studies occurring by
chance is one in 51 million.

Speculations as to why

individuals respond prosocially when alone include
adherence to internal norms of responsibility, guilt,
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and empathic arousal.

On the other hand, three factors

might explain the reduction in inclination to initiate
helping while in the presence of others.

First,

audience inhibition refers to how individuals might be
embarrassed if they deviate from their normal public
behavior.

Thus an individual might believe that he or

she could become embarrassed through misinterpreting the
emergency or intervening in a way that others consider
foolish.

Social influence is a second factor.

Individ-

uals look to others as measures for appropriateness
concerning their own behaviors; consequently, the
disinclination of other to offer aid most likely
influences one's decision to offer help.

Finally,

diffusion of responsibility offer a reason for refusing
to aid others.

If alone, the burden of responsibility

is solely one's own.

However, in a group, responsibili

ty is shared thereby lessening one's own feeling of
personal responsibility.
As noted above, group size investigations must be
interpreted cautiously for confirmation of any thesis on
everyday morality due to the ''emergency" nature of the
situational variable.

Nonetheless, in terms of everyday

morality, it is likely that group influences are likely
determinants in commonplace prosocial responding.
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Mood
:.:--A variety of studies haye investigated the role of
In general, positive mood states

emotions in helping.

foster positive social behaviors; in this regard,
experimental findings are relatively straightforward.

on

the other hand, negative mood states are more

complex.

Thus, guilt appears to induce prosociality

whereas sadness and failure,

to a great extent, appear

to inhibit prosocial responding.
are offered for this finding.

Numerous explanations

One of the most

persuasive explanations appears to be the shift of
attentional focus from the distressed person to oneself
thus lessening concern for the other
Salovey, Karylowski,

&

Hargis, 1981).

{Rosenhan,
Cialdini,

Kenrick, and Baumann {1982) shed light on the influence
of negative mood states.

These researchers offer a

negative relief state model to explore the relationship
of prosocial responding and mood.

According to these

researchers, a prosocial act becomes a source of
self-gratification thus serving the function of reducing
one's negative mood state.

All in all, these research-

ers view prosocial responses in light of negative mood
states as serving an instrumental function;
they are directed to altering one's mood.

that is,
On the other

hand, helping behaviors carried out when experiencing

125
positive mood states are viewed as "by products" of the
positive mood; iri other words, these states encourage
one to like others, be optimistic about future events,
and focus on positive memories.

Thus, positive mood

states serve as a foundation upon which prosocial
response naturally thrive and often occur.
socialization Factors
A variety of socialization factors have been linked
to prosociality.

Among these are:

modeling,

attribution, exhortation, reinforcement, punishment, and
verbal instruction (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; Grusec,
1981, 1982; Staub, 1978, 1979).

Staub (1981) has

attempted to apply these factors in working with school
age children.

According to Staub, effective

socialization to prosociality focuses on the
significance of reinforcement whereas Hoffman (1979)
advocates the use of gradual insight which comes with
inductive techniques.

More recently, psychologists have

attempted to translate these ideas into practical
applications for parents (e.g., Schulman
1985).

&

Mekler,

It follows that exposure to these factors, over

time, encourages the development of prosocial responses.
Conversely, limited experience with the above factors
most likely makes one less receptive or at least limited
in one's capacity to respond prosocially.
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-

other Influences
The amount

of

factors affecting one's inclination

to respond prosocially are immense.

In addition to

factors cited above, a variety of researchers
(Bridgeman, 1983a; Eisenberg, 1982a; Rushton

&

Sorrentino, 1981; Staub, 1978, 1979) have provided
evidence for a multitude of variables that are linked to
prosocial responding.

Among these factors are:

decision-making skills, one's level of perceptual
awareness, cognitive factors,

internal mediators such as

devaluation of others and just world conceptions,
situational factors, and feelings of personal
competency.
To summarize, an empathically based everyday
morality is most likely influenced by numerous factors
operating within a multitude of relationships and
situations.

Consequently, although the everyday

morality described herein is in some sense an abstract
concept, focus and attention to influences provides
recognition as to the complexity of morality as it is
experienced in daily life.
Norma Haan's Interactional Morality
Norma Haan has set forth an interactional view of
morality which offers similarities to the empathy based
everyday morality described herein.

The following is a
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brief discussion of Haan's understanding of morality.
Haan (1982) has disputed the disjunction between social
science inquiry and the study of morality.

In essence,

says Haan, the function of social science (she focuses
on psychology in particular) is an impartial explanation
of facts.

However, if social science attempts to be

value free then it inexorably fails for such a view of
science is no longer tenable (Haan, 1982; Haan et al.,
1985; Manicas and Secord, 1983}.

On the other hand,

social science is "scientific" when it examines facts
impartially.
To answer the question I initially posed,
moral research cannot be "scientific" if this
means being value neutral, but it can be
"scientific" in the sense of impartially
submitting all formulations to the full
reality of people's moral consensuses and
interactions in everyday life.
(pp. 11031104)

Haan criticizes Kohlberg's theory because it
proposes an understanding of morality that is unencumbered by the situational realities individuals must
confront in everyday life.
In everyday life, the dialectic between self
and other interests seldom leads to perfect
solutions but instead to compromises, to
discoveries of mutual interests, to choices of
the lesser of two evils, or to ways to rectify
temporary inequalities by future action.
In
contrast, traditional theories define moral
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situations as adversarial and hold out the promise
of perfect solution: One party is wrong while the
other is right.
These solutions strain relationships. (p. 1103)
Haan has described her view of morality as "everyday morality" (because it is focused on morality as it
is commonly experienced in everyday life) and "practical
morality" (because it is a morality that people actually
use) before settling on the term "interactional morality",

Haan favors what Packer (1985) has termed the

hermeneutic approach to psychology. As conceived by
Packer, this approach studies what people actually do in
their everyday lives.

Moreover, it is questionable

whether human can be studied simply as properties
subject to causal interpretations as in the physical
sciences.

Manicas and Secord (1983) maintain that the

problem of consciousness--the intentions, meanings, and
understandings humans give to everyday life
encounters--place limitations on or call for expansion
of the scientific approach.

Instead, these researchers

argue that attention must be given to ideals and
purposes which motivate people in their everyday lives.
Haan (1982), in turn, appears to accept this view.
To elucidate the contingently enacted moral
forms of everyday life is surely a task for
social scientists; however, enacted moralities
cannot be understood if separated from their
cherished forms.
Therefore the kinds of

129
analyses typically performed by
essential part of the empirical
empirical studies cannot reveal
because morality is flavored by
(p. 1103)

philosophers are an
search. Naively
morality's nature
cherished meanings.

According to Haan, the social scientist's study of
morality should assure several goals:

First, any study

of morality by scientists already assumes the adoption
of a value which she terms "the moral ground"; that is,
every morality must adhere to some essential ingredient
as the core experience of morality (e.g., for Kohlberg
this moral ground is ''justice" whereas for Haan it is
11

equality"--one 1 s moral concerns are taken seriously and

treated in a respectful manner by others).

Second,

social scientists must move beyond the empirical fallacy
(that the entire truth is contained within measurable
facts)

ucherished moral ideas have the power to move

history, so it is clear that social scientists need to
take more than observable morality into their accounts"
(p. 48).

Third, special emphasis must be placed on the

need to take into account moral action.

Fourth,

although important, the study of action must be comple
mented by what might be.

There appears to be, in other

words, a call by Haan for social scientists to examine
the significance of moral imagination--ideals which are
inspirational for peoples' lives (e.g., Martin Luther
King's speech "I Have a Dream''}. Fifth social scientists
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must be willing to embrace their peers in other
disciplines; in effect the study of morality must be
transdisciplinary.

All too often, says Haan, psychology

has narrowly focused on the individual while eschewing
the influences of sociopolitical contexts within which
moral actions transpire.
Haan openly admits that her thinking is "controversial" since it fails to follow traditional understandings of morality. In pointing out her challenge to
psychology and other social science disciplines, she
pinpoints six ''irreverent" theses germane to her
thinking.

Because these irreverencies concerning the

nature of interactional morality help to portray her
thinking, they are presented below.
1.
It [interactional morality] is irreverent
toward moral philosophy in reasoning that fresh,
clarifying insights may come out of attempts to
understand the moral psychology of ordinary people.
2.
It is irreverent toward research psychology by
arguing that valuing cannot be denied so the
cherished morality of people and researchers should
be openly brought into account.
3.
It is irreverent to the academy in general in
contending that vested boundaries among the
disciplines of social sciences and philosophy
hinder our coming to understand the moral basis of
life.
4.
It warns citizens not to accept too easily
psychologists' and sociologists' "scientifically
based" claims about morality, as truth without
dross.
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5.
It is irreverent toward old beliefs that the
educationally, politically, and economically
advantaged are morally superior and that the
disadvantaged's complaints are merely envy and
therefore without moral merit.
6.
It is irreverent toward the theory and work of
the pioneer psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, who
stirred philosophy when he added the idea of
development to classical moral theory, but who
stopped short, in our view, of apprehending the
promises and emendations that lie in practical
inquiry. (p. 4)
In her study of morality Haan has attempted to
bring together both the cognitive-developmental view of
Kohlberg (which emphasizes reasoning} and social
learning accounts of morality (which stress the
importance of societal and environmental influences). By
focusing on everyday life contexts, Haan contends that
her own interactional view of morality blends these two
approaches together.

Given this blending of the two

approaches she maintains that
in this formulation, morality is action.
People with moral dilemmas are actors involved
in real or imagined dialogues and negotiate
moral claims so that balanced, equalized
relations with others can be achieved or
reestablished.
In other words, when people
make moral choices, they interact with others
and within a given situation.
(p. 38}
Haan asserts that eight conclusions can be drawn
from an interactional approach to morality.
conclusions are listed below.

These eight
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l. Moral decisions are created and jointly
achieved in actual or imagined dialogues instead of
being drawn by single persons from principles or
learned generalizations.
2.
The reasoning involved is practical, not
formally logical.
3.
General self-interest is always a legitimate
part of dialogue, although a particular
self-interest may or may not be found legitimate in
particular dialogues.
4.
Moral decisions are not always expected to be
perfect, absolute solutions; they are often
compromises or choice between the lesser of two
evils.
5.
Young children are not seen as moral
primitives; they engage in moral dialogues at a
very early age and make self-chosen decisions.
6.
Moral skills, but not moral concern, develops
gradually rather than by stages.
7.
All aspects of people's functioning, including
thought, emotions, and motivations, are brought
into play during the dialogue and influence
eventual decisions.
8.
The adequacy of moral actions can vary,
depending on the contents or dilemmas and demands
and stress of immediate social contexts. {p. 39)

An implicit assumption in Haan's theory is the
centrality of equality in the moral dialogue.

That is,

Haan states that, above all, individuals place priority
in their need to have their moral concerns heard and
considered by others.

"The cherished value is that

participants' claims--interests in terms of facts,
needs, and contributions--are considered, understood,
and weighed" {p . 4 O ) .
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There are several similarities between interactional morality as described by Haan and an everyday
morality.

First, both moralities give recognition to

the role of affect.

However, for interactiona1 morality

affect is viewed more as an adaptive and coping device
that influences moral action whereas for everyday
morality affect represents the foundation on which
morality is constituted {although as already noted
empathic distress lessens the probability of moral
action).

Second, interactional morality has as its

moral ground, equality; on the other hand, everyday
morality views the moral ground as prosocial action.
Third, both mcralities leave open the possibility for
examining the role of values and their impact on moral
action.

Likewise, both emphasize action--what the

individual does.

In addition, both moralities are

sensitive to the context of everyday life events in
which moral actions transpire.

For interactional

morality this involves some type of consensual dialogue
and negotiation whereas for everyday morality such
context is centered on the possibility of responding
prosocially in daily life.
addressed to educators.

Finally, both moralities are

Haan et al.

(1985) has noted

that interactional morality is addressed "with professional social scientists in mind, but the primary
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concern is to address educators and parents" (p. 9).
Everyday morality, on the other hand, is an attempt to
conceptualize a morality that is sensitive to educational concerns, and, in particular to the current
interest in awakening students to the need to exhibit
prosocial behaviors (see Solorzano, 1985).

CHAPTER V
TOWARDS A MORALITY OF THE HEART
At this point it is helpful to recapitulate the
conceptual perspectives that this study incorporates.
Kohlberg 1 s approach to morality is deemed inadequate
when attempts are made to address everyday morality
(prosocial behavior in daily life).

If Kohlberg's

approach is not acceptable, then what approach can
adequately address the concerns of a morality centered
on prosociality?

We have concluded that Hoffman's

perspective of an empathy based morality is a viable way
to conceptualize a prosocial morality.

Still, utilizing

empathy presents a far too general construct which
inadequately addresses the multifaceted nature of
morality.

This complex!ty of morality is nicely

delineated by Rest 1 s use of four components.

When

applied to everyday morality, Rest's model allows for
distinctive constructs which together form what is
termed in this chapter a morality of the heart.

It is a

morality of the heart which allows for an understanding
of the adolescent's everyday morality.
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In this chapter, Rest's component process model
will be examined and his understanding of morality will
be explored in order to set forth what he terms a "fully
developed morality."
approach we

After a discussion of Rests'

move to a conceptual framework which allows

for a discussion of everyday morality. In this regard,
the "heart" will be used as a metaphor to capture the
adolescent moral experience.

More specifically, the

metaphor will be extended to apply to each of the
components that Rest sets forth.

Thus, the metaphorical

framework will include four dimensions:

the sensitive

heart, the valuing heart, the discerning heart, and the
committed heart.
The Rest Model
Rest (1983, 1984, 1985; Carroll

&

Rest, 1982) has

provided a framework for viewing morality which attempts
to capture all relevant dimensions.

According to Rest,

psychological criteria for defining morality have
included:

norms, behavior, reasoning, and internal

mechanisms (e.g., guilt). Psychologists have tended to
view morality solely from one of these perspectives.
Yet each of these criteria at some point fail to addres~
the complexity of morality.

Thus, Rest (1983) maintains

that "we need to attempt a fuller, more complicated,
more integrated picture of morality and to envision how
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the part processes are organized" (p. 558}.

Rest {1985}

notes that "the four components are not presented as
four virtues that make up an ideal person; rather they
are the major units of analysis in tracing how a
particular course of action was produced in the context
of a particular situation" (p. 14).

For moral behavior

to occur, all four components must function adequately.
Rest believes that popular moral theories (e.g.,
Kohlberg's) address issues germane only to one or two of
these components, but that no research focuses
sufficiently on all components.

For example, Rest views

Kohlberg 1 s cognitive-developmental approach as situated
within the framework of Component II.

"In short, it

[Rest's model) claims that to a large extent, the major
theoretical approaches have bypassed one another in
attending to different aspects of the phenomenon of
morality" (Rest, 1984, p. 25).
Component I is best termed the sensitivity
component.

More specifically, this component focuses on

the ability to recognize- to be aware that there exists
a situation calling forth some level of moral response.
A variety of factors exist that have the potential to
obfuscate the sensitivity component.
factors are

Among these

ambiguity of the event, the interpretation

of the situation, and emotional arousal to the situation
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(for an extensive treatment of these factors see Staub,
1978).

According to Rest, to respond morally one must

first recognize that a moral response is required.

Rest

notes Hoffman's discussion of empathy as a primary
candidate to be studied as a Component I process.

He

argues that empathy is a significant factor in
recognizing the moral element in situations. At the same
time, he elucidates three reservations concerning
empathy's role.

First, empathy is limited to select

situations; thus, under many circumstances, empathy is
not the most adequate rendering of morality {Rest cites
the biblical story of Solomon where his wisdom was more
aptly translated as fairness).

Second, over-empathizing

with another might unduly sway one in a prejudicial way;
for example, a judge who over-empathizes with a
contestant might unfairly favor that contestant.

Thi~d,

some situations require a wider social context such as
institutional involvement whereas empathic responding is
most likely associated with one on one personal
encounters ..

To illustrate, one might be upset over

individuals who are placed in a state institution;
however, given the number of indigent individuals or the
realities of state budgetary restraints, the state's
course of action might be the most appropriate response.
Rest (1983) notes
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Any paradigm of morality that neglects the
societal-historical context of human
interaction is likely to underestimate
institutional and programmatic ways of meeting
human needs and one's duties and rights within a
set of ongoing social arrangements.
Sometimes a
person charged with the responsibility for a social
organization must act in opposition to his empathy
for specific people.
(p. 561)
On the other hand, Rest's reservations do not
disclaim the significance of empathy.

Situations

calling for fairness do not preclude a viable role for
empathy (cf. Gibbs

&

Schnell, 1985).

Further, to

over-empathize is a question as to the extent of one's
empathic response rather than a question of empathy's
merits.

Even Hoffman has addressed this concern in his

cautionary note regarding empathic overarousal (too
great an empathic response to the other diminishes the
altruistic response).

Finally, although institutional

contexts might alter the role of empathy even these
wider social contexts require basic empathic components
(e.g., perspective-taking).

For example, Shelton (1985)

found a significant relationship between empathy and
social morality

which suggests some consideration can

be given to empathy even when addressing complex social
system concerns.

I~ addition, essential empathic

responses (empathic concern) might well act as an
inhibiting agent to impersonal decision making which is
commonplace in social-bureaucratic structures.
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whereas Component I focuses on the realization that a
moral concern exists, Component II centers on the ideal
one envisions as central to the moral concern at hand.
In other words, that there is a moral concern now
becomes:

"What am I now to do in light of this

concern?''

"Component II involves determining what

course of action would best fulfill a moral ideal, what
9-~gl}_t to be done in the situation" (Rest, 1983, p. 561).
Rest explores how psychologists have dealt with
this ideal.

One tradition, says Rest, focuses on social

norms such as equity and social responsibility.

In

contrast to this line of research, a more popular way to
conceptualize morality is the justice principle set
forth in Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view.

Much

of Rest's own research has been within this tradition
(e.g., his research with the DIT--Defining Issues Test).
Thus, it is understandable that Rest discusses Component
II primarily in terms of Kohlberg's research.

As a

consequence, in the Kohlbergian tradition, a
psychologist concentrates on the moral reasoning
responses that articulate the responder's understanding
of justice.

As noted previously, although Kohlberg

would deem his understanding of morality as satisfying
all four components, Rest views the Kohlberg
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paradigm as falling under Component II.

Rest gives

little attention to other approaches which might
incorporate other dimensions (e.g., values).
Even though one might know what one ought to do,
one still must choose to do it; this choice is the
essence of Component III.

Damon (1977) demonstrated

that children's moral ideals (what they said was just
and fair} could be discrepant from their actual behavior
(self-interest led them to give a disproportionate share
of candy to themselves).

Damon's findings, says Rest,

point out the need to investigate what leads one to
actually choose to behave morally.
Rest (1983, 1984) notes that a variety of moral
motivational theories exist {the choices one makes to
behave morally).

These include biological, social, and

psychological elements.

Rest states that research gives

only limited support to any theory of moral motivation
and that

11

an enormous amount of work" needs to be done

on this component of morality.

No one would deny that

the complexity of morality necessitates on-going
research.

At the same time, it is questionable whether

Rest's statement as to little support for these research
traditions is sustainable.

For example, the

cognitive-developmental view of Kohlberg {Chapter II)
and

the empathy perspective of Hoffman {Chapter
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III)

have generated a large body of studies and a

significant amount of research support.
Rest devotes the least attention among the four
components to Component IV.

The most likely reason for

this is the psychological nature of Component IV and the
fact that this component is least likely to be
associated with morality.

In other words, Component I

focuses on recognizing a moral situation and
Component II addresses what ideals are relevant.

In

turn, Component III views the moral choices which must
be made.

All three of these components address relevant

moral concerns--recognition, ideals, and choices.

In

contrast, Component IV is defined as the executing
component--to carrying out one's moral action.

An apt

image for this component is some sort of executing
mechanism residing within the person which fosters the
carrying out of one's moral choice.

As such, this

component has the "potential" for being sterile;
embracing a cold, calculating efficiency (thus a
sociopath could score very high on Component IV).
Although Rest admits this possibility if Component IV is
viewed in isolation from the other components, he favors
viewing this component in terms of some type of "inner
strength."
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Rest (1983) quotes St. Paul's famous statement "the
good that I would,

I do not; but the evjl which I would

not, that I do" (Romans 7: 19) to point out the pitfalls
associated

with executing moral actions.

The

resolution to carry through on one's moral intentions is
essentjal; simply stated, moral choices are not
adequate, one must also follow through on one's moral
ideals.

His emphasis on a fourth component blends with

his understanding of morality (Rest, 1983) which
stresses "that behavior can be called moral only on the
basis of knowing both the observable behavior and the
processes giving rise to the behavior" (p. 569).
Finally, Rest notes that this component has received
little attention in

logical research.

One significant limitation of Rest 1 s component
process approach is the lack of a developmental focus.
For example, there is no attempt to integrate his
components with the "adolescent experience".
Accordingly, the adequacy of various theoretical moral
approaches in terms of the adolescent experience need
consideration. In this way, pertinent factors which influence the adequacy of Rest's four components can be
addressed.

In order to understand the adolescent experience,
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attention will be given to short accounts of two
dominant focuses .for adolescent morality--the
psychoanalytic and cognitive developmental views.
The psychoanalytic interpretation of adolescent
morality has been set forth by several writers (Elos,
1962,

1967, 1973;

Gedo, & Terman,

A. Freud, 1958; Settlage, 1973; Wolf,

1972).

According to this tradition,

the

superego emerges as the "heir to the oedipus complex."
The child's object attachment to the parent must yield
to the social and interpersonal realities which now
surro~n~ him. 1 her.

To allay fear of parental displeasure

and punishment and to control the massive repression
needed to contain libidinal urges,
superego.

there emerges the

During the latency period the consolidation

of ego and superego psychic structures transpires.
Thus,
the superego can be traced from early ir.fancy
through its many precursory stages until it
assumes the definitive structure of a psychic
institution at the decline of the oedipal
phase.
Its origin, or better, its formation,
is due to the settlement or the Pyrrhic
victory which brings the oedipal struggle to a
close.
(Blos, 1962, p. 184)
However, with puberty, sexual urges again gain
ascendancy and the adolescent must now defend against
the re-emerging oedipal struggle.

As Anna Freud (1958)

notes in her comment upon this adolescent phase of life
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Threatened with anxiety by the drive development, the ego, as it has been formed in
childhood, enters into a struggle for survival
in which all the available methods of defense
are brought into play and strained to the
utmost.
The results, that is the personality
changes which are achieved, vary.
Normally,
the organization of ego and superego alter
sufficiently to accommodate the new, mature
forms of sexuality. (p. 124).
Ideally, the adaptive functioning of the ego in
adolescence coincides with a flexible superego thereby
allowing for a gradual disengagement from parental ties
and a growing attachment (cathexis) to others.

Blos

(1957) notes that the resolution of adolescent
intrapsychic conflicts generates character formation
which is typified by increasing self-esteem, a growi~g
sense of one's ego identity, and the management of
emotional turmoil.
Blos (1962) states that the ego ideal takes on a
significant role during the adolescent period.
According to Blos (1962), the ego ideal is formed
separately from the superego.

Unlike the superego whose

structure is set with the ebbing of the oedipal phase,
the ego ideal is consolidated only with the advent of
early adolescence.

In essence, the ego ideal

attains its definite organization only
belatedly at the decline of the homosexual
stage of early adolescence.
The psychic
institution of the ego ideal continues to
integrate during adolescence an ever variable
content; its structure, however, remains
constant and permanent.
(p.184)
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In effect, the ego ideal provides the adolescent
the opportunity to develop object attachment to others.
Moreover, the decathecting of libidinal ties signals the
potentjal for narcissism as well as object attachment
beyond earlier parental attachments.
11

Blos {1967) notes

the love of the jnfant's parents is, partjally at

least, replaced by the love of self or its potential
perfection'' (p.

252).

Unfortunately, as Anna Freud

(1936) has pointed out, the disengagement from parental
object attachments can foster such narcissism.
The adolescent is in danger of withdrawing his
object libido from those around him and
concentrating it upon himself; just as he has
regressed within the ego, so he may regress in
his libidinal life from object love to
narcissism. (p. 121)
The significance of the ego ideal lies in its
capacity to effectuate the movement from narcissistic
centering to outer-directed object attachments thereby
fostering growing psychic stability through an
increasing incorporation of significant others and
cultural norms.

In sum, the ego ideal eases the process

of parental object disengagement and provides a bridge
for channeling libidinal energies towards
developmentally appropriate objects.
More specifically, growing exposure to diverse
attitudes and values leads the adolescent to become,
through object attachment, "what he/she would like tu
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be",

Blos (1962) views the ego ideal as an agency for

solidifying interpersonal attractions.

Moreover, the

shedding of parental attachments leads to a growing
shift in psychic energy resulting in increasing bonding
to others and the development of social roles.
The libidinal model of "I love what I would
like to be" establishes narcissistic completeness; this was described above in terms of the
homosexual phase of early adolescence.
The
heir of this phase is the ego ideal in its
final organization.
Thus, the ego ideal
advances to the status of an ego institution
by the transformation of homosexual object libido
into ego libido, and in the concomitant state of
sexual completeness to be found in heterosexual
polarity . ( p . 18 5 )
The psychoanalytic account of adolescent morality

has been criticized for its lack of empirical research
as well as its inability to explain how the superego can
so readily incorporate numerous attitudes and values.
More importantly, however, the

question remains how the

ego necessarily responds in a moral (prosocial) sense
when, in fact, the ego is inclined to immoral as well as
moral ends.

That is, what human experien~e orients the

adolescent to behave morally (Hoffman, 1980)?
The dominant theoretical mode for viewing
adolescent morality has been Kohlberg's cognitive
developmental approach.

Because Kohlberg's

understanding of morality has been described in detail
in Chapter II, only brief mention will be given

here.
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However, time will be spent examining its applicability
to the secondary school experience.
adolescent's moral reasoning,

In regards to the

the thinking of Kohlberg

on this subject can best be characterized by the word
"retrenchment."

The alteration in Kohlberg's thinking

on adolescent morality is best viewed by examining
Kohlberg's (Kohlberg

&

Gilligan, 1971) now classic (anc

now acknowledged idyllic) article which portrayed the
adolescent's moral experience--"The Adolescent as
Philosopher:

The Discovery of the Self in a

Postconventional World."

Kohlberg relates the

adolescent 1 s struggle to find meaning within a society
whose norms and values are increasingly held suspect, as
the germinal period for postconventional thinking.
The postconventional level is first evident in
adolescence and is characterized by a major
thrust towards autonomous moral principles
which have validity and application apart from
authority of the groups of persons who held
them and apart from the individual's
identification with those persons or groups. (pp.
1066-67) .
Kohlberg recognized that the acquisition of formal
operational thinking created a fertile field for the
transition to truly principled thinking.

A key to this

transition is the adolescent's experience of relativism
Which allows for the questioning of society's norms and
values while still uncommitted to moral principles.
Moreover, Kohlberg viewed the adolescent questioning and
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rejection of conventional understandings of justice as
allied with the growing mass social movements which
critically challenged American cultural norms (e.g.,
protest movements of the late sixties).
In contrast to this optimistic view of moral
reasoning advancement, Kohlberg, by the late seventies,
stated that postconventional thinking was only possible
with the passing of the adolescent years.

In his

article published in 1980, "Educating for a Just
Society:

An Updated and Revised Statement," Kohlberg

shed his hopeful view of the early seventies.

No longer

viewing adolescence as the harbinger for
postconventional thought, he saw high schoo: youth as

wedded to conventional thinking.
In summary, my 1976 lecture on education for
justice stressed a retrenchment from my 1968
Platonic stage 6 to a stage 5 goal and
conception of justice. The present paper
reports a further retrenchment to stage 4
goals as the ends of civic education.
It
discusses my civic educational efforts for the
last four years at Cambridge high school's
alternative Cluster School.
Our Cluster
approach is not merely Socratic and
developmental, it is indoctrinative.
Its goal is
not attainment of the fifth stage but a solid
attainment of the fourth stage commitment to being
a good member of a community or a good citizen.
(pp. 458-459)
Central to Kohlberg's current thinking is the
importance of a communal atmosphere where students
actually experience a sense of justice in peer and
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teacher student relationships.

A community for Kohlberg

represents a forum for shared decision making, thereby
allowing students the opportunity to experience justice
issues first hand.

This community also provides

opportunities for the discussion of conflicting
arguments as well as exposure to more advanced levels of
moral reasoning.

Kohlberg has reported (Kohlberg, 1984;

Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg, 1984) success in
developing the good citizen among secondary school
students.

He now views principled thinking as beyond

the reach of secondary school youth.

For such thinking

to take place, students are in need of on-going life
experiences which challenge them to re-examine their own
beliefs and invest themselves in deepening commitments
(e.g.,

leaving home, vocational choices, etc.)

(Kohlberg, 1984).
Hoffman has admiration for the empirical rigor
exemplified in the cognitive-developmental approach.
Yet, he finds missing in the moral reasoning approach a
motive force that orients the person to actually pursue
moral ends.

Hoffman (1980) states "Jn short, what seems

to be missing in the psychoanalytic account, as in the
cognitive disequilibrium view,

is a concept of a mature

motive force that may underlie moral action" (p. 307).
It is with an eye towards rectifying the void in these
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accounts of morality that Hoffman has stressed the human
experience of empathic arousal.
~_r:1_9.rali ty_ of the Heart
Wicker {1985) has argued that psychologists must
break from their "conceptual ruts" through the use of
-~ aphors which expand awareness and lead to increased
understanding of psychological processes.

Because there

exists no adequate psychological understanding of the
adolescent 1 s everyday moral experience, notwithstanding
the component processes set forth by Rest, it is helpful
to offer a metaphor which elucidates a framework for an
everyday morality.

I propose that an apt metaphor for

such a morality is the "heart."

Haan (1982; Haan, et

al., 1985) has warned psychologists that the
psychological study of morality must move beyond
statistical findings.

To fail to do this, says Haan, is

to commit the "empirical fallacy."

The empirical

falla~y is the mistaken assumption that the tot2}
understanding of a phenomenon is gathered through
empirical data.

On the contrary, morality is a richly

nuanced construct which has "cherished meaaings."
Psychologists must be open to unraveling these meaning
to fully understand the significance of morality for
peoples' lives.

Moreover, the word "heart"

resonates with the prosociality described within these
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pages.

The heart is a cherished meaning that cannot be

explained totally by physical or empirical data.

It is

what Rahner (1974) terms a "primordial word."
It [heart] cannot be defined, cannot be
composed of better known words, because its
meaning is an original unity and totality.
For this reason it occurs in all languages and
belongs to the primitive patrimony of man's
speech.
It is one of the words in which from
the beginning man has already ascended beyond
the superficial experience of daily life
(including that of anatomy and of purely
physiological sensations of the body), without
becoming abstract and losing touch with the
corporeal and tangible.
It is one of the
words in which man, knowing himself, expresses
the mystery of his existence without solving
that mystery.
When a man says that he has a
heart, he has told himself one of the crucial
secrets of his existence.
(p. 323)
Rahner's understanding of heart attempts to link
the bodily existence of personhocd with the capacity to
find meaning beyond the isolate self.
understanding blends nicely with

This

everyday morality

which posits a visceral arousal that is focused on the
other's experience (e.g., the distressed person).

In

effect it is a transcendent experience for it renders,
through arousal, a bonding to and reaching out beyond
the self. As Feshbach (1982) notes "in essence, empathy
is the vicarious sharing of another person's experience"
and "empathy entails an internal representation in one
person of a psychological experience taking place in
another person" (p. 319).

Psychiatrist Robert Jay
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Lifton in The Broken Connection, his provocative study
of life and death imagery, reflects this bonding
capacity of empathy when he notes
the quality of that access to another's
experience, physical and mental, is also
specifically human.
It is what makes possible
the intense level of caring that can develop
with love.
That is why human being can
express and experience love in letters, on
long-distance telephone, during and after
prolonged physical separations, while being
mostly indifferent to others immediately
around them. (pp. 123-124}
In order to capture the meaning of the word heart
for a psychology of morality, it is helpful to view a
different metaphor which characterizes the
cognitive-developmental perspective and to explore
briefly its implications as a way of contrast.

What

metaphor might fit the cognitive-developmental view of
morality?

An apt metaphor might be that of a

"negotiator".
Chapter II explored Kohlberg's understanding of the
"moral point of view" as the justice principle, a
principle most fully demonstrated through stage six
moral reasoning.

Although Kohlberg gives a variety of

justice definitions, he consistently views justice as
capable of negotiating the rights and claims of
individuals.

According to Kohlberg, one must be an

"impartial spectator", judiciously capable of taking the
role of every other person.
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This impartiality is most fully discovered in the
context of stage six (the morality which Kohlberg labels
as truly "moral") .

Only at this stage can one clearly

glean and clarify issues and concerns of others as
legitimate rights which must be respected.

Yet, as the

crjtique of Kohlberg's theory {Chapter II) points out,
other perspectives on morality call into question the
view of morality as negotiation.

Moral concerns (e.g.,

whether to act prosocially} in everyday life are not
solely amenable to negotiating rights and claims.

Such

a perspective points to a sterility and dispassionate
view of life that is far removed from bonded
relationships with significant others.
The Heinz example illustrates this point.

The

Heinz of stage six would view the conflicting claims of
life and property and discern the clear priority of the
value of human life as the ultimate value and act
accordingly.

However, Kohlberg fails to stress

adequately what is absolutely central for the human
being in any actual life context.
citizen, he is a husband.

Heinz is not only a

One cannot speak of a spousal

relationships without thinking of emotional bonding,
commitment, and cherished meaning.

The sterile nature

of negotiating rights and claims is inadequate for the
marital bond.

In other words, to view morality simply
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as rights and claims renders Kohlberg's Heinz
existentially impossible.

A spouse's reactions to the

distress of the other spouse are more than rational
calculation.

Even the legal system, the ultimate source

of impartiality, admits this fact.

For example, a

spouse cannot be forced to testify against his or her
partner.

Accordingly, the experiences of everyday life

lead us to look elsewhere for a morality.
Hans Walter Wolff (1974) has shown in his analysis
of Old Testament literature that the ''heart" is a richly
nuanced term.

He notes that "the most important word in

the vocabulary of Old Testament anthropology is
generally translated 'heart'" (p. 40).

Wolff has shown

that in the Hebrew Old Testament the heart includes
meanings associated with feelings, wishes and desires,
reason, and decisions of the will.

The decisions of the

will include not only planning and choosing but the
actual carrying out of one's actions.

He notes it is

"difficult to distinguish linguistically between
-perceiving' and 'choosing', between -hearing' and
·obeying 1 "

{

p. 51 ) .

Given the highly nuanced meanings of the word
"heart", this word can be used to capture the essential
components of morality set forth by Rest.

Consequently,

in order to incorporate the symbolism of the heart,
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the four components discussed herein are termed the
sensitive heart

(Component I), the caring heart

(Component II),

the discerning heart (Component III),

and the committed heart

(Component IV).

In order to explore an adolescent everyday morality
in terms of the perspective of the heart, each wiJl be
examined separately.
"I.he _Sensitive _Hear_t
A morality of the heart must first

be a~tivated.

What mechanism undergirds this caring response?

What

sensitizes a person to the plight and distress of
others?

Or,

from another vantage point, what is the

constitutive element within human experiencing that
orients one to be aware of the needs of others?

Thus

the thematic expression of this sections is, simply,
within what does the sensitive heart consist?
Because a sensitive heart denotes a recognition and
awareness of another 1 s experience,

it is proposed that

empathy is ari integraJ feature of the sensitive heart.

Although a delineation of empathy has already been
undertake~ in Chapter III, it is important to explore
how empathy is integral for the sensitive heart 1 s
functioning.

Thus, references wil' be made to both

Hoffman as well as other researchers' work which points
to this sensitivity.

The sensitivity one has to the
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need (plight, distress, etc.) of another is for Hoffman
primarily an affective response.

Although Hoffman does

speak of a cognitive component (1982) and a behavioral
component for empathy (1980), the primary thrust of
Hoffman's framework for empathy is the affective
element.

Hoffman's focus on affective arousal appears

to represent his desire to set forth a "moral motive
force."

As stated a:iove, he finds the psychoanalytic

and cognitive-developmental view as lacking this moral
basis.

Accordlng to Hoffman, it is this affective

arousal which engenders the prosocial response
(behavioral component).

The primacy of the affective component can be
viewed in Hoffman's delineation of the inchoative nature
of empathic arousal.

This rudimentary level of empathic

arousal (termed "global empathy") is essentially a
response to the distress of another.

Only with

advancing cognitive sophistication, however, does
self-other differentiation take place thereby allowing
an accurate perception of the other's situation and the
possibility of a prosocial response which can alleviate
the other's plight.

This explanation captures the

meaning Hoffman (1979) gives to one succinct
relationship between empathy and cognition -"the
experience of empathy depends on the level at which one
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cognizes others"

(p. 962).

As can be seen from the previous discussion,
empathy is a multi-dimensional experience which
incorporates several components. Within this context,
the sensitive heart is best viewed as an affective
experience wherein increasing levels of cognitive
maturation allow for greater awareness of moral concern
and increasing likelihood of an appropriate response.

Although Hoffman has presented the most
sophisticated explanation of empathy, his approach to
empathy is not the sole conceptualization.

Norma

Feshbach (1982) has argued that for empathy to occur,
three components are necessary.

First, the capacity to

perceive accurately the affective state of the other
persor..

Second,

the ability to take the role of another

(the capability to comprehend a situation in the way the
distress~d person understands the situation).
the capacity to respond emotionally must exist;

Third,
in other

words, one must be able to experience the feelings of
another.

The first two components are cognitively based

whereas the third component is affective.

Although

Feshbach's model stresses two cognitive components, her
discussion of empathy,

like Hoffman's, views empathy as

primarily an affective response.

Moreover, Feshbach

believes "that it is just this vicarious emotional
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reaction that separates empathy from the general area of
social cognition ~nd role-taking" (Goldstein

&

Michaels,

1985, p. 19).
To summarize, one aspect of the sensitive heart is
the emotional arousal engendered by the need or distress
of the perceived person.

Still, for this emotional

arousal to be activated there is need for a cognitive
component which represents some perceptual accuracy and
understanding for the empathizer.

It is this two-fold

perspective which reflects the essence of the sensitive
heart.
Goldstein and Michaels (1985) have argued that any
cognitive component of empathy must be examined closely
in order to delineate its dimensions.

Several

researchers (e.g., Staub) have noted that the cognitive
element of empathy is best described as a two-fold
dimension.

The first entails role-taking or what

Goldstein and Michaels term "perspective taking
ability."

This process allows one to recognize tha"::

another person is distressed.

The second dimension is

labeled "affective role taking" and focuses on an
accurate interpretation of another's feelings.

Gove and

Keating (1979), for example, demonstrated that
children's ability to interpret the feelings of another
is contingent upon their ability to interpret
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situational cues;

that is, children must first be able

to construe accurately a situation before they can
correctly interpret internal psychological processes
(the other's feelings).

Thus, it is

ible that one

may not recognize distress in another if a situation is
misinterpreted.

A more suggestive finding of this

research is that one may indeed recognize the distress
of another and could conceivably still misrepresent the
other's internal psychological state.

Utilizing the

framework of empathic development formulated by Hoffman,
this growth in cognizing from situational to internal
psychological states is compatible with his level of
empathy termed "empathy for another's feelings".

This

level of empathy allows the child to develop, over time,
an accurate representation of another's plight which
employs both perceptual accuracy of the situation as
well as increasing understanding of internal
psychological processes.
Underwood and Moore (1982b) have provided an
exhaustive analysis of the relationship between
perspe tive-taking and altruism.

Their analysis sheds

light on the dimensions of the sensitive heart and
support the scrutiny needed when addressing this
component of everyday morality.
These researchers delineated a three fold
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understanding of perspective taking.

Their expanded

discussion of perspective-taking includes three forms:
(a) perceptual ("to predict the literal visual
perspective of another");

(b) social-cognitive ( to

identify another person's thoughts,

intentions, motives,

or social behavior); and (c) affective ("to infer
another's feelings,

reactions, or concerns" p. 144)

These researchers utilized a meta-analytic technique to
examine perceptual, social-cognitive, and affective
dimensions of perspective-taking.

In regards to

perceptual perspective taking, meta analysis reveals a
highly significant relationship between perceptual
perspective-taking and altruism (Zma=4.63, g <.000005).
However,

the entire list of studies is limited to

elementary school children and no studies were found
that examined adolescents' perceptual perspective-taking
abilities.
In regards to social perspective taking (which
includes a range ''from the ability to predict and
understand other people's thoughts and actions to thP
ability to communicate with another person in a
nonegocent r i c fashion," p.

150) ,

l.JndervWOl~ and Moore

noted that there existed "a reliable positive relation
between social-perspective taking and altruism
( Zma=7. 64, p_ <. 000000001) .•

Again,

there exist no
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studies which examine adolescents as subjects; all
subjects in these studies were children.

An examination

of partial correlations suggested a possible causal
relationship between social-perspective taking and
children's altruism whereas for perceptual
perspective-taking such causality could not be
established.
Underwood and Moore defined two kinds of affective
perspective-taking. One should note that Underwood and
Moore differentiate this type of perspective-taking
(affective perspective-taking) from perceptual
perspective taking that is discussed above.

The first

type of affective perspective-taking is a recognition of
another's response,

the second is actually experiencing

the other 1 s affective response.

Underwood and Moore

state "we follow convention by referring to this
vicarious affective aro~sal as empathy and distinguish
it from affective recognition, which we label affective
perspective-taking" (p. 159).

These researchers found

only two studies dealing with "affective recognition"
and significance did result from their analysis
(Zma=2.25, p=.02).

However, the researchers found

"somewhat less encouraging" results fur empathy and
altruism.

The researchers speculate that reasons for

weak results between empathy and altruism result both
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from flawed instruments used to measure empathy as well
as children's inability to adequately process situations
and their own empathic arousals (see Hoffman, 1981a for
a critique of such studies).

More importantly,

Underwood and Moore cite more recent studies using more
advanced measurement techniques and note highly
significant results.

Further, experimental rather than

correlational studies tend to support a significant
relationship between empathy and altruism.

All in all,

based on these findings Underwood and Moore (1982b)
conclude nwe feel that there is good reasons to believe
that empathy plays a causal role in its relationship
with altruisn:"

(p.

166).

One finding stressed by these

rese~rchers is that the most solid evidence for relating
empathy and altruism is with adults.

They note,

specuJatively tha.t it is possibJe "there is a
relationship between empathy and altruism and that it
develops over time, so it is not present during
childhood;

it is present only partially or unstably

during adolescence, and it emerges as a stable positive
relationship only during adulthood"

(p.

164).

Eve:1 so,

the researchers state they are "uneasy" with this
explanation because of the small number of studies in
the adolescent and adu]t age group.
Karniol 1 s

(1982) approach to cognitive processes
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and altruism is instructive for the sensitive heart
although it differs dramatically from the developmental
perspectives discussed thus far.

For Karniol, an

information processing approacr i~ adequate to explain
what is traditionally termed empathy and role-taking.
She argues that these constructs need to be recast as
attempts to retrieve and gain access to stored knowledge
from memory.

"Our contention is that the inference of

need in others does not depend on role-taking activities
but on information retrjeval processes that are
initiated by situational stimuli" (p. 256).

In other

words, as a person interprets an event, he or she
attempts to join currently interpretable data with
prestored knowledge.

To illustrate, the recognition of

situational cues calls forth a set of "situation relatec.
scripts"; these scripts contain material relevant to tr:e
curre~t situation.

Thus,

11

understanding is a process by

which people match what they see and hear to prestored
groupings of actions that they have already experiencec"
(p.

257).

In order to respond prosocially, the observer

activates "inducement networks" which allows one tc f.:t
the distressed person's inferred emotional state wjth
the given situation.

In sum,

it is this situational

retrieval of stored knowledge and the activation of
inducement networks which allows for the recognition of
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prosocial situations.
Equally important in examining the role of
cognition is the presence of the prosocial act.

Karniol

applies information processing to prosocial action in
the following way.

Having recognized the need of

another, motivation to aid the other arises froffi the
activation of self-schemas.

A self-schema is a

cognitively based self-generalization which monitors
information relevant to the self.

Thus,

self-schema for being a "kind person",

if one has a

then an

interpreted situation calling forth a helping response
would allow one to relate the currently perceived need
situation to one's "self as a kind person" and foster a
helping response.

KarnioJ's explanation of the role of cognition is
subject to criticisrr..

For example, experimentally

induced emergency situations demonstrate that
individuals often respond instantaneously to emergencies
(P.offman,

1977; Staub, 1978) thus offering little time

for processing and retrieval of scripts.

Moreover, a

more pointed criticism is the issue of self-schemata
saliency.

That is, what actually leads one to activate

a kindne~:s script rathe~' than a script
non-involvement, etc.

o:

What is the motivation that pulls

for kindness rather than contempt?

In short,

the
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question for information processing understandings of
prosociality resembles the challenge Hoffman levels
against psychoanalytic and cognitive-developmental
accounts:

What is the motive force that necessitates

moral action?

Neither an ego, a reasoning

perspective, nor an accessed script necessarily orients
one to respond prosocially whereas the distress
accompanying empathic arousal focuses one on the plight
of others and the ensuing "sympathetic distress"
channels one's energies to respond prosocially.
Notwithstanding this criticism of an information
processing perspective of prosociality, this approach
does demonstrate the importance of interpreting
correctly the situation.

Moreover, for a sensitive

hea;t accurate cognitive interpretations are essential.
These interpretations include both situational
understanding as well as accurate interpretations of the
other's affective state.

Additionally, the cognitive

interpretation must parallel affective arousal which is
at the heart of both Hoffman's and Feshbach's theories
of empathy.
then,

The sensitivity one shows another's needs,

is supplemented by a cognitive component which

initiates the affective response.

In sum, Karniol has

shown that cognitive factors exercise a crucial role in
determining awareness of a moral situation (e.g.,
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focusing on situational cues, accurately interpreting
the situation).

Equally important, other theorists

(e.g., Hoffman, Feshbach) have demonstrated the

significant nature of the affective dimension of
empathy.

Thus, the sensitive heart must be construed in

such a way that it is capable of embracing what is
typically viewed as empathy (e.g., Hoffman's definition)
as well as cognitive factors which are essential
indicators for

appropriate empathic arousal.

Eisenberg

(]982) succinctly points to the sensitive heart's need
for both the primacy of affection yet the necessity of
cognition.
Just because an individual understands
another's perspective does not mean that he or
she will act in a manner consistent with the
other's needs.
The individual must be
motivated to act in ways consistent with one's
understanding of the situation. Often the
core of this motivation is affective. Thus,
it is important to consider affective motives
as well as cognitive motives in the
development of prosocial behaviors (p. 12}.
The Adolescent's Sensitive Heart
Research on adolescent empathy and prosociality is
limited.

The general thrust in research does ehow that,

with increasing age, children do respond more

prosocially (Green & Schneider, 1974} and that the
incidence of prosocial responding tends to be greatest
in the adult years (Underwood & Moore, l982a, 1982b).
Adolescents appear to respond more prosocially than
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children but with less consistency that adults;
unfortunately, psychologists have not theorized to any
great extent on why this might be the case.
By the adolescent years, empathy has reached its
most sophisticated expression; that is,
embrace social systems perspectives.

the ability to

As noted in the

Underwood and Moore research, studies focusing on
empathy and prosociality in adolescence are meager.
Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978)

found that adolescent

males who engaged in a prosocial act were significantly
higher in their empathy score than males who did not
help; on the other hand,
for females.

this relationship did not hold

For both sexes empathy was

significantly related to prosocial moral reasoning.
Finally, females were more empathic than males (t=6.81,
E <.001).

Although no explanation was given

for the lack of significance in the empathy score
between prosocially and non-prosocially oriented
adolescent females,

it is possible that the greater

homogeneity in scores (less variance) accounted for the
non-significant biserial correlatio~ between empathy and
helping behavior.
As reported in Chapter IV, Shelton & McAdams (in
press) utilizing the VMS and the IRI noted significant
relationships between various dimensions of empathy arid
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everyday morality.

An advantage of their research in

the use of an empathy measure (IRI) that delineates four
dimensions of empathy.

Their findings show that a

significant relationship exists between prosociality and
the empathy dimensions of empathic concern and perspec
tive-taking.
Factors
--~--- in the Adolescent Experience That Inhibit the
sensitive Heart

-------------If, as the research suggests, the adolescent is
less inclined to behave prosocially (or at least with
less consistency than adults}, what psychological

experiences during the adolescent years might account
for this diminished prosociality?

There appears to be

no differences in the adolescent as opposed to the
adult's level of empathic development (this is
consistent with Hoffman's assertion that adolescents are
capable of experiencing the highest form of empathy).
However, there are factors within the adolescent
expe?ience that predispose the adolescent to be less
sensitive to the needs of others.

We now exami~e two

factors which most likely diminish the adolescent's
capacity to develop the sensitive heart.
The first factor centers on the cognitive
transformations transpiring during this age period.

A

large body of writing has been produced on the subject
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of adolescent thought processes (Elkind, 1978, 1980;
Inhelder

&

Piaget, 1958; Keating, 1980; Piaget, 1968).

A primary focus of these writings is the adolescent's
experience of egocentrism.

Egocentrism in childhood

refers to the inability of the child to take the
perspective of another.

Research suggests that this

inability restricts the child's capacity for responding
prosocially.

Thus, Buckley, Siegel, and Ness (1979)

found in a study of children 3 to 8 that children who
responded prosocia11y scored significantly higher on
empathy and perspective-taking measures than those who
did not respond prosocial1y.

This gives support to the

view that inconsistency and lower scores among children
in regards to prosocia1 behavior is at least to some
extent due to their developmental level.

Most likely,

this egocentric response precludes the child from
recognizing the need of the other.

With time, cognitive

advancement coupled with increasing peer interactions
allows the child to understand the other's psychologica~
processes thereby facilitating relational understandings
and peer friendship formation.

With adolescence

egocentrism continues, but in a new form.

Whereas

childhood egocentrism is defined by the child's
inability to take the perspective of another, adolescent
egocentrism originates in the wedding of adolescent
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thinking with the adolescent role.

Inhelder and Piaget

(1958) note the quality of the egocentric response.

Moreover, the adolescent manifestation of
egocentrism stems directly from the adoption
of adult roles, since ... the adolescent not
only tries to adopt his ego to the social
environment but, just as emphatically, tries
to adjust the environment to his ego.
In
other words, he begins to think about the
society in which he is looking for a place, he
has to think about his own future activity and
about how he himself might transform this
society.
The result is a relative failure to
distinguish between his own point of view as
an individual called upon to organize a life
program and the point of view of the group which he
hopes to reform. (p. 343}
Adolescent egocentrism encompasses a fascination by
the adolescent in his or her own thought.
of the world,

The realities

in effect, yield to the adolescent's own

idealized theories and understandings.

Moreover, the

adolescent not only adapts the self to adult roles but
in an egocentric sense wonders how other adults and
societal views can be subject to his or her own
ruminations.
Elkind (1978, 1980), has contributed the most
elaborate formulation of adolescent egocentrism.

One of

the most discernible qualities of sucl1 thinking is
adolescents' preoccupation with their own thought.
Correspondingly, "the adolescent fails to differentiate
between the objects towards which the thoughts of others
are directed and those which are the focus of his [the
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adolescent 1 s] own concern" (p. 1029).

This

self focusing nature of adolescent thinking leads him or
her to believe mistakenly that others are also
preoccupied with his or her thoughts or behaviors.
effect, the adolescent "thus constructs an :!:_mag_:!:_~ary
that is constantly monitoring his or her owc
behavior'' (1980, p. 354).

Unfortunately, or what Conger

(1977) terms a "minor tragedy",

this egocentric stance

often precludes the adolescent from being aware of
others.
Relatedly, Elkind offers a "corollary" to the
imaginary audience which also originates out of the
adolescent's egocentrism: the personal fable.

Elkind

(1978, 1980) suggests that the adolescent, because of a~
inability to differentiate between his or her own
thinking and that of others, develops a sense of
omnipotence or uniqueness.
others focus on "me",
Consequently,

In other words, because

"I" must be someone ~~g_i_al.

there is constructed a personal fable.

Unfortunately, such thinking often engenders foolish and
ill-fated risks whereby the adolescent erroneously views
his or herself as the exception, the one who can
disregard rules with impunity.
It is likely, too, that the adolescent's cognitive
advancement is supportive of defensive psychic
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functioning.

Blos {1967) speaks of the adolescent's

egocentrism as vital in warding off instinctual urges.
Infantile ego states are, furthermore,
recognizable in the emotional state that is
akin to merger.
Such states are frequently
experienced, e.g., in relation to abstractions
such as Truth, Nature, Beauty or in the
involvement with ideas or ideals of a
political, philosophical, aesthetic, or religious
nature.
Such ego states of quasi-merger in the
realm of symbolic representations are sought as
temporary respite and serve as safeguards against
total merger with the infantile, internalized
objects.
(p. 167}
Thus, if one explains defensive psychic functioning in
psychoanalytic terms, the following is illustrative of
its function for adolescent maturation.

In effect, to

invest psychically in objects in thought is to create
forms of safe object attachments which are consciously
under the adolescent's control.

These cognitively based

attachments offer a refuge from the reawakened infantile
attachments that seek to threaten the embattled ego.
To date, there exists no psychological literature
which examines the inhibiting tendencies of adolescent
cognj~ive maturation on prosocial behavior.

Yet,

the

need to recognize situational cues as well as the
internal psychological states of oth0r·s renders the
introspective tendencies of adolescent thinking as a
likely inhibiting event in the recognition of another's
distress.

Absorbed in his or her own thinking, the

adolescent is more than likely to fail at consistently
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attending to situational cues and the other's internal
state.

"It is perhaps one of the minor tragedies of

adolescent life when these young people actually meet,
each is likely to be more preoccupied with himself or
herself than with observing others!! (Conger, 1977, p.
184) .

Keating (1980) has remarked that introspection is a
salient feature for adolescents.

"There seems to be a

great fascination among adolescents for probing their
own internal states, whether cognitive or emotional'' (p.
215).

Although there are reasons other than cognitive

advancement for adolescents to explore introspectively
their own self-understanding, an acknowledged catalyst
for the intense introspection of adolescence is the need
for adolescents to expand their own "horizon" and to
seek a fuller and more adequate self-definition
(Keating, 1980).
Thus, it is plausible that the cognitive
advancement present in the adolescent years provides not
only greater cognitive discriminations and broadened
opportunities for insight into others' need states, but
also the potential to misperceive the needs of others.
In effect, adolescent cognitive maturation represents a
double edged sword.

On the one hand, it provides the

necessary abilities requisite for advanced empathic
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development--a social systems perspective.

On the other

hand, it offers a temporary respite from the outer world
through retreat into self-examination thereby narrowing
one's sensitivity towards others and subsequent
recognition of another's need.
Relatedly, formal thinking makes provision for thF
adolescent to think about contrasts and what is
In other words, formal thinking provides the
adolescent the opportunity to consider what might be
opposed to what simply is (Keating, 1980).

Conger

(1977) notes that it is this enhanced ability to imagine
contrasts and possibility that can account for the
handicapped adolescent, who in childhood appeared robust
and happy, to suffer depressive episodes in adolescence.
In childhood a person is cognitively constrained; he or
she is not capable of fully understanding the various
possibilities that "could be" Having come to realize
that others do enjoy differing opportunities and
seemingly unlimited possibilities, the handicapped
adolescent is capable of a more meaningful realizatio~
which

contrasts his or her own narrowing life options

with those of peers.
It is likely that this capacity for thinking about
alternatives (or possibilities at variance from one's
current life situation), can lead one to diminished
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recognition and attention towards others.

par t

1 -- ~1. C1',,.,...1.0._,_
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In

what an adolescent might like to do might

well be at variance with what the adolescent is actually
doing; consequently,

the adolescent might lose interest

in the other 1 s life situation.

Evidence for this

misat~ention is found in Csikszentmihalyi and Larson's
(1984) use of the experience sampling method (ESM)

to

study the everyday lives of high school age adolescents.
These researchers utilize the construct of "psychic
entropy" to describe the lack of attention and focus
that adolescent experience in their everyday life.

More

specifically, there exist significantly different
finding between adults and adolescents in terms of
several measures of cognitive efficiency (concentration,
ease of concentration) and activation (alert, active;.
Further,
class.

these findings held across age, sex,

and social

These researchers speculate that adolescents are

unable to choose goals that account for their diminished
attentional focus.

The possibility of future goals,

turn, necessitates a sufficient level of cognitive
maturation that allows for the continual viewing of
various options and future possibilities.
researchers state that adolescents

Thus, these
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appear to be less able or willing to mobilize
their psychic energy.
These data suggest that
they attend to the world less often and see it
less clearly, because unless a person can
concentrate on what is around him, unless he
can actively focus hjs attention upon things,
he is but a passive recipient of disordered
information and stimuli.
(p. 87)
Loneliness and th_~_ Adolescent
A second phenomenon that acts as an inhibiting
factor in the adolescent's development of a sensitive
heart is the vicissitudes and emotional intensities
which accompany the adolescent experience of loneliness.
Loneliness can be viewed as an emotional experience
which accompanies a relational deficit
France, McDowell,
&

Perlman, 1982).

adult life,

&

(Brennan, 1982;

Knowles, 1984; Numerof, 1984; Peplau
Although loneliness is evident in

this experience takes on greater impact

during the adolescent years due to intrapsychic
conflicts and the newly experienced intensity of the
adolescent's affective experience.
Adolescents may not be more lonely than people
at other points of transition in their lives,
but there are common elements to the
adolescent process that give loneliness at this
stage a specific quality.
Characteristically,
loneliness during adolescence is stamped with
issues of mourning one's own identity as a child
and giving up certain forms of childhood
attachments and beliefs.
The process of separating
and maturing is tinged with loneliness.
(Ostrov &
Offer, l978, p. 36).
A number of features might account for the
intensity of adolescent loneliness.

Brennan (1982) has
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cited severa: experiences which predispose adolescents
to the uncomfortable nature of their emotional state.
Asong these experiences are:

cognitive development,

separation struggles with parents and the need for
autonomy, interpersonal concerns with peers, and the
�arginality of adolescents in society.

Surprisingly,

few studies have exarr.ined the nature of loneliness in
adolescence.

11

Dat� from available studies consistently

suggest that loneliness is an acutely painful and
widespread problem among adolescents 11

(p.

271).

Adolescents a ppear to find solitude a more lonely
experience than adults.

In their discussion of

aGolescent solitude, Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984)
�cte that the adolescent 1 s emotional state is
unsettling.

"The most extreme characteristic of

sclitude are feelings of loneliness and detachment'' (p.
l 8 4)

Adolescents, according to these researchers, find

sc2itude an entropic experience which undermines the
at�lities to attend to other dimensions of their lives.
The·; expl,.dn tht.� dy:1c,m.:i c in thie:� vJay.

".'he ado~e~~cent

needs validation and recognition from others in order to
confirm his or her own existence.

When this recogriit.ion

is not forthcoming (e.g., in the experie�ce of
solitude)

1

the adolescent draws increasingJy inward anc:

focuses inordinate arr.aunt of psychic energy on the self.
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To remain in an ordered state, the self
requires others to confirm its existence.
Unless others recognize me and my goals, I
begin to doubt that there is such a thing as
"I.ft These doubts demand turning increasing
amount of attention inward to bolster the
sagging self, leaving less attention to deal
with other information. It is thus that the
experience of loneliness takes hold,
increasing emotional entropy in consciousness.
187)

(p.

There is no evidence in psychological research to
suggest how loneliness attenuates the adolescent 1 s
se:i.sitive heart.

To date, there is no literature

available on the effects of loneliness on prosociality.
However, there is evidence regarding mood states that
address, at least in a suggestive sense, the
adolescent's disinclination to be sensitive to others.
A fairly reliable finding in the literature on
prosociality is that positive mood states tend to foster
prosocial responses (Rosenhan, et al., 1981).
Interpretations of negative mood states are more
problematic.

In general, negative mood states (e.g.,

guilt} appear to foster prosociality.

This has been

explained by a negative relief state model wherein the
prosocial response appears to lift one's mood.

The

negative mood of "sadness" has appeared, however, to
have mixed results (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Moore,
Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Thompson, Cowan, and
Rosenhan, 1980).

As loneliness to some degree is
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compatible with feelings of sadness (e.g., Ostrov &
offer, 1974} it is conceivable that the effects of
loneliness mirror those of sadness.

In an attempt to

explain the mood of sadness on prosocial behavior,
Cialdini et al.

(1982) note that a crucial distinctio~

must be made between one's attention to another's
distress (sadness resulting from viewing the other's
situation) and one's attention towards one's own
internal psychological state (sadness emanating from
one's own self).

Thus a review of the Thompson et al.,

(1980} study shows this to be the case.

These

researchers asked a group of college students (late
adolescents) to imagine an extremely distressing
event -their best friend was dying of cancer.

One group

was asked to focus on their friend's feelings whereas
the second group was requested to focus on thejr own
feelings.
date,

When asked to respond prosocially at a later

the former group helped significantly more than

controls whereae the latter group failed to respond more
th2n controls.

In commenting upon these findings,

Cialdini, et al., ( 1982) note that ''an inner focus may
render an individual inattentive or insensitive to the
gratifying nature of external events, such as the
opportunity to help others" (p.

348}.

The inward focus that loneliness fosters and the
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accompanying negative moods suggests an inhibition in
the perceptual understanding of another's situation and
thereby weakens the possibility for empathic concern for
another's plight.

Because the experience of loneliness

is a more intense experience during the adolescent years
than at any other stage of life,

the attentional focus

surrounding emotional states renders the adolescent
particularly vulnerable to a more inward focus thereby
leaving less sensitivity for the needs of others.
As loneliness is experienced as a needy state by
the adolescent,

it is useful to explore the possibility

that s~ch adolescents might actually help others more iD
order to gain peer approval and,

in effect, compensate
No studies report

for their felt interpersonal deficit.

such findings with adolescents; however, several studies
have focused on younger children who were emotionally
needy (e.g., unpopular with peers).
(Mussen, Harris, Rutherford,
Scott,

&

Waxler,

&

These studies

Keasey,

1970; Yarrow,

1973) demonstrate that such children

2.:- t=' riot more prosoc .i ally inclined than their less

emotionally needy (and presumably less lonely) peers.
Indeed, such children tend to provide lower prosocial
responses.

Although it is difficult to interpret why

this might be so,

it is plausible given the need for

perspective and affective perspective taking as well as
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accurate interpretation of situational cues that
individuals who are focused on their own "needs" are
less inclined to be aware of others' needs.
Consequently, their capacity to accurately interpret of
another's situation and their corresponding affective
distress at another's plight are diminished.
To conclude, if the sensitive heart of the
adolescent is to be present, there must exist an
orientation towards others that contains both cognitive
understandings and affective concerns.

Given the nature

of the adolescent experience, there exist developmental
features of this age period which preclude the optimum
awareness needed for sensitivity to the concerns of
others.

Two likely events which foster this diminished

focus are cognitive maturation and the emotional impact
of the experience of loneliness.
then,

It would seem likely,

that enhancing the adolescent's sensitive heart

necessitates addrPssing the consequences of these
developmental realities.
The Valuing_ Heart

Rest

(1984) focuses on two "major researcL

traditions'' for understand!ng the second component--the
moral ideal.

The first tradition incorporates the

emphasis psychological theorists,

in particular social

psychological theorists, have given to social norms.
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Among the social norms that Rest notes are legitimate
modes of inquiry for understanding the moral ideal are
social responsibility and equity.

Although Rest does

make mention of these approaches, he gives little
attention to them.

His primary emphasis is on the

cognitive-developmental perspective.

In other words,

for Rest, the moral ideal, from a psychological vantage
point, appears best explained by one's developing
structural understanding of morality rather than by the
internalization of social norms.

As noted previously,

Rest's own research is within this cognitive-developmental tradition.

Accordingly, in his explication of

component two he gives considerable attention to the
Defining Issues Test (DIT}.
What is lacking in Rest's second component is
another approach which we might term a value
orientation;

this approach emphasizes the role of

values in morality.

We have already noted in chapter

two's critique of Kohlberg that values can be
significant predictors of behavior.

In the discussion

that follows, we will focus on the valuing heart as the
repository of values which reflect care and concern
towards others while providing meaning for the
recognition and sensitivity that is experienced by the
sensitive heart.

Furthermore, we will focus on the
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process within which the adolescent orients him or
herself to choose values.
Values have received less attention in psychology
than other cognitive constructs, such as attitudes.
Historically, psychologists have approached the study of
values through an examination of one of two
perspectives:

behavioral values or object values.

former are "prescriptive guides" or what one

11

The

ought to

do" whereas the latter are the values one gives to
objects (McKinney

&

Moore, 1982).

Rokeach (1973) has focused on the behavioral
approach for he notes it is more conducive to the study
of social behavior.

According to Rokeach, a value is

"an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or
end-state of existence is personally or socially
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or
end-state of existence" (p. 5).
values contain several elements:

Rokeach states that
(a)

they contain

cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions;

(b)

they state a preference for one course of action over
another; (c)

there is a degree of "oughtness" to them.

Thus values allow one to set standards, foster
decision-making, and sustain long term goals.

Rokeach

(1983) states that a person•s values "are centrally,
strategically located "deep structures" within one's
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total belief system" (p. 172).

Values are core beliefs

which contribute to one's self-definition.

Furthermore,

they exercise a significant role in terms of one's
self-identity and self-presentation to the world.

In

sum,
to say that a person has a value is to say
that he has an enduring prescriptive or
proscriptive belief that a specific mode of
behavior or end-state of existence is
preferred to an opposite mode of behavior or
end-state. This belief transcends attitudes toward
objects and toward situations; it is a standard
that guides and determines action, attitudes toward
objects and situations, ideology, presentations of
self to others, evaluations, judgments,
justifications, comparisons of self with others,
(Rokeach, 1973,
and attempts to influence others.
p. 25)
The Relation of Values and Behavior
The significance of a psychology of values for
psychological research stems from the assumption of a
consistent relationship between values and behaviors.
"An implicit assumption among those who study cognitive
concepts, such as beliefs, attitudes, and values is that
there is some correspondence between behavior and these
cognitions" (McKinney & Moore, 1982, p. 550).
Although many researchers have critically
questioned the use of values as predictors of behavior
(Kohlberg's use of the term "bag of virtues" is a
classic example), a considerable body of research
disputes this premise and maintains that beliefs (values
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and attitudes) are good predictors of behavior (e.g.,
see reviews by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Kelman, 1974).
The question as to whether values can predict
behaviors is contingent upon the behavioral analysis
employed.

Ajzen & Fishbein (1977) state in order for

the predictive utility of a cognition to be operative,
four elements of behavior must be examined:
specific action;

the

(b) the target at which the specific

action is directed;
is performed;

(a)

(c) the context in which the action

(d) the time when the behavior transpires.

For predictive accuracy to exist, the measurement should
correspond to these elements of behavior.

Thus, a

generalized measure of a specific cognition (e.g., the
value of honesty) would not be expected to predict a
specific instance of cheating; yet, this same measure is
predictive in general of honest behavior over time
across a variety of situations (review and application
of this approach is given extensive treatment in
McKinney & Moore, 1982; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).

This

method of analysis, for example, provides insight into
Rushton 1 s formulation of the "altruistic personality."
Such an individual possesses a generalized trait of
prosociality that predisposes him or her to respond
prosocially.

Rushton does not maintain that one would

necessarily respond prosocially in a specific situation.
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However, given any number of situations, the predisposition of the altruistic personality would show forth
through behaviors which reflect a prosocial response.
The complexity of the predictive nature of values
is brought to light in a now classic social
psychological study that focuses directly on the issue
of prosociality--Darley and Batson's (1973) experiment
entitled ''The Good Samaritan."

Darely and Batson set up

an experimental situation reminiscent of the Good
Samaritan Bible Story

11

what is perhaps the classical

helping story in the Judeo-Christian tradition" (p.
101).

Forty seminarians who were paid volunteers were

asked to give a talk on either employment prospects for
seminarians (a secular topic) or on the parable of the
Good Samaritan.

The subjects were instructed to go to

another building to present their talk.

Half the

subjects for each type of talk were told they were under
time pressure and needed to leave immediately whereas
the other half were under no such time constraint.
Along the way all subjects encountered a distressed
person.

The independent variables were time and subject

matter for the talk and the dependent variable was
helping.

Analysis of the data demonstrated that time

was a significant variable in determining whether one
would aid the person in distress.

Thus, those under ~o
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time constraints responded significantly more often to
aiding the distressed person than those under time
pressure.

The type of speech given, however, had no

effect as to whether one helped.

Darely and Batson

concluded "thinking about the Good Samaritan did not
increase helping behavior, but being in a hurry
decreased it" (p. 107).

It could be assumed that these

seminarians held values supporting prosociality.

Still,

situational pressures (e.g., time) inhibited the
behavioral dimension of their values.

However, a

reanalysis of the Darley and Batson findings (Greenwald,
1975) has reached a partially different conclusion.
Greenwald used a Bayesian analysis of the data rather
than hypotheses testing.

A Bayesian analysis is an

approach to statistical inference based on a subjective
definition of probability rather than the more commonly
used relation frequency definition of probably.
Greenwald concluded that it was highly probable that the
seminarians who were to speak on the parable of the Good
Samaritan were much more likely to aid the distressed
person than those who were speaking on a secular topic.
Moreover, given this reanalysis, the saliency of one's
beliefs might well emerge as a significant factor in
prosociality.
Three conclusions might be drawn from these
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findings.

First, it appears that a value orientation

does not necessitate behavior consonant with one's
values (e.g., the many seminarians who did not help).
Furthermore, situational realities (e.g., time) can
influence prosocial responding.

Yet, a self-conscious

saliency concerning one's values can predispose one to
aid others.

All in all, this novel experiment shows the

complexity of linking values and prosociality.
The Adolescent Experience of Values
The adolescent experience has provided a fertile
ground for value research.

Much research has attempted

to capture the values of adolescents in terms of
generational change (Jennings & Niemi, 1975);
ideological thinking (Gallatin, 1980); and the
prototypic or type of adolescent (Baumrind, 1975).
As might be expected, Feather (1980) has noted that
value changes over time among adolescents mirror their
internal psychological changes.

For example, he notes

that the relative importance of values (using the
Rokeach Value Survey) shows greater importance given to
values which are associated with self-autonomy.

"There

were signs that both sexes were increasingly valuing
achievement, open-mindedness, responsibility, and
self-respect as they grow older and downgrading modes of
behavior connoting conformity to convention and
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authority" (p. 262).

Overall, however, value research

has focused disproportionately on late adolescents
(college youth) rather than students at the secondary
school level.
Furthermore, little research exists concerning the
relationship of values and prosociality during the
adolescent years.

Although not related specifically to

prosociality, Rokeach (1985) reports significant
differences in the value orientations of adolescent
non-drug users and drug abusers.

The former group

placed greater emphasis on social values such as "world
at peace 11 and

11

equality 11 whereas the latter group

favored more personal and hedonic oriented values such
as "an exciting life 11

,

11

happiness 11

and

,

11

pleasure 11

•

As noted previously, the issue of values and
prosociality has received little attention in
psychological research.

Staub (1978) has reported

findings for late adolescents (college undergraduates)
which indicate that values such as

11

helpfulness 11 and

"equality" differentiate helpers from non-helpers.
Moreover, conducting such research is made difficult due
to the contrasting generality of value instruments and
the specific nature of prosocial experimental
conditions.

Utilizing the Fishbein model of attitude

formation, exacting standards of specificity must be
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employed for target values and behaviors or researchers
must utilize general instruments measuring general value
orientations and prosocial responses.

At the same time,

such a paucity of research does not preclude a
reasonable speculation which considers empathy and
other-centered values to be linked.
Exactly what link exists between the sensitive
heart which is aware of the distress and needs of others
and the valuing heart which reflects values consonant
with this awareness of others remains a question.

Most

likely, psychological research has assumed that values
focus on the "right action"
empathic arousal.

that is a consequence of

Within this framework, prosocial

responses are a direct result of empathic arousal.
Rest's model of morality would differentiate between
these two behaviors (the empathic arousal and the value
orientation) through his unit analysis of discrete
components.

Such a ''clean" differentiation is, however,

not totally acceptable.

Currently, psychological

research has focused on cognitive interpretations which
would include value orientations that generate emotional
reactions.

In effect, values not only provide an

idealized sense for what one "ought to do 11 but most
likely contribute to arousal.

Although their role

(values) might be ancillary to the role of empathy and
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the corresponding correct interpretation of situational
realities, a value orientation most likely exercises a
collateral role in sensitizing one to the distress of
others.

Thus, ••particular values and value

orientations are likely to form a cognitive network;
these interrelated cognitions are applied to the
interpretation of the world" (Staub, 1978, p. 45).

For

example, a value orientation that favors values which
focus on the concerns and needs of others is likely to
engender empathic arousal and cognizance of what ought
to be done to aid others.
The Ego Ideal as the Source for the Valuing Heart
If the valuing heart of the adolescent is oriented
to a compassionate stance as regards to the welfare of
others, then what psychic experience does the adolescent
undergo that allows for this caring dimension to
surface?

That is, what psychological phenomenon during

adolescent maturation can account for the experience of
the valuing heart?

Stated another way, if empathy

resides as a central component for the sensitive heart,
then what parallel experience within the adolescent
fosters the valuing heart?

Hoffman (1980) has rightly

noted that the ego in general can be subject to immoral
as well as moral ends and thus is an inappropriate
subject as a source for morality.

Yet, within the
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psychoanalytic framework, there does exist a psychic
structure, the ego ideal, which takes on great
prominence and is predisposed to adopt values that
reflect a prosocial dimension.
The ego ideal has received sparse attention in
psychoanalytic literature.

In discussions concerning

any type of moral orientation, attention focuses on the
superego.

As Blos (1962) has noted, "the concept of the

ego ideal has played of late a rather insignificant role
in the psychology of adolescence" (p. 184).
Historically, the ego ideal has often been confused
with the superego. The apparent reason for this

confusion is the dual nature Freud gave to development
of a person's moral orientation.

That is, according to

Freud, there exist two features necessary for the
psychological development of personal morals:
idealization and prohibition.
ego ideal in 1914.

Freud introduced the term

At this early juncture the term was

used to refer to an individual's attempt to maintain an
infantile narcissism.

Moreover, the term was kept

distinct from conscience which monitored behavior and
was self-punitive.

By 1921 Freud's use of the term

incorporated both a narcissistic element and a
self-critical sense.
11

Soon thereafter (1923) the term

superego" and "ego ideal" were used synonomously.

194

Finally, in 1932 it appears Freud saw the ego ideal
residing within the superego and reflecting the person's
idealized parental introjects (Sandler, Holder, & Meers,
1963).

Thus, Freud's final position on the source of

intrapsychic morality was the incorporation of the ego
ideal into the superego construct.
More recent psychoanalytic accounts have focused on
delineating the concept of ego ideal from superego and
pointing out

the significance of the ego ideal for the

adolescent period.

Essentially, the ego ideal

represents an attempt at wish fulfillment or the
attainment of some desired state.

To contrast, the ego

ideal represents the self's wish to obtain a desired
state whereas the superego's function resides in
self-criticism and prohibition (Lample-DeGroot, 1962).
As Blos (1973) has stated, "the superego is an agency of
prohibition, while the ego ideal is an agency of
aspiration" (p. 95).
The ego ideal's significance in the adolescent's
years resides in its pivotal role in enabling the
adolescent to shed reawakened libidinal ties to parents.
Most psychoanalytic writing, however, has tended to
focus on the internal psychic restructuring which allows
the ego ideal to emerge as the natural successor to the
narcissism of adolescence.

That is, with adolescence,
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the young person is submerged in a growing
narcissistic presence.

This newly discovered narcissism

is rekindled by reignited oedipal feelings and the
concomitant disillusionment resulting from parental
inadequacies.

The adolescent, troubled by the waning of

parental ties, seeks refuge in an omnipotent self, fads
and cursory interests, or peer group ideals in order to
assuage a felt inner void.

With time, this narcissism

is shed through a growing adoption of personal values
which reflects the adolescent's adaptation to the adult
world.
If we follow the course which the ego ideal
follows from infancy to adulthood, we can
trace a continuous adaptation of its basic
function to the increasingly complex value system
as it accrues along developmental lines. Thus, the
ego ideal gets further and further removed from
those primitive efforts which aim at narcissistic
restitution.
(Blos, 1973, p. 95)
This internal focus (e.g, emphasis on cathectic
shifts and object attachments) has preoccupied
psychoanalytic writing to the detriment of viewing other
aspects of the ego ideal which receive only sparse
comment.

More specifically, the focus on internal

psychological dynamics precludes viewing the
interpersonal and social nature of the ego ideal.

Yet,

it is this social nature of the ego ideal that reflects
the value constellation which crystallizes during the
adolescent period thereby providing a content of values
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for the valuing heart.
The ego ideal is bonded with an ethical stance.

In

essence, a mature ego ideal is formed through gradual
identification with values that lead to an increasing
sense of autonomy.

In the adolescent years what

transpires in normal development is the shedding of
idealized parental standards and the adoption of an
increasingly personalized value system.

The final stage

of ego ideal formation occurs in adolescence and leads
to the "formation of ethics and ideals as
attainable goals after disillusionment by the idealized
parents" (Lample-DeGroot, 1962, p. 99).

The ego ideal

emerges as a source for values whereby the adolescent
gradually identifies with a personalized value
orientation that in turn provides a greater adaptive
capacity for the adult world.

In the course of normal

development, implicit in this value identification is
the presence of societal norms and the significance
accorded some minimum level of prosociality.
The ego ideal represents a unique psychic structure
for value because of its aspirational drive to become
something beyond the present.

In essence, the ego ideal

represents a striving for something yet-to-be-realized.
The ego ideal possesses an aspirational quality which
seeks to achieve the self's ideals.

Blas (1973) hints
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at this feature when he notes the ego ideal is an
"agency of aspiration."

Like values, the ego ideal to

promote an "idealized end state".
The author experienced a situation while a
secondary school classroom teacher which points out the
aspirational quality of values.

A high school junior,

Jim, was periodically difficult during class.

He

displayed attention seeking behaviors and showed a
strong need for adult approval.
difficult home background.

Jim came from a

His father was an alcoholic

and his mother was a dominating figure in his life.
day a classmate, John, was disrupting class.

One

As the

teacher I corrected John and requested he stay and see
me after class.

At the end of the class period John

came to me quite upset.
fair.

He accused me of not being

He stated I allowed Jim to get by with actions

which I would not allow from him.

He pointed out that I

displayed a more tolerant attitude toward Jim.

In

effect, John was demanding that I be fair in my
classroom discipline.

As the teacher I was well aware

of this discrepancy (although the disparity was most
certainly overdramatized by John).

I explained to John

that as the teacher in the class it was important to be
fair with students.

At the same time I explained to Jim

that as a teacher I also strived to understand my
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students and desired to know "why" they acted as they
did in the classroom.

I simply asked John to reflect on

whether he and Jim were the same.

Thus, in this

particular situation, I was attempting to go beyond
fairness.

I was appealing to a valued ideal in John

which cherished sensitivity and compassion.

Based on

the discussion thus far, John would hopefully empathize
with Jim's difficult situation at home.

His own

evolving moral identity and the significance of his own
value system would allow him to view the need for
sensitive understanding of Jim's situation and to aspire
to a set of personal behaviors and openness that
reflected this understanding.
In effect, the ego ideal can be depicted as
providing the psychic energy for values.

Values in turn

are the expression of the ego ideal's attempt to
engender an "idealized end state.

11

In a sense, then,

the ego ideal represents the psychic substratum for
values.

As noted above, the adolescent's need for such

ideals is the result of the hiatus resulting from the
gradual shedding of parental attachments and the
concomitant need to internalize societal norms.

This

process of focusing on ideals becomes an integral
feature in adolescent maturation or what Wolf, Gedo, and
Terman (1972) term the adolescent's "transformation of

199
self"; it is the ego ideal's purpose to function as an
integral fixture in the growing stabilization of the
adolescent self which is increasingly removed from
childhood.
To be sure, the values with which the adolescent
identifies need not necessarily reflect a dimension of
prosociality.

Furthermore, ego ideal formation might

well contribute in its own unique way to pathology
(Blos, 1979).

Still, the very nature of the ego ideal

is characterized by a decidedly prosocial dimension
which, in normal development, would reflect a minimum
level of concern and care for others.

This results from

the nature of the ego ideal as a harbinger for
adolescent adaptation to adult society and the adoption
of a cultural ethos.

Within such a context, societal

norms and parental standards are more weighted to a
decisively prosocial stance.

In effect, for normal

maturation to occur, the adolescent comes to adopt such
standards as his or her own.

Idealized norms in society

such as compassion and care for others become
significant ideals that the adolescent can strive to
achieve.

Even though peer group values and norms might

delimit such idealized values, studies of adolescent
values in relation to peer group and parental values
demonstrate remarkable similarity between adolescents
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and parents regarding significant life decisions and
general attitudes and values.

Disagreements and

adoption of peer standards center more on stylistic
concerns and personal behaviors (hair style, use of
time) rather than on more general value orientations
which focus on prosociality (Coleman, 1980; Newman,
1982).
The Discerning Heart
If empathic sensitivity and the recognition of
another's distress are necessary in order to view a
moral problem, and values point to "what I ought to do,"
given this moral problem, then, following Rest's model,
the course of action (given that the "moral ground"
chosen is prosocial behavior) becomes the focus of
attention.

The discerning heart is the adolescent's

choice to behave prosocially.
Given that a person is aware of various
possible courses of action in a situation,
each leading to a different kind of outcome or
goal, why then would a person ever choose the
moral alternative, especially if it involves
sacrificing some personal interest or enduring
some hardship?
(Rest, 1984, p. 32)
In other words, why would one choose a particular course
of action, especially if this course of action leads to
a level of sacrifice, an experience often encountered in
situations calling for prosocial response?

From the

vantage point offered here, the question can be
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addressed as to why prosocial behavior is likely to be
chosen by the adolescent as the appropriate action.
For the adolescent, the decision to choose some
particular value over others, even to act at variance
with one's self-interest, can be traced to the
development of a "moral identity."

According to Blasi

(1984), every individual organizes a level of
"self-related information" that
determines the order and the hierarchy among
the characteristics that are included in the
self, along such metaphorical dimensions as central
peripheral, deep superficial, important
unimportant, and so on.
It also defines what could
be called the essential or the core self, namely,
the set of those aspects without which the
individual would see himself or herself to be
radically different; those so central that one
could not even imagine being deprived of them;
those whose loss would be considered and felt as
irreparable. (p. 131)
Given this definition of moral identity, there
exists not only a conscious awareness of "what I must
do" but also the actual choosing of certain actions
which reflect a basic self-consistency with "who I am".
That is, there exists consonance between one's personal
self-definition and action.

Without this unity, a sense

of self-discrepancy develops whereby at the core level
of self one feels alien to who one truly is.
This self-consistency allows one to define the self
as moral ("I am moral because I do what I believe to be
the moral action").

Further, according to Blasi, there
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develops a responsibility to act consistently in a
manner that mirrors this self-definition ..
There exists a high degree of congruity between
Blasi's notion of moral identity and the more commonly
understood view of identity as expressed in the writings
of Erik Erikson (1956, 1968, 1980).
discussion of identity is elusive.

Erikson's
Erikson (1956)

himself admits that the term has been used
interchangeably to refer to a variety of meanings for
identity.

Among these meanings are:

a conscious sense

of one's personal identity, a sense of on-going
character which develops over time, the synthesizing
aspects of the ego, and a solidarity with the ideals of
one's own group.

Although identity can take on a number

of meanings, Erikson (1968) favors identity as an aspect
of self-continuity.

More specifically, then, identity

formation allows one to connect a personal life history
with the demands of the on-going present while preparing
for the tasks that await one in the future.

More than

anything, identity produces an inner sense of
continuity, a cohesiveness of self.

Erikson (1956)

states "the term identity expresses such a mutual
relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness
within onself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing
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of some kind of essential character with others"
(p.

179).

He writes elsewhere
An optimal sense of identity, on the other
hand, is experienced merely as a sense of
psychosocial well-being. Its most obvious
concomitants are a feeling of being at home in
one's body, a sense of "knowing where one is
going, 11 and an inner assuredness of
anticipated recognition from th~~e who count.
(1968, p. 165).
According to Erikson, each stage has a particular
virtue (he now uses the term "strength" to describe
these virtues).

They represent the successful

resolution of the task essential for the stage.

For

adolescence, the stage of identity crisis, the positive
feature corresponding to the successful meeting of
identity issues is fidelity.

"Fidelity is the ability

to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of the
inevitable contradictions and confusions of value
systems" (Erikson, 1980, p. 25).
the "cornerstone" of identity.
identity

It is, for Erikson,
This definition of

shows similarity to Blasi 1 s use of the term

moral identity.

Both definitions point out the self's

capacity for an inner directed consistency in action and
the desire to direct the self towards ideals in spite of
uncertainty.

McAdams (1985) has presented a life story

model of identity which addresses the ideals which form
within the adolescent's life.

This story is shaped by
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an ideological setting (beliefs and values) as well as
significant characters--idealized "images" of self
{McAdams terms these imagoes).

These imagoes serve as a

foundation and directional focus for the adolescent's
evolving self-definition which confronts on-going moral
concerns and questions.
McAdams notion of a story as a context for an
evolving identity is intuitively appealing.

In the

context of the present discussion what is suggested is
that every life story has the potential for an image of
self that is caring.

Stated another way, a morality of

the heart brings care to central images of self which
all men and women come to develop in their life story.
Thus "Hera'' (utilizing McAdams' typology of Greek
figures for imagoes), the loyal friend, as well as
11

Ares 11

,

the warrior, are images which are affected by

this care.

In the case of the former overt acts of care

are most likely forthcoming whereas with the latter
bonded loyalty and the desire to protect might be apt
characterizations of a morality of the heart.
Support for the notion of an adolescent moral
identity is given by Damon's (1984) study of child and
adolescent self-understanding.

Damon's understanding of

self coincides with the notion of identity for he
defines the self as a psychological construct "whose
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domain is the individual's experience of personal
identity" (p. 112).

More specifically, and in line with

moral identity, Damon is interested in exploring how
morality relates to one's self-understanding.

Damon

utilized open ended question (e.g., "What kind of person
are you?" "What do you want out of life?") and
discovered gradual, schematic growth in
self-understanding. This self-understanding in both
childhood and adolescence incorporates knowledge of
physical (Level one), active (Level 2), social (Level
3), and psychological (Level 4) aspects of the self.
For example, in early childhood, self-understanding is
associated with aspects of one's physical self
(self-understanding in terms of physical
characteristics).

During the adolescent years, however,

there appears the dominance of the social and
psychological aspects of the self.
Moral self-statements are one signal of Level
4 and rarely appear in prior levels. The only
real exception is some mention of reciprocal
moral responsibilities sometimes made in the
context of Level 3 social-relational
self-statements. But morality does not become a
dominant characteristic of self until Level 4, and
Level 4 statements are not found in any frequency
until middle adolescence. (p.
116)
Thus, children most often characterize themselves by
physical and active selves; they are unable to
articulate moral principles which are typically stated
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by the psychological self in adolescence.
According to Damon, the adolescent self shows an
increasing sensitivity towards the opinions and
expectations of others as well as the realization that
others expect certain behaviors from the adolescent.
The adolescent understands

that he or she must now take

greater responsibility for personal behaviors and that
this is an assumption that others share.

Because

of the presence of a "social network" in which the
adolescent becomes actively engaged, he or she becomes
aware of others' expectations, the needs of others, and
his or her own role within the social group.
A second feature of adolescent morality is the
ideological theme that is often present in adolescent
thinking.

With the advent of formal thinking, the

adolescent discovers a fascination with ideas which
provide a framework for reflecting upon and discovering
ethical beliefs.

From the perspective of society,

ideology offers the initial underpinnings for entrance
into the adult world.

Although the formulation of

ideology becomes more differentiated and personalized in
late adolescence (the college years), the power of
formal thinking allows the high school adolescent to
examine inchoatively, i f only in a rudimentary way, a
variety of positions on various issues.

As a
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consequence, the adolescent develops numerous
self-statements (e.g. ,"I am a Democrat,"

"I believe in

God") which are seeds sown for further self
understanding in late adolescence.

Damon notes the

passionate nature of adolescent thinking when he says
"perhaps at no other time in life, at least for most
individuals, are such doctrines so extensively
articulated and so purely held" (p. 119).
Damon states there are two significant changes in
adolescent self-understanding which provide a base for
"conceptual integration with adolescent moral thinking"
(p. 119).

The first shift is the development of a

sophisticated Level 3 perspective on self--the social
personality perspective.

The adolescent now witnesses

the self in a social context which he or she soon
discovers is fraught with moral consequences.

Thus,

"being helpful, generous, open, suspicious all are
morally relevant characteristics of one's social
interactional self" (p. 119).

The daily interactions of

the self in interpersonal contexts naturally elicit
moral questions and concerns which help the adolescent

sort out personal moral views and ways to act which
reflect personal beliefs.

A fuller understanding of the significance of the
social-interactional self is given by Youniss (1980) in
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his discussion of adolescent friendship formation.
Borrowing on the work of Sullivan and Piaget, Youniss
hypothesizes that adolescents come to engage in a
"relation of cooperation" whereby they come to
appreciate the thoughts and feelings of others and
interact with peers in mutually supportive and healthy
ways.

Further, Youniss states "the psychologically

healthy and morally mature personality" is derived from
this ''relation of cooperation."
five characteristics:

Such relations contain

mutuality (give and take between

peers which leads to compromise and mutual
understanding); standards of worth (personal judgments
based on interpersonal consensus); similarity between
self and others (awareness of sameness which fosters an
equality in the relationship); interpersonal sensitivity
{awareness of the individuality of the self and the
others and the acceptance of personal limitations);
relational possibilities (the formulation of a
self-definition that is derived from being in
relation-with-others).

In short, peers provide the

adolescent the opportunity for increasing cooperation,
developing self-insight, and accepting individuality.
Peer friendships lay the foundation for future adult
intimacy {Youniss, 1981).
This focus on interpersonal interactions finds
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further confirmation in the work of Kegan (1982).

His

constructive-developmental view of human growth situates
adolescence in the Stage 3 Interpersonal Self.
at this stage is relationships.

The self

According to Kegan, the

adolescent self is embedded within the interpersonal; he
or she has shed the later childhood construction of the
self as "need."

In effect, the adolescent self no

longer is its needs; rather, it has needs.

Consequent

ly, the adolescent self can now increasingly reach
outward to others and come to regulate the self's needs
through interpersonal interactions.

The interpersonal

consequences of moving the structure of needs from
subject to object is that the person, in being able to
coordinate needs, can become mutual, empathic, and
oriented to reciprocal obligation" (p. 95).

According

to Kegan, with adolescence the self becomes
interactional, it becomes a shared reality.

This

movement represents a transformation for the adolescent
is now situated in a self-understanding that must
recognize the needs of others in order that the self can
be defined.
Interestingly, evidence suggests that such
interpersonal interactions which typify the adolescent
years are important for the adolescent's development of
prosocial behavior.

Adolescents tend to act more
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prosocially towards their friends than peers; this
behavior most likely reflects the increase in mutuality
and equality within the friendship.

Further,

adolescents who respond prosocially towards their
friends are more likely to respond in a similar fashion
towards strangers.

Although little research exists

which discusses the relationship of friendship and
prosocial behavior in either childhood or adolescence,
it is possible that the experience of friendship and the
accompanying prosocial responses directed towards
friends do in turn influence the adolescent's behavior
towards others (Berndt, 1982).
A second "developmental shift" in the adolescent
self involves the increasing understanding of the self
in psychological terms; this change allows the
adolescent to define the self in the context of ideas
and philosophical beliefs.

"The system of belief

[philosophical/ideological thinking] reflects the main
organizing principle of the adolescent's
self-conception" (p. 119).

Such beliefs have moral

consequences for they frame for the adolescent a
distinctive set of attitudes and behavioral norms which
influence the adolescent's behavior towards others.
Even though Damon (1984) does not set forth a
definition of morality, the social interactional
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perspective of self implies an awareness of and focus on
the welfare of others; thus, there seems to be
incorporated into Damon's thinking some level of
prosocial response.

Moreover, Damon's work which

documents the interpersonal nature of the adolescent
self ("How I act towards others is who I am") points to
the interpersonal features of adolescent morality.
There emerges within this interpersonal focus, a merger
with the psychological understanding of self.

Thus,

through interactions with peers adolescent come to view
their own behaviors as either consonant or at variance
with their own self-understanding which is increasingly
defined through rudimentary philosophical and ethical
understandings.

Correspondingly, behaviors which vary

from increasingly proclaimed self-understandings ("I am
a Christian," "I am honest") engender what Rokeach
(1981) terms states of "self-dissatisfaction."

In

effect, such states are violations of the ego ideal.
The above findings drawn from Blasi, Damon, and
Kegan suggest the possibility of a prosocial inclination
with adolescence.

The identity of the adolescent--an

organizational system of self-understanding--is
increasingly framed both in relationship and in terms of
cognitive understandings of self that include value
formulations.

Because the identity of the
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adolescent is in part a product of socio-cultural values
(Erikson, 1968), p·rosociality emerges as a significant
factor within which the adolescent can frame his or her
own self-definition.

Likewise, acting in ways contrary

to one's self definition ("It is right to be kind to
others," "I am loyal to my friends") engenders the
self-dissatisfaction discussed by Rokeach (failing to
have one's actions reflect one's values).

A more

adequate expression of this "self-dissatisfaction" is
Hoffman's notion of "interpersonal guilt" which results
from empathic distress.

Unlike behavioral

understandings of guilt which reflect fear of
anticipated punishment, and Freudian guilt

which is the

product of repressed wishes, interpersonal guilt arises
from feelings of empathic distress and the
self-attribution of blame associated with the other's
plight.

Feelings of guilt initially arise in young

children simply because of the awareness of empathic
distress and the close proximity of this internal state
to the child's personal actions.

Thus, even though the

young child might not be responsible for the plight of
the other, he or she might still experience guilt.
Later, the awareness of their own actions as causing
another's pain is likely to lead to guilt.

Even

comparisons between one's own situation and that of
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another can lead one to feel guilt, even though one has
done nothing directly to hurt the other.

Over time,

empathic distress can elicit guilt even when one is not
responsible for the plight of the other (the example of
the Good Samaritan).

"The line between empathic

distress and guilt thus becomes very fine,- and being an
innocent bystander is a matter of degree" (1984, p.
289).

The adolescent who develops a salient value

system which is oriented towards prosociality is
particularly likely to be subject to a sense of guilt.
To violate one 1 s internal values which are central for
one's self-definition ( 11 I am loving,
compassionate 11

)

11

"I am

leads to personal self-dissatisfaction

which in turn fosters prosocial behaviors.
The Co~mitted Heart
Whereas the first three components of Rest's model
lead one to recognize the need for a prosocial response,
clarify significant values which orient one to engage in
a moral action, and lead one to choose the action, the
actual execution of one's behavior is the domain of
Component 4.

Rest quotes St. Paul's famous passage in

Romans to show the tenuous nature of moral execution.
11

The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I

would not, that I do" (7:19).

The intention of the

person often falls short of action.
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Executing and implementing a plan of action
involves figuring out the sequence of concrete
actions, working around impediments and
unexpected difficulties, overcoming fatigue
and frustration, resisting distractions and
other allurements, and not losing sight of the
eventual goal. Psychologists sometimes refer
to these processes as involving "ego strength"
or "self-regulation skills."
(Rest, 1984,
p.33)
Evidence suggests that numerous characteristics
exist that influence the actual carrying out of
prosocial behaviors.

For example, Barrett and Yarrow

{1977) showed that among children who recognized the
needs of others, those who were more assertive were
significantly more likely to engage in prosocial
behaviors.

Rest cites evidence which shows that

individuals at Kohlberg's Stage four level of moral
reasoning who scored high on ego development showed less
dishonest behavior than Stage 4 subjects low in ego
development.

Commenting upon this research, Rest notes

"presumably those subjects with high ego strength had
the strength of their convictions; whereas the Stage 4
subjects with low ego strength had such convictions but
did not act on them" (p. 33).
What personal strengths enable one to implement
one's chosen course of action?

A likely candidate for

fostering the execution of actions is found in maturity
(see below for a definition).

In all likelihood, those

adolescents who evidence mature behavior are more likely
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to carry out their intentions and sustain over time
their behaviors in a consistent fashion.
Suprisingly, little research has been reported in
the literature on the maturity of adolescents.

What

evidence that does exist is more focused on late
adolescents (Heath, 1965, 1980) or is reported in
conjunction with literature delineating clinical
concepts of normality and psychopathology (Oldham,
1978; Offer & Sabshin, 1974).

The most sophisticated

attempt at exploring aspects of maturity for middle
adolescence is contained in the writing of Greenberger
and Sorenson (1974).

Their model outlines a three

dimensional focus for maturity. The underlying theme of
their conceptual schema is the adaptational capacity of
the adolescent in light of his or her meeting of
specific developmental tasks.

The first dimension is an

adequate coping capacity and the ability to function in
a growthful and adaptive way on one's own; this
dimension is termed individual adequacy.

This dimension

is focused on the adolescent's capacity for selfautonomy, bringing clarity to his or her identity, and
on-going commitment to growth in the development of
personal talents and interests. The second dimension,
labeled interpersonal adequacy, focuses on the
individual's ability to relate interpersonally with
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others.

Major focuses of this dimension are the

development of communication skills, a growing trust of
others, and the gradual obtainment of roles.

Finally,

there is a social adequacy which is concerned with the
adolescent's capacity to function in a wider social
context; this dimension takes into account how the
adolescent adapts to sociopolitical changes, functions
within cultural norms, and is capable of identifying
with and relating in wider social groupings.

Aspects of

this dimension include openness to change in the
sociopolitical environment, a tolerance for contrasting
ideas, and growing realization of the need to be a
functioning member of the community.

This three

dimensional view of maturity is consonant with the
fourth component of Rest.

Moreover, Rests notes that

"perseverance," resolution, competence, and character"
are contained within Component IV.

Maturity, as defined

by Greenberger and Sorenson, relates to the adolescent's
capability to function in a regard to individual,
interpersonal, and social levels.
Utilizing this conceptual approach, Greenberger,
Josselson, Knerr, and Knerr (1975} developed a maturity
scale to measure the maturity levels of middle
adolescents (secondary school students}.

Josselson,

Greenberger, and McConochie (1977a, 1977b} report
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findings for both males and females.

These researchers

contrasted high and low maturers of both sexes.
Two characteristics appeared in the description of
low-maturing females.

These students desired to possess

material goods and have fun.

The data identified two

groups of low maturing females.

The first group,

reflecting the popular stereotype, were very active
socially, attractive, and identified closely with the
interests and preoccupations of peers.

A basic

self-centeredness and non-reflective manner was evident
in this group of females.

Their behavior was influenced

more by external restraints than by internal goals.
Another group of low maturing females were noted for the
lack of enjoyment they experienced. These females had
feelings of low self-esteem and inferiority, and they
desired the care-free life of the first group of
females.

Also, their home lives were often conflictual.

In both groups there was a tendency to show little
self-awareness and the need for external controls to
guide behavior.
In contrast to the low maturing females, high
maturing females could be characterized as having
multidimensional lives noted for their complexity.
These females were not as absorbed in the present as the
low maturing females and they presented a picture of
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forward thinking which was concerned with future
commitments.

There was also evident a significant level

of reflectivity and awareness of personal actions and
their consequences.

The peer pressures which dominated

the thinking of low maturers were noticeably absent from
high maturers.

There was a good sense of interpersonal

relatedness among this group and their relationships
were characterized by awareness of the other and
personal sensitivity.

Finally, these females valued

independence and enjoyed focusing on the future and
influences that affected their lives beyond their
immediate environments.
Similar characteristics were found among adolescent
males.

For low maturing males, there was a notable lack

of self-reflection and awareness.

They were more

subject to external pressures than their high maturing
peers and they were more preoccupied with the present
than with the future.
for low maturing boys.

Relationships were problematic
Their peer relationships lacked

depth, and even making friendships was difficult.
Aggressive impulses were also difficult to control.
Friendship for these students was valued for what "was
in it for me."
High maturing males are more difficult to
characterize than their low maturing counterparts.

They
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are less subject to peer influences and their lives are
noted for their diversity with school interests,
religious practices, and personal hobbies occupying
their time.

There is a strong sense of individuality

and an optimistic view of the future.

They are capable

of living with self-doubt and can effectively cope with
personal concerns.

They are goal directed and possess

an adequate level of concentration to accomplish their
goals.
For high maturing males and females there is a
tendency to be more focused on others and less concerned
with the influences and pressures of peers.

Moreover,

high maturing adolescents are capable of drawing upon
inner resources thereby allowing them to accomplish
personal goals and sustain their focus on future
aspirations and commitments.

Most likely, high maturers

have less need to expend psychic energy on their own
needs or to be defensive about their lives whereas low
maturers must expend considerable energies attempting to
contain inner impulses and to cope with personal
feelings of inadequacy.
Moreover, the sense one is left with when viewing
high maturing adolescents is that of resolute
individuals capable of carrying out their intentions
without being encumbered by the developmental exigencies
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which preoccupy the lives of their peers.

These

adolescents successfully master their environment and
there is displayed a "developmental increase in ego
control" (Josselson, Greenberger, & McConochie, 1977a,
p. 46).

What is proposed here is that adolescents who are
found to be mature and who at the same time are found to
experience empathy, other-centered values, and an
articulated sense of their moral identities are more
likely to exhibit most consistently a morality of the
heart.

Most likely, such expression reflects the mature

adolescents' ability to respond appropriately to their
own value systems while being aware of their
environments (the needs of distressed others), and the
parallel capacity to act resolutely on their own values
without being overly burdened by peer pressures or
personal shortcomings.
Rest (1984) correctly notes of all the components
of morality, this component has a specifically
quality.

11

amoral 11

That is, whereas Component I displays a moral

sensitivity, Component II moral values, and Component
III a moral choice, Component IV focuses on the
execution of action.

Thus, a mass murderer or a Nazi

storm trooper can resolutely carry out an action in the
same manner as a Good Samaritan.

Although this might be
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case, to frame Component IV in terms of maturity which
is the development of ego strength as expressed through
individual, interpersonal, and social adequacies adds a
moral dimension.

This arises from an examination of

interpersonal and social adequacies.

Interpersonal

adequacy includes an essential trust in others and the
capacity to relate interpersonally.

Likewise, social

adequacy necessitates a tolerance of others and
identification with a larger social body.

In both

instances there exists the need for the adolescent to be
aware of others' needs.
In this chapter we have examined the adequacy of
Rest's component process model as it relates to the
adolescent experience. In addition, specific features
have been set forth for each component which together
suggest that a fully developed morality that is germane
to the adolescent's experience does exist.

In sum, it

is suggested that the empathic adolescent who is aware
of and can accurately recognize the needs and hurts of
others, who articulates a compassionate value system
{adopts values of love, self-sacrifice, etc.), who
expresses these values as essential features of his or
her identity in a consistent fashion, and who exhibits
mature behaviors is most likely to display a high degree
of everyday morality.

CHAPTER VI
ADOLESCENT SOCIAL MORALITY

Social morality, as noted in Chapter IV, is the
fostering of prosocial behaviors in order to eradicate
social injustice as well as aid those suffering from
this injustice (e.g., discrimination, inequality). This
morality is related to developmental shifts which
prepare the child for adulthood.

Correspondingly,

because this morality concerns issues beyond
interpersonal concerns (personal encounters with
others), questions of political socialization and
understandings of social phenomena become significant.
Recently, there has been increasing interest in
discussions about the importance of social morality in
education (e.g., Grant, 1981; Groome, 1980; Kagan,
1981).

This chapter focuses on why the development of

social morality is truly possible only with the
beginning of the adolescent years.

An examination will

be made of specific developmental processes which
influence the growth of social morality during the
adolescent period as well as psychological perspectives
on the formation of social morality.
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Attention will
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then shift to utilizing a morality of the heart as the
basis for discussion about the fostering of social
morality during the adolescent years.
Adolescent Development and Social Morality
From a developmental perspective, the capacity for
a social morality resides in the adolescent's experience
of formal thinking and the struggle for identity.
Formal thinking allows the adolescent to comprehend
complex forms of social stimuli as well as intricate
understandings of abstractions, e.g., "justice" and
"peace".

Thus, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) have noted

that "the notions of humanity, social justice ... freedom
of conscience, civic or intellectual courage ... are
ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's
affective life" (p.349).

What is noted by these

researchers is adolescents' new found capacity to fall
in love with their thinking.

Ideas are not merely

comprehended, they are at times passionately felt.
Understanding such concepts (e.g., peace) necessitates a
capacity for abstraction, deductive thinking, and
reflective thought which only emerges during the
adolescent years.
thinking,

Consequently, when utilizing formal

"the adolescent goes injecting himself into

adult society.

He does so by means of projects, life

plans, theoretical systems, and ideas of political
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or social reform" (Piaget, 1968, p. 67).

These ideas

are woven into a rudimentary yet personally meaningful
theory of society.

"These theories are often taken

quite seriously, with the result being a new coherence
of judgment and opinion, deriving from an arduously
thought-out system of beliefs" (Damon, 1984, p. 119).
With respect to the foregoing, however, attention must
be given to the question of whether a social morality is
universally obtainable in adolescence.

That is, a

considerable body of research has noted that formal
thinking is not experienced by all adolescents (e.g.,
Elkind, 1975; Keating & Clark, 1980).

This objection is

answered by how social morality is defined.

Although

many adolescents might be unable to articulate a
sophisticated understanding of the social system and
base their behaviors on these understandings, the
experience of empathic concern and the encounter with
numerous opportunities for prosocial actions in both
home and school environments allow virtually all
adolescents to consider the possibility of engaging in
behaviors which aid those suffering from social
injustice.
It is unlikely, however, that this awakening
concern for social morality can exist as isolated from
the larger developmental needs of identity which are
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salient issues for adolescent maturation (Miller, 1978;
Marcia, 1980).

Further, the linkage of psychosocial

development and formal operational thinking is likely
mediated by factors unique to the adolescent period
{Rowe

&

Marcia, 1980).

Erikson {1963, 1968) has offered the dominant
theory for understanding the adolescent's identity
quest.

This identity search, framed in the context of

crises and commitment, has received operationalized
success through the use of the identity status paradigm
developed by Marcia {1966).

Central to the adolescent's

achievement of identity is the experience of an
ideological crisis which necessitates the adolescent's

successful negotiation of newly acquired ideas and
values with formerly sacrosanct and unquestioned
childhood beliefs.

This potentially traumatic

experience of reevaluation entails a fundamental
reexamination of political, religious, and social
beliefs.
Although the secondary school years represent a
time when identity issues are initially considered, the
extant research has focused almost exclusively on late
adolescents (college undergraduates)

(Marcia, 1980).

Recently, attempts have been made to apply identity
paradigms to secondary school adolescents (Mielman,
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1979).

Raphael and Xelowski (1980) have questioned the

validity of such an approach.

Characteristically,

secondary school students are neither likely nor
expected to have experienced the developmental concerns
or the environmental situations which are requisite for
the crisis and commitment struggles which may preoccupy
the college age adolescent.

Raphael and Xelowski argue

that a more profitable approach to identity measurement
during the high school years is to assess the
adolescent's familiarity with salient issues as well as
the openness the adolescent evinces towards new
experiences.

In this regard, a morality framed in terms

of prosocial behaviors appreciates the age appropriate
level of the secondary school student's identity search.
The fashioning of morality in the context of everyday
prosocial situations allows for a universal experience
that is appropriate for the high school adolescent 1 s
initial exploration of social issues.

Thus the adolescent's awareness of the political
world, engendered by cognitive maturation and
developmental strivings, sets the stage for the initial
yet tentative steps toward ideological commitment; on
the other hand, failure to confront ideological demands
relegates the adolescent to a confused and ambiguous
state (Erikson, 1968).

The presence of formal thinking
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prepares the adolescent to attend to complex political
stimuli whereas the capacity to reflect on a personal
life history allows the adolescent to encounter a world
that is both complex and changing.
It is only with increasing maturity that the
adolescent becomes able to form generalized
concepts, to understand the role of history
and the impact of the present on the future,
to get some feeling for social change and the
possibility that man and social institutions
may alter and be altered, to weigh up the
wider costs and benefits of actions and
decisions, and to develop principles and
frameworks for judging particular events.
(Feather, 1980, p. 281).
The acquisition of formal thinking also makes
available to the adolescent a higher level of empathic
experience.

Hoffman (1980, 1984) has tied the

adolescent's greater empathic sophistication to the
ability to imagine the plight and suffering of wider
social groups such as the poor, the retarded, and the
oppressed.

He has stated that "empathic affect combined

with the perceived plight of an unfortunate group may be
the most advanced form of empathic distress" (1979, p.
963).

Clark (1980) has echoed Hoffman's assertion.

While criticizing the dearth of research on the topic of
empathy, he has stated that "the highest and probably
the least frequent form of empathy is that in which the
individual is compelled to embrace all human beings" (p.
189).

In a particularly forceful passage he goes on
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to state:
It is the level of empathy that when real and
functional cannot be used to justify the naked
use of power, tyranny, flagrant or subtle
injustices, cruelties, sustained terrorism,
killings, wars, and eventual extinction ... This
lack of simple expanded empathy is in the eyes
of this observer the basis of social tensions,
conflicts, violence, terrorism, and war (pp.
189-190).
During adolescence there develops what some
researchers (Adelson

&

O'Neil, 1966; Leahy, 1983) term

the sociocentric perspective.

This perspective entails

a widening understanding of social relationships.

Leahy

has noted that the emergence of an understanding of the
concept of "social class" for example arises from these
developmental changes.

Initially, the child defines

difference between "rich and poor" (social class) in
terms of "peripheral" characteristics (e.g., physical
characteristics, amount of wealth).

By adolescence,

these conceptions have become more sophisticated with
descriptions of psychological features as well as
sociocentric understandings (how social structures
influence individuals).

"Sociocentric concepts reflect

a more abstract decentering in that they indicate a
refocusing from individuals or groups to their
relationships within a social structure" (Leahy, 1983,
p. 97).
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Relatedly, the entrance of socio-cultural factors
in the adolescent's conception of social morality is
mediated to a large extent by cultural attitudes and
norms.

Individuals are socialized to believe that "they

can accomplish".

"The overwhelming majority of children

from all social strata are convinced that they
personally can succeed in a system where everyone cannot
succeed" (Hall & Jose, 1983).

Social psychological

explanations which help to explain such a cultural
belief include status attribution theory which argues
that in light of unknown characteristics of another,
those known characteristics become the basis for
inferring other qualities.

Thus, individuals of the

upper class who are financially successful (what is
known) are also expected to have high abilities in other
areas--personality attributes, successful in
relationships, etc.

Another candidate for this

socialized belief in personal success is the just world
theory (Lerner, 1975).

Thus, individuals who are in the

lower class "deserve" what they have whereas personal
efforts allows those more advantaged to "deserve" their
advantage.
At the same time, these culturally held beliefs
must compete with developmental changes that enable the
adolescent to move beyond commonly accepted cultural
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beliefs in their evaluations of social reality.

Damon

{1975) has shown that with age there is an increasingly
complex understanding of "positive justice" which is
concerned with the fair allocation of goods and
resources.

At its highest level, which is obtainable by

adolescence, one's view as to how goods and services are
to be allocated takes into account the special needs of
others as well as special circumstances which mitigate
right or wrong {e.g., a person's physical
limitations--blindness).

Relatedly, Lapsey and Quintana

{1985} have shown that the notion of retributive justice
bec~~~s more complex with age.

In this regard, they

note that by adolescence, applications of
punishment are no longer simply a "tit for tat"
phenomenon.

Rather, there exists an increasingly

sophisticated understanding of relationships and a
corresponding sensitivity for mitigating and
extenuating circumstances which influence one's
behavior.
All in

all, although cultural socialization is

powerful within the adolescent years, developmentally,
the adolescent is capable of recognizing complex social
phenomenon and

victims of social injustice.

When

combined with levels of empathy which allows a felt
distress for the disadvantaged, a situation is createo
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for the fostering of social morality.
The point made by both Clark and Hoffman is that
empathy has a specifically social dimension which leads
it to be inextricably tied to questions of social
injustice, political decision-making, and cultural
values--indeed, the same concerns which are central for
social morality.

This level of empathy is dependent

upon cognitive maturation and expresses itself in a
universal sensitivity towards society's disadvantaged.
Moreover, Hoffman (1980) has hypothesized that many
middle class and affluent adolescents often undergo a
sense of existential alienation as a result of their
advanced empathic experiences. Their growing awareness
of others' plight in contrast to their own advantaged
state creates a sense of "existential guilt'' and for
some adolescents it leads to distancing or disavowal
from their own cultural milieu.

In effect, tacit

beliefs and assumptions concerning society are called
into question through their empathic concern towards
those who are suffering.

Their empathic stirrings also

engender a personal perplexity as they must now
successfully negotiate their earlier socialization
experiences which prized the conventional values of a
competitive and success-oriented society with their
newly experienced feelings of care and concern for the
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socially oppressed.

For some, this entails the

beginning of rudimentary ideological formulations.

He

notes
that adolescents often search for moral
ideologies that foster a sense of identity.
Ideologies are the ''guardians of identity"
because they locate oneself in the world and
provide coherence to one's affective and
cognitive experiences.
If one succeeds in
finding or constructing an ideology fitting
one's empathic leanings, then one's new moral
viewpoint is an advancement over the simple
empathy-based moral norm of childhood because
it incorporates social realities previously
ignored.
In this way, one's ideology may
become an integral part of one's moral system
rather than an abstraction lacking moral
force. (Hoffman, 1984, p. 292}.
In a similar vein, to discuss the possibility of a
social morality is to bring to the forefront the
relationship of youth to the political system.

Easton

and Dennis (1965} have provided data analyses which
document children's attitudes toward government.

In

essence, the Easton and Dennis data uncover a gradual
shift of the child from a "political primitive'' who
views government in an almost magical way, dominated by
personable leaders, to a maturing understanding of
pluralism, complexity and the multi-functionalism of the
American political system.

Interestingly, the

researchers note that increasing comprehension of
governmental authorities leads to a diminution in
positive attachments towards governmental leaders.

Thus
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greater understanding of government diminishes an
uncritical infatuation with the components of government. In other research (Easton

&

Dennis, 1967) the

emergence of a sense of "political efficacy''

is noted

as early as the third grade. Although children do not
comprehend with any depth the realities of the political
system, it appears that an incipient conceptualization
of an individual's power to influence the political
process occurs in young children. Consequently, childhood socialization might well provide a preparatory
stage for the later internalization of norms and
feelings requisite for a sense of political efficacy.

It should be noted that the child does not actually
believe that he or she can influence the system, rather
he or she construes an image of citizen which prepares
the child to assume this adult role in later years.
The formation of political attitudes leads to
inquiry as to the source of this formation.

Not

surprisingly, evidence suggests that parents exercise
the dominant role in the child's development of a
political sense of self.

"Within the family the child

has his first experience with authority
relationships which he may generalize to larger
political systems.

Political loyalty, patriotism,

national heroes, and devils are all seen as developing
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early in life" (Langton, 1969, p. 22).

Parents provide

a reinforcing environment wherein positive ties towards
authority are promoted.

Likewise, if parents profess

political loyalties (partisanship or party affiliation)
then these loyalties are likely to be transmitted to
their children.

Further, with increasing education the

child is more able to differentiate correctly
ideological conflicts between political parties (Hess &
Terney, 1968; Lane & Sears, 1964).

All in all, there is

a growing constellation of childhood needs, parental
influences, and educational opportunities which shape
the child's political attitudes.

In sum, a predominant

view in socialization studies is the child's acceptance
of personable political leaders.

Only with time is the

child able to adopt a critical perspective of
government.

Further, this positive attachment to

government and its leaders holds across social class and
intellectual ability (IQ)

(Hess & Terney, 1968).

Two points can be drawn from such findings.

First

many researchers take a psychodynamic interpretation;
that is, they view the child as a helpless person who
gladly substitutes positive and uncritical acceptance of
authority figures for his or her own helplessness.
Second, it is assumed that all children adopt a positive
attachment toward government and its leaders.
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This latter point, the unanimity of social classes'
feelings towards governmental leaders, has not gone
without challenge.

For example, Connell (1971) speaks

of an intuitive political sense which children possess.
Based on in-depth interviews, Connell note that children
can sometimes develop a starkly honest and critical
sense of their government.
(1975).

This view is shared by Coles

The Harvard educator notes "the poor or those

who belong to the so-called working class always live
close to the law, close to the whims and fancies of
political authority" (p. 24).

Using an in-depth

interview format with lower class white and black
children, Coles documents a much more negative and
fearful view of government, even among children five and
six.

Recent research (Leahy, 1983) has documented the

child's ability to perceive gender, racial, and social
differences.

Thus it might be that germinal political

attitudes are framed from nascently formed perceptions
of inequality and social differences.
In the secondary school years, adolescents begin to
develop both a deepening understanding of political
realities and the capacity to think critically about
social phenomena.

In the early high school years, these

evaluations are elementary and simplistic.

Through the

later high school years and during the undergraduate
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years of college, however, adolescents are capable of
developing a rudimentary ideology and philosophy of life
that aids them as they evaluate political and social
institutions.

At the same time, the ideological

groundings for most adolescents are unstructured; that
is, the overwhelming number of adolescents display
thought patterns in which complex and hierarchically
ordered belief structures are lacking (Adelson, 1971,
1975; Gallatin, 1980).
The adolescent's disinclination to form an
ideologically structured belief system arises from
several factors.

Adolescents, like children, form

political thinking patterns which reflect adult beliefs;
therefore, because most adult Americans are
non-ideological in their political belief structures, it
stands to reason that adolescents, too, will reflect
weak ideological commitments
1976).

(Adelson, 1979; Conger,

Furthermore, the adolescent's awakening to

serious political issues is influenced by numerous
socializing factors which include parents, teachers,
peers, and the media (Jennings & Niemi, 1974).

It is

highly likely that these numerous influences offer at
times contradictory and opposing interpretations of
political realities which in turn lessen the
adolescent's attempt at forming political commitments.

237

Finally, the nature of political reality itself is often
complex and variable.

Adelson (1975) has captured the

essence of political events and their accompanying
ambiguity.

He notes when discussing political phenomena

we have gone from a one-on-one collision of
values to far more complicated issues; the
relation of variable means to variable ends;
the relation of uncertain means to uncertain
ends; the relation between short- and longterm ends; the relation between individualistic and
collective goods; the distinction between
particularistic and universalistic orientations;
the collision between values, and also the
collision between interests, and between interests
and values (p. 76).
Consequently, the adolescent must attempt to make
sense of a vast array of information and in the midst of
this complexity construct a personally meaningful value
system.

No doubt this venture is often frustrating and

for some adolescents leads to adoption of a
nonreflective ideological position (this could be
construed as an example of identity foreclosure) whereas
for other adolescents this confusion leads to the
abandonment of any attempt at political commitment.

It

is likely that most adolescents fall between these

extremes.

Unlike the privately encountered moral

choices which adolescents face concerning questions of
personal morals--should I lie?

Should I

steal?--questions relating morals and politics are
inherently complex and often lack moral clarity.
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Furthermore, the certitude and moral simplicity that so
often preoccupies the moral beliefs of children yields
to the confusion and questioning which characterizes the
political world of the adult.
The framing of morality in a prosocial context
offers the adolescent a respite from the moral confusion
emanating from political controversies.

Although

adolescents might evince uncertainty as to which of
several political choices are moral, their familiarity
and socialization to prosocial behaviors provides a
resourceful means for creating interest in and
commitment to socially important issues.
Adolescent Social Morality and a Morality of the Heart:
A Case Study
No research exists which explores the meaning of
Rest's ''fully developed morality" to the adolescent
experience.

Equally important, no literature exists

that discusses the model of Rest and the development of
a social morality.

This being the case, in this

section, we attempt an integration of the Morality of
the Heart, the adolescent, and social morality.

This

integration is made more difficult by the fact that
research studies which show prosociality and the
adolescent are wedded to personal and interpersonal
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concerns rather than "social'' factors and related
issues.
Although speculative in nature, in all likelihood
one can assume that the empathic distress which develops
with cognitive maturation not only forms the center of
the component one process but it is significant in
focusing the adolescent's attention on the disadvantaged
and unfortunate.

Moreover, empathic stirrings most

likely foster one of the first critical intrusions into
tacitly held conventional beliefs which, until
adolescence, allow for an acquiescent adoption of
societal beliefs.
An example illustrates this process.
year old junior in high school.

John is a 16

He has recently

finished reading a book (for a social studies course) on
race relations in the United States.

John comes from a

middle class background and is white.

He has had few

interactions with minorities.

The stark accounts in the

book he has read, however, have troubled him.

Although

he finds it difficult to articulate his feelings, John
experiences discomfort as he thinks about the treatment
of minorities in general and, in particular, the extent
of discrimination that exists in his own city.

Further,

these feelings are confirmed by what he has recently
read in newspapers and stories he has viewed on tele
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vision about white-black relations.
John's empathic concern suggests a salient
experience for the development of social morality.
There is some level of aroused affect (empathic
distress).

In turn, his emotional arousal is made

possible by his cognitive maturation--that is, John's
awareness that a problem exists.

Although he himself

has not been the victim of discrimination, he perceives
that others have.

This arousal highlights Hoffman's

assertion that empathy is experienced at the level at
which one cognizes the other (with the understanding
that the other can be not only an individual but a group
or wider body of people).
The question does arise as to "why'' John does feel
this empathic arousal whereas other peers might not.
One likely answer, is that John possesses a higher level
of empathy.

Instruments such as the IRI (Davis, 1980)

could substantiate this fact. Further, these empathic
expressions most likely are fostered from socialization
experiences, specifically parental practices (Hoffman,
1979).

Additionally, John attends outwardly to his

environment; thus cognitive egocentrism (Elkind, 1980)
does not preclude his awareness of other problems,
especially of wider social groups.

In all likelihood,
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John also evidences a life history that enables him to
empathize with others.

This includes a sustained

experiences of peer interactions and friendship
formations.

Noting Youniss (1980) studies in this

regard, the mutuality and reciprocal functions of rights
and duties could well form the basis for perceiving the
rights and duties of others in social contexts.
Friendships and meaningful peer interactions promote
mutuality and a more mature understanding of reciprocity
and equality.

Thus, as Berndt (1982) notes, evidence

suggests "that close and stable friendships can enhance
altruism and self-esteem" p. 1458).

The interaction

among adolescents in peer relationships might well be a
crucial determinant in obtaining adolescent concern for
disadvantaged groups.

Unless the adolescent can

understand and experience the reciprocal rights and
responsibilities inherent in personal relationships, and
the caring and empathic concerns requisite for personal
friendship,

then the focus on broader groups and people

might be unproductive.

In other words, it is arguable

that the seeds for a social morality exist in the
fertile soil established by already existent nurturing
personal relationships.

Further, the disappointments,

inequalities, and hurts sustained in these interpersonal
contexts provide the cognitive schema by which the
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plight and disappointments of larger social groups are
experienced.

Building on the work of Karinol (1982),

hurts experienced in personal relationships provide a
repository for experiencing the hurts and pains of
others experienced in wider social contexts.

That is,

the empathic distress engendered through exposure to
social injustices activates previous stored knowledge
which provides an interpretable context for the now
broader understanding of the other's

plight and one's

personal distress over the other's pain.
Moreover, experiencing personal hurt is likely to
foster an empathic bonding with those who are less
That is, as Staub

fortunate and who are suffering.

(1978) notes, "people frequently respond more
empathica11y to others 1 when they themselves have had
similar experiences.'' p. 138).

Even though John has not

been a victim of racial discrimination, he most likely
has experienced other forms of disappointment, perhaps
some of which are discriminatory.

He might have

personal characteristics which have made the
accomplishments of his own goals problematic (e.g., too
short for the basketball team, not perceived as having
talent for the school play).

Even disappointment in

personal relationships (experiences of betrayal, broken
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confidences) might provide the requisite psychological
experiences for ~mpathizing with a wider social group.
At the same time, the adolescent's experience of
personal disappointment and hurt must not be overly
burdensome.

If this is the case, then the emotional

vicissitudes of adolescence (Larson, Csikszentmihalyi
Graef, 1980; Steinberg

&

&

Silverberg, 1986) and personal

disappointments inherent in friendship formations
(Youniss, 1980)

foster defensive reactions and over

preoccupation with intrapsychic and interpersonal needs.
Indirect support is given this interpretation when, as
noted in Chapter III, needy individuals are less likely
to engage in prosocial responses.

In sum, there exists

the need for what might be termed a 2sychological
vulnerability in the adolescent.

On the one hand the

adolescent must have experienced personal disappointment
and hurt, most likely some of which is felt to be
unjust.

On the other hand, this hurt must not be of

such immensity that it induces a level of defensive
reactions which inhibit the ability of the adolescent to
perceive distress in others and center one's focus
solely on the self.
One other piece of evidence seems to offer support
to this assertion concerning psychological vulnerability
as it pertains to social morality.

Shelton (1985)
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confirmed Hoffman's (1981) assertion that empathic
distress inhibits prosociality.

He found that for both

a private morality as well as interpersonal morality,
empathic distress was unrelated to helping.
not the case for social morality.

This was

On the contrary,

distress was highly significantly related to prosocial
responding.
case.

It is unclear exactly why this would be the

It might be that if viewing someone in need of

help whether the person is unknown or known to the
observer is accompanied by emotional distress than
defensive reactions or an egoistic quality might enter
into one's decision to help.

That is, one's own

internal distress takes priority over the hurt of
another.

On the other hand, to envision or imagine

large groups of people suffering social injustice might
turn one 1 s inner turmoil into a cause or ideological
commitment that demands one's response.

In sum, the

inclination to respond prosocially in cases of social
morality appears to contradict the assertion that all
affective overarousal inhibits prosocial actions.

It

might be that Hoffman's theory of empathic distress
applies more to interpersonal situations whereas more
socially oriented concerns are influenced by a different
dynamic.

Thus an individual when exposed to a

distress-filled interpersonal situation might fail to
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respond to another's plight.

on the other hand, the

overwhelming distress one feels when reflecting on
social injustice might lead one to constructively

channel energies into efforts to eradicate such
situations.
To continue the discussion.
what he reads.

John is distressed by

Yet, his sensitivity to this moral

problem must include reference to Component II--the
understanding that "something must be done."

If John's

socialization experiences has taken place in the context

of a religious background, this "oughtness" can be
understood in terms of conscience (e.g., Nelson, 1973)
or a conversion experience (e.g., Conn, 1981).
Regardless, there is some prescriptive focus to John's
thinking.

There exists some internal standard (norm)

which provides an evaluative stance for what "ought to
be done."

Research evidence does support the notion of

internalized norms as predictors of prosocial behaviors.
A wide range of studies have demonstrated this
to be the case.
Individuals with highs scores
on paper-and-pencil or verbal measures of
social responsibility, other-oriented values,
or moral reasoning tasks, were more likely to
engage in prosocial behavior than those with
lower scores on the same tests. (Rushton,
1981, p. 262)
Rushton quotes 16 studies that show this to be the case
(for a list of some of these studies see Chapter II).
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We have also noted that the underlying psychic
mechanism that gives impetus to this value formation is
the ego ideal which, in its normal course of
development, fosters the growing adolescent-parent
separation.

Initially this separation transpires

through idealized friendships (Blos, 1962) but a
parallel process and eventually a more functional way
for this to occur is through the gradual adoption of a
coherent and meaningful system of beliefs and attitudes
which express what one "ought to be."
The standards and values formerly attributed
to the parents thereby become parts of a
guiding ego ideal, and the lost perfection of
the parental imagoes is transmuted into the
felt perfection of these now internal
standards and ideals.
(Wolf, Gedo, and Terman,
1972, p. 267)
This gradual development of a personal set of ideals
(values) fosters the "transformation" of the adolescent
self.

Even so, this increasingly personalized values

system is most likely more readily disposed to
evaluations in terms of personal and interpersonal moral
concerns (Should I lie? Should I steal?) than to
questions of social morality which include the necessity
to evaluate social phenomena as well as political and
social issues.

Some evidence for the difficulty of

responding in the context of a social morality is
provided by Torney-Purta (1983) which shows that
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questions of social and economic equality are perceived
less clearly by children and adolescents than questions
of political freedoms (e.g., free speech).
Although civil and political rights are
clearly perceived as essential in a just
society, situations where social or economic
justice is involved or where rights come into
conflict are considerably more problematic for
young people.
(p. 300)
Further, evidence seems to indicate that solutions to
political and social problems are arrived at with more
difficulty than the ability to recognize a problem.
11

There is little evidence that understanding of remedies

for inequality or injustice progresses in a parallel
fashion to (or as rapidly as) awareness of injustice or
inequality 11 (Torney-Purta, 1983, p. 308).
Although John appears sensitive to the plight of
those who suffer racial discrimination, he must
determine how he will respond now that he knows that his
own standards have been violated.
decide what he will now do.

In short, John must

At this point, John's

behavioral choices must confront the complexity of
social realities.

Is the injustice that John seeks to

respond to the result of complex social conditions?

He

might, for example, have various interpretations of the
reasons for racial discrimination which are conflictual
and lead him to a tentative response.

He might be

overwhelmed by the amount or the complexity of the

248

social problem or feel he does not have enough
information.

Further, as John formulates his own

philosophy of life which includes increasingly
well-thought ideas of society and a moral evaluation of
them (Damon, 1984; Erikson, 1968), there emerges the
potential for conflict with parental ideas and beliefs.
John might favor wholeheartedly the consequences of
actions consonant with a social morality in order to
distance himself from parental values and beliefs.
Thus, John might opt for some choices not so much
because he believes them, but because they psychically
establish his identity and ease separation struggles
with parents who perhaps think differently on such
issues.

On the other hand, some adolescents might

resist choosing behaviors consonant with a social
morality in order to assuage their own separation fears
from parents.

Some other adolescents might believe they

lack the ability to respond to issues important to
social morality.

Still others might be disinclined to

adopt a social morality because of reactance (Brehm,
1966).

Thus, in adolescence, where freedom to form

one's own beliefs and values is crucial, parental or
authority demands to adopt such positions can create
opposition to such views thereby making problematic the
development of a social morality.
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Finally, for some adolescents, parental support of
social morality might provide a fertile socialization
for the adolescent's adoption of this morality.
Ideally, the most developed understanding of social
morality includes not only behaviors which respond to
distressed others, but an increasingly sophisticated
value system which provides a coherent conceptual
framework in order that John's behaviors can mirror his
values.

Furthermore, the set of values which mirror

choices made is not rigidly held (Marcia, 1980) but
defined and flexible in order to accommodate new
experiences and challenges to currently held beliefs
(Raphael & Xelowski, 1980).
Finally, what fosters John's prosocial behavior to
the actual stage of execution of a prosocial act?

The

ability to carry out the prosocial act is considered to
be a function of John's maturity level.

This maturity

includes the ability to fulfill one's goals and carry
out one's desires.

Also, a sense of self-efficacy

regarding one's own behaviors.

In regards to performing

of prosocial acts, Staub (1978) notes "belief in one's
ability to influence events and bring about desired
outcomes seems important in leading people to initiate
action and actively pursue goals, except when the
required action is easy and straightforward" (p. 55).
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Future Research
This study offers a conceptual understanding from a
psychological vantage point of everyday morality.

The

advant~ge of this conceptual framework is that it
identifies discrete factors at a distinctive
developmental level which are essential components for
the adolescents prosocial response.
As such, this framework offers a variety of
research possibilities.

For one, there exists the

question as to whether the value oriented and
empathically based morality described herein is a better
predictor of prosociality than the
cognitive-developmental perspective set forth by
Kohlberg.

If Rest is correct that a morality must take

into consideration each of the four components in order
to be a "fully developed morality," then one research
strategy is a comparison of adolescents who score at
various levels of these four components with adolescents
who score at various levels on the DIT.

Dependent

measures in such a study could be either the paper and
pencil instruments (e.g., the VMS) or a set of
behavioral situations which measure the student's
prosocial response.
Other research might attempt to measure whether
indeed certain distinctive personality variables such as
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loneliness in adolescence inhibit prosociality.
Research could be conducted either cross sectionally or
longitudinally in order to ascertain differences in
prosociality between the beginning and end of the middle
adolescent period.
Other areas of research that might prove fruitful
include ascertaining the role of political efficacy and
political awareness.

For example, are these concepts

significantly related to social morality?

In other

words, does a high level of social morality necessitate
a level of political competence?

Further, are

adolescents who experience personal hurts in friendships
and peer relationships more likely than their peers to
be open to empathizing with the hurts and pains of wider
social groups (e.g., the poor, oppressed)?

In other

words, does there exist some linkage between the quality
of interpersonal functioning and a Widening moral
concern for social questions and issues (e.g., the
plight of the economically disadvantaged)?
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